February 18, 2018

Archives for October 2010

NPR Gets it Wrong on the Rutgers Tragedy: Cyberbullying is Unique

On Saturday, NPR’s Weekend All Things Considered ran a story by Elizabeth Blair called “Public Humiliation: It’s Not The Web, It’s Us” [transcript]. The story purported to examine the phenomenon of internet-mediated public humiliation in the context of last weeks tragic suicide of Tyler Clementi, a Rutgers student who was secretly filmed having a sexual encounter in his dorm room. The video was redistributed online by his classmates who created it. The story is heartbreaking to many locals who have friends or family at Rutgers, especially to those of us in the technology policy community who are again reminded that so-called “cyberbullying” can be a life-or-death policy issue.

Thus, I was disappointed that the All Things Considered piece decided to view the issue through the lens of “public humiliation,” opening with a sampling of reality TV clips and the claim that they are significantly parallel to this past week’s tragedy. This is just not the case, for reasons that are widely known to people who study online bullying. Reality TV is about participants voluntarily choosing to expose themselves in an artificial environment, and cyberbullying is about victims being attacked against their will in the real world and in ways that reverberate even longer and more deeply than traditional bullying. If Elizabeth Blair or her editors had done the most basic survey of the literature or experts, this would have been clear.

The oddest choice of interviewees was Tavia Nyong’o, a professor of performance studies at New York University. I disagree with his claim that the TV show Glee has something significant to say about the topic, but more disturbing is his statement about what we should conclude from the event:

“[My students and I] were talking about the misleading perception, because there’s been so much advances in visibility, there’s no cost to coming out anymore. There’s a kind of equal opportunity for giving offense and for public hazing and for humiliating. We should all be able to deal with this now because we’re all equally comfortable in our own skins. Tragically, what Rutgers reveals is that we’re not all equally comfortable in our own skins.

I’m not sure if it’s as obvious to everyone else why this is absolutely backward, but I was shocked. What Rutgers reveals is, yet again, that new technologies can facilitate new and more creative ways of being cruel to each other. What Rutgers reveals is that although television may give us ways to examine the dynamics of privacy and humiliation, we have a zone of personal privacy that still matters deeply. What Rutgers tells us is that cyberbullying has introduced new dynamics into the way that young people develop their identities and deal with hateful antagonism. Nothing about Glee or reality TV tells us that we shouldn’t be horrified when someone secretly records and distributes video of our sexual encounters. I’m “comfortable in my own skin” but I would be mortified if my sexual exploits were broadcast online. Giving Nyong’o the benefit of the doubt, perhaps his quote was taken out of context, or perhaps he’s just coming from a culture at NYU that differs radically from the experience of somewhere like middle America, but I don’t see how Blair or her editors thought that this way of constructing the piece was justifiable.

The name of the All Things Considered piece was, “It’s Not The Web, It’s Us.” The reality is that it’s both. Humiliation and bullying would of course exist regardless of the technology, but new communications technologies change the balance. For instance, the Pew Internet & American Life Project has observed how digital technologies are uniquely invasive, persistent, and distributable. Pew has also pointed out (as have many other experts) that computer-mediated communications can often have the effect of disinhibition — making attackers comfortable with doing what they would otherwise never do in direct person-to-person contact. The solution may have more to do with us than the technology, but our solutions need to be informed by an understanding of how new technologies alter the dynamic.

General Counsel's Role in Shoring Up Authentication Practices Used in Secure Communications

Business conducted over the Internet has benefited hugely from web-based encryption. Retail sales, banking transactions, and secure enterprise applications have all flourished because of the end-to-end protection offered by encrypted Internet communications. An encrypted communication, however, is only as secure as the process used to authenticate the parties doing the communicating. The major Internet browsers all currently use the Certificate Authority Trust Model to verify the identity of websites on behalf of end-users. (The Model involves third parties known as certificate authorities or “CAs” issuing digital certificates to browswers and website operators that enable the end-user’s computer to cryptographically prove that the same CA that issued a certificate to the browser also issued a certificate to the website). The CA Trust Model has recently come under fire by the information security community because of technical and institutional defects. Steve Schultze and Ed Felten, in previous posts here, have outlined the Model’s shortcomings and examined potential fixes. The vulernabilities are a big deal because of the potential for man-in-the-middle wiretap exploits as well as imposter website scams.

One of the core problems with the CA Trust Model is that there are just too many CAs. Although organizations can configure their browser platforms to trust fewer CAs, the problem of how to isolate trustworthy (and untrustworthy) CAs remains. A good review of trustworthiness would start with examining the civil and criminal track record of CAs and their principals; identifying the geographic locations where CAs are resident; determining in which legal jurisdictions the CAs operate; determining which governmental actors may be able to coerce the CA to issue bogus certificates, behind-the-scenes, for the purpose of carrying out surveillance; analyzing the loss limitation and indemnity provisions found in each CA’s Certification Practice Statement or CPS; and nailing down which CAs engage in cross-certification. These are just a few considerations that need to be considered from the standpoint of an organization as an end-user. There is an entirely separate legal analysis that must be done from the standpoint of an organization as a website operator and purchaser of SSL certificates (which will be the subject of a future post).

The bottom line is that the tasks involved with evaluating CAs are not ones that IT departments, acting alone, have sufficient resources to perform. I recently posted on my law firm’s blog a short analysis regarding why it’s time for General Counsel to weigh in on the authentication practices associated with secure communications. The post resonated in the legal blogosphere and was featured in write-ups on Law.Com’s web-magazine “Corporate Counsel” and 3 Geeks and a Law Blog. The sentiment seems to be that this is an area ripe for remedial measures and that a collaborative approach is in order which leverages the resources and expertise of General Counsel. Could it be that the deployment of the CA Trust Model is about to get a long overdue shakeup?

Did a denial-of-service attack cause the flash crash? Probably not.

Last June I wrote about an analysis from Nanex.com claiming that a kind of spam called “quote stuffing” on the NYSE network may have caused the “flash crash” of shares on the New York Stock Exchange, May 6, 2010. I wrote that this claim was “interesting if true, and interesting anyway”.

It turns out that “A Single Sale Worth $4.1 Billion Led to the ‘Flash Crash’“, according to a report by the SEC and the CFTC.

The SEC’s report says that no, quote-stuffing did not cause the crash. The report says,

It has been hypothesized that these delays are due to a manipulative practice called “quote-stuffing” in which high volumes of quotes are purposely sent to exchanges in order to create data delays that would afford the firm sending these quotes a trading advantage.

Our investigation to date reveals that the largest and most erratic price moves observed on May 6 were caused by withdrawals of liquidity and the subsequent execution of trades at stub quotes. We have interviewed many of the participants who withdrew their liquidity, including those who were party to significant numbers of buys and sells that occurred at stub quote prices. …[E]ach market participant had many and varied reasons for its specific actions and decisions on May 6. … [T]he evidence does not support the hypothesis that delays in the CTS and CQS feeds triggered or otherwise caused the extreme volatility in security prices observed that day.

Nevertheless … the SEC staff will be working with the market centers in exploring their members’ trading practices to identify any unintentional or potentially abusive or manipulative conduct that may cause such system delays that inhibit the ability of market participants to engage in a fair and orderly process of price discovery.

Given this evidence, I guess we can simplify “interesting if true, and interesting anyway” to just “interesting anyway”.