January 18, 2017

Brexit Exposes Old and Deepening Data Divide between EU and UK

After the Brexit vote, politicians, businesses and citizens are all wondering what’s next. In general, legal uncertainty permeates Brexit, but in the world of bits and bytes, Brussels and London have in fact been on a collision course at least since the 90s. The new British prime minister, Theresa May, has been personally responsible for a deepening divide across the North Sea on data and communication policy. Although EU citizens will see stronger privacy and cybersecurity protections through EU law post-Brexit, multinational companies should be particularly worried about how future regulation will treat the loads of data they traffic about customers, employees, and deals between the EU and the UK.  [Read more…]

How is NSA breaking so much crypto?

There have been rumors for years that the NSA can decrypt a significant fraction of encrypted Internet traffic. In 2012, James Bamford published an article quoting anonymous former NSA officials stating that the agency had achieved a “computing breakthrough” that gave them “the ability to crack current public encryption.” The Snowden documents also hint at some extraordinary capabilities: they show that NSA has built extensive infrastructure to intercept and decrypt VPN traffic and suggest that the agency can decrypt at least some HTTPS and SSH connections on demand.

However, the documents do not explain how these breakthroughs work, and speculation about possible backdoors or broken algorithms has been rampant in the technical community. Yesterday at ACM CCS, one of the leading security research venues, we and twelve coauthors presented a paper that we think solves this technical mystery.

[Read more…]

How cookies can be used for global surveillance

Today we present an updated version of our paper [0] examining how the ubiquitous use of online tracking cookies can allow an adversary conducting network surveillance to target a user or surveil users en masse.  In the initial version of the study, summarized below, we examined the technical feasibility of the attack. Now we’ve made the attack model more complete and nuanced as well as analyzed the effectiveness of several browser privacy tools in preventing the attack. Finally, inspired by Jonathan Mayer and Ed Felten’s The Web is Flat study, we incorporate the geographic topology of the Internet into our measurements of simulated web traffic and our adversary model, providing a more realistic view of how effective this attack is in practice. [Read more…]