Like other computer scientists who have studied Diebold voting machines, we were surprised at the apparent carelessness of Diebold's security design. It can be hard to convey this to nonexperts, because the examples are technical. To security practitioners, the use of a fixed, unchangeable encryption key and the blind acceptance of every software update offered on removable storage are rookie mistakes; but nonexperts have trouble appreciating this. Here is an example that anybody, expert or not, can appreciate:
The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine – the door that protects the memory card that stores the votes, and is the main barrier to the injection of a virus – can be opened with a standard key that is widely available on the Internet.
On Wednesday we did a live demo for our Princeton Computer Science colleagues of the vote-stealing software described in our paper and video. Afterward, Chris Tengi, a technical staff member, asked to look at the key that came with the voting machine. He noticed an alphanumeric code printed on the key, and remarked that he had a key at home with the same code on it. The next day he brought in his key and sure enough it opened the voting machine.
This seemed like a freakish coincidence – until we learned how common these keys are.
Chris's key was left over from a previous job, maybe fifteen years ago. He said the key had opened either a file cabinet or the access panel on an old VAX computer. A little research revealed that the exact same key is used widely in office furniture, electronic equipment, jukeboxes, and hotel minibars. It's a standard part, and like most standard parts it's easily purchased on the Internet. We bought several keys from an office furniture key shop – they open the voting machine too. We ordered another key on eBay from a jukebox supply shop. The keys can be purchased from many online merchants.
Using such a standard key doesn't provide much security, but it does allow Diebold to assert that their design uses a lock and key. Experts will recognize the same problem in Diebold's use of encryption – they can say they use encryption, but they use it in a way that neutralizes its security benefits.
The bad guys don't care whether you use encryption; they care whether they can read and modify your data. They don't care whether your door has a lock on it; they care whether they can get it open. The checkbox approach to security works in press releases, but it doesn't work in the field.
Update (Oct. 28): Several people have asked whether this entry is a joke. Unfortunately, it is not a joke.
Front page posts
Very nice work.
The office products website leads to a 404, by the way. Google cache still available, but they seem to have yanked the page.
This simultaneously brightened and darkened my morning. I'm trying to decide whether to laugh derisively or click my tongue derisively.
Thank you for finding a very good explanation for non-technical users as to why these machines are not secure.
[...] It has reached the point where hardly a day passes without some news about yet another huge security hole. Not in our air or sea ports, but in our voting machines. From Freedom To Tinker this morning comes the lovely news that you can buy a key to the Diebold voting machines on the Internet. And just in case you want to kick back after you’ve rigged yet another election. The key opens the mini-bar in your hotel room too. [...]
At least the minibar has a paper record of what you've taken out.
You are HONEST, aren't you?
[...] Here’s a link to the original post, but click through BoingBoing too, because that’s how I found it. [...]
So, is Diebold going to sue you for violating their digital rights management security?
What makes you think the "Bad Guys" didn't make and distribute the exact voting machine they wanted?
Maybe I sound like a conspiracy theory nutcase, but didn't the CEO of Diebold tell bush he would deliver Ohio?
Why else would you use such a simplistic locking mechanism? Why else keep votes on a plug-in USB card instead of a hard disk? Their engineers can't ALL be THAT stupid.
Sometimes the simplest explanation possible actually is that some people are evil and will conspire for personal gain--it's not always a theory.
[...] “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines. [...]
Or, if I had to give access to people, I would build a strong lock and give them the keys.
This is just a case of stupidity.
They can do whatever they want. It's pretty amazing the way any semblance of Democracy is faded out in our times.
Thing is, although this particular thing is so frickin' crazy, people were talking about these machines before the elections and nothing happened. People were talking about them before the recent primary elections, and still nothing happened...
All the talk about democrats taking over Congress is meaningless as long as these machines are allowed to determine election results.
[...] I should start a new category for this. We all know that the security of Diebold voting machines sucks, but this is a new low. The machines apparently can be opened with a hotel minibar key that can be ordered online. [...]
[...] Freedom to Tinker » Blog Archive » “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines Like other computer scientists who have studied Diebold voting machines, we were surprised at the apparent carelessness of Diebold’s security design. It can be hard to convey this to nonexperts, because the examples are technical. To security practitioners, the use of a fixed, unchangeable encryption key and the blind acceptance of every software update offered on removable storage are rookie mistakes; but nonexperts have trouble appreciating this. Here is an example that anybody, expert or not, can appreciate: [...]
[...] ‘Hotel Minibar’ Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines [...]
[...] News, Technology, Security, Vote, Interesting | no comments yet | permalink Written byPatrick Havens Freedom to Tinker » “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold VotingMachines Like other computer scientists who have studied Diebold voting machines, we were surprised at the apparent carelessness of Diebold’s security design. It can be hard to convey this to nonexperts, because the examples are technical. To security practitioners, the use of a fixed, unchangeable encryption key and the blind acceptance of every software update offered on removable storage are rookie mistakes; but nonexperts have trouble appreciating this. Here is an example that anybody, expert or not, can appreciate: [...]
