April 19, 2024

The Last Mile Bottleneck and Net Neutrality

When thinking about the performance of any computer system or network, the first question to ask is “Where is the bottleneck?” As demand grows, one part of the system reaches its capacity first, and limits performance. That’s the bottleneck. If you want to improve performance, often the only real options are to use the bottleneck more efficiently or to increase the bottleneck’s capacity. Fiddling around with the rest of the system won’t make much difference.

For a typical home broadband user, the bottleneck for Internet access today is the “last mile” wire or fiber connecting their home to their Internet Service Provider’s (ISP’s) network. This is true today, and I’m going to assume from here on that it will continue to be true in the future. I should admit up front that this assumption could turn out to be wrong – but if it’s right, it has interesting implications for the network neutrality debate.

Two of the arguments against net neutrality regulation are that (a) ISPs need to manage their networks to optimize performance, and (b) ISPs need to monetize their networks in every way possible so they can get enough revenue to upgrade the last mile connections. Let’s consider how the last mile bottleneck affects each of these arguments.

The first argument says that customers can get better performance if ISPs (and not just customers) have more freedom to manage their networks. If the last mile is the bottleneck, then the most important management question is which packets get to use the last mile link. But this is something that each customer can feasibly manage. What the customer sends is, of course, under the customer’s control – and software on the customer’s computer or in the customer’s router can prioritize outgoing traffic in whatever way best serves that customer. Although it’s less obvious to nonexperts, the customer’s equipment can also control how the link is allocated among incoming data flows. (For network geeks: the customer’s equipment can control the TCP window size on connections that have incoming data.) And of course the customer knows better than the ISP which packets can best serve the customer’s needs.

Another way to look at this is that every customer has their own last mile link, and if that link is not shared then different customers’ links can be optimized separately. The kind of global optimization that only an ISP can do – and that might be required to ensure fairness among customers – just won’t matter much if the last mile is the bottleneck. No matter which way you look at it, there isn’t much ISPs can do to optimize performance, so we should be skeptical of ISPs’ claims that their network management will make a big difference for users. (All of this assumes, remember, that the last mile will continue to be the bottleneck.)

The second argument against net neutrality regulation is that ISPs need to be able to charge everybody fees for everything, so there is maximum incentive for ISPs to build their next-generation networks. If the last mile is the bottleneck, then building new last-mile infrastructure is one of the most important steps that can be taken to improve the Net, and so paying off the ISPs to build that infrastructure might seem like a good deal. Giving them monopoly rents could be good policy, if that’s what it takes to get a faster Net built – or so the argument goes.

It seems to me, though, that if we accept this last argument then we have decided that the residential ISP business is naturally not very competitive. (Otherwise competition will erode those monopoly rents.) And if the market is not going to be competitive, then our policy discussion will have to go beyond the simple “let the market decide” arguments that we hear from some quarters. Naturally noncompetitive communications markets have long posed difficult policy questions, and this one looks like no exception. We can only hope that we have learned from the regulatory mistakes of the past.

Lets hope that the residential ISP business turns out instead to be competitive. If technologies like WiMax or powerline networking turn out to be practical, this could happen. A competitive market is the best outcome for everybody, letting the government safely keeps its hands off the Internet, if it can.

Adobe Scares Microsoft with Antitrust Threat?

Microsoft has changed the next versions of Windows and Office after antitrust lawsuit threats from Adobe, according to Ina Fried’s article at news.com. Here’s a summary of Microsoft’s changes:

[Microsoft] is making two main changes. With Vista [the next version of Windows], it plans to give computer makers the option of dropping some support for XPS, Microsoft’s fixed-format document type that some have characterized as a PDF-killer. Under the changes, Microsoft will still use XPS under the hood to help the operating system print files. But computer makers won’t have to include the software that allows users to view XPS files or to save documents as XPS files.

[…]

On the Office side, Microsoft plans to take out of Office 2007 a feature that allows documents to be saved in either XPS or PDF formats. However, consumers will be able to go to Microsoft’s Web site and download a patch that will add those capabilities back in.

The obvious comparison here is to the Microsoft’s tactics in the browser market, which were the basis of the big antitrust suit brought by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1998. (I worked closely with the DOJ on that case. I testified twice as DOJ’s main technical expert witness, and I provided other advice to the DOJ before, during, and after the trial. I’m still bound by a confidentiality agreement, so I’ll stick to public information here.)

Critics of the DOJ case often misstate DOJ’s arguments. DOJ did not object to Microsoft making its Internet Explorer (IE) browser available to customers who wanted it. With respect to the bundling of IE, DOJ objected to (a) contracts forbidding PC makers and end users from removing IE, (b) technical measures (not justifiable for engineering reasons) to block end users from removing IE, and (c) technical measures (not justifiable) designed to frustrate users of alternative browsers. DOJ argued that Microsoft took these steps to maintain its monopoly power in the market for PC operating systems. The courts largely accepted these arguments.

Microsoft has reportedly made two changes at Adobe’s behest. The first change, allowing PC makers to remove Vista’s XPS printing feature, may be consistent with the DOJ/IE analogy. By hardwiring IE into Windows, Microsoft raised the cost to PC makers of offering an alternative browser. Depending on how the XPS feature was provided, this may have been the case with XPS printing too. There is at least a plausible argument that allowing PC makers to unbundle XPS printing would enhance competition.

What may differ from the DOJ/IE situation is the relationship between the OS market and the other product (browser or portable document) market. With browsers, there was a pretty convincing argument that by suppressing alternative browsers, Microsoft was helping to entrench its OS monopoly power, because of the likelihood that a rival browser would evolve into a platform for application development, thereby reducing lock-in in the OS market. It’s not clear whether there is an analogous argument for portable document formats – and if there’s not an argument that tying XPS to Windows hurts consumers somewhere else, then perhaps it’s okay to let Microsoft bundle XPS printing with Vista.

The other action by Microsoft, distributing XPS/PDF printing functionality separately from Office (via download only), isn’t so close to the arguments in the DOJ case. Recall that DOJ was willing to let Microsoft ship IE with Windows if the customer wanted it that way, as long as there was a way for customers (including PC makers) to get rid of IE if they didn’t want it, and as long as Microsoft didn’t try to interfere with customers’ ability to use competing browsers. The analogy here would be if Microsoft allowed PC makers and customers to disable the XPS/PDF functionality in office – for example, if they liked a competing print-to-PDF product better – and didn’t try to interfere with competing products.

The point of all this should not be to handcuff Microsoft, but to protect the ability of PC makers and end users to choose between Microsoft products and competing products.