[...] Last year, Kryptonite had a huge PR nightmare on their hands when an uploaded video to the internet demonstrated just how easily it was to pick a Kryptonite lock using nothing more then a standard BIC pen. Earlier this week, someone uploaded a Mythbuster’s episode of how you can beat a biometric fingerprint scan by licking a Xeroxed copy of a fingerprint and now it is being reported that Diebold’s infamous voting machines have a significant weakness in that that keys used to secure the machines can be unlocked using a standard minibar key. [...]
paper and pen
[quote]as long as these machines are allowed to determine election results.[/quote]
The only conspiracy theroy I belive is the "golden rule". They that have the gold make the rules and it doesnt matter if you have an R or D after your name. It doesn't matter who we vote for because our votes no longer mean anything.
So give the alphanumeric code already. What more perfect way is there to convince those still on the fence about this issue? Anyone looking to exploit the lapse will obviously already have that information.
So rigging elections is no longer limited to the upper echelons of the American Political Elite?
Thanks, Diebold, for democratizing this "interesting" aspect of elections! :-)
Gee, I wonder if Diebold's automatic teller machines use the same key ;-)
I doubt it. The banks probably won't put up with the same shenanigans that goverment will tolerate.
I guess Ross Anderson was right when he said this was a lemons market!
For product information send inquiries to productinfo@diebold.com
DIE-bold: Drunk with power
Bump keys and Diebold machines
Sorry, I unintentionally posted before I finshed.
As I was saying, bump keys and Dieobold machines are a marriage made in heaven.
Bump keys have been in the news recently as the skill-free way to open locks without knowing how to pick a lock. ( That sound you hear is Richard Feynman turning slowly in his grave.)
Even if Diebold uses different key serial numbers on their toy locks in different states, a bump key is the universal approach to opening them all. (One key to rule them all, one key to unbind them.)
Good f***ing stuff. I love this.
People will probably just steal a memory card, not votes, but that's cool. I'd love to hear them try to censor this news as a copyright\trade secret. lol...
This doesn't surprise me in the least but it sure does bother me a whole damn lot.
It's about time we put the Nevada Gaming Commission in charge of voting machines.
As a society we seem to do a much better job insuring our citizens get a fair game of video poker than a fair presidential election.
[...] http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1064 [...]
[...] We all already know that Diebold voting machines are at best absolute crap and at worst specifically designed to maximize ease of election fraud. Yet, it just keeps getting worse. On Wednesday we did a live demo for our Princeton Computer Science colleagues of the vote-stealing software described in our paper and video. Afterward, Chris Tengi, a technical staff member, asked to look at the key that came with the voting machine. He noticed an alphanumeric code printed on the key, and remarked that he had a key at home with the same code on it. The next day he brought in his key and sure enough it opened the voting machine. [...]
Does this remind anyone of a 2600 story about the east coast drop boxes of a major delivery service were installed unchanged from the factory. Comobination in the box every body gets opened all the drop boxes on the east coast.
At least they should have been a big enough company to get them
numbered differently than stock
No one is going to do anything about it. This is the end of what we have always called our Freedom. Freedom that never existed, just an illusion.
They will change the locks, they'll change the memory card. But what they won't change is who controlls it. It's over. Our Freedom, our rights, or way of life.
Soon the Internet will be controlled. Live with it, or without it. It will be controlled.
Our entire goverment is corrupt. Our entire country stinks of corruption.
and one other point voter fraud can now be slicker than even
Duval County's reputation for political corruption peaked with Lyndon B. Johnson'sqv election to the United States Senate in 1948. The famous Box 13, which gave Johnson his eighty-seven-vote victory, was actually in Jim Wells County, but the manipulation of the returns was almost certainly directed by Parr
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/DD/hcd11.html
How much of Vietnam would have happened if Johnson not been a major player
[...] read more | digg story Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: . [...]
[...] We all already know that Diebold voting machines are at best absolute crap and at worst specifically designed to maximize ease of election fraud. Yet, it just keeps getting worse. [...]
There's only one way to set this right. Not only do we need to get these machines decertified in every state of the Union that's purchased them (way to go California, for leading that charge), but then each and every machine needs to be returned to Diebold, and a full refund demanded. I urge everyone who cares about this issue to call and/or write their State's Secretary of State and Attorney General, and impress upon them the importance of doing this. For a fiasco such as this, the LEAST Diebold deserves is to be forced to give a full refund for each and every machine sold. And such a result will go a long way to making sure something like this never happens again. Go do it; call 'em now.
[...] Freedom to Tinker » Blog Archive » “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines: <snip> The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine — the door that protects the memory card that stores the votes, and is the main barrier to the injection of a virus — can be opened with a standard key that is widely available on the Internet. [...]
By comparison, Windows is ironclad...
If you didn't trust Diebold voting machines before — I didn't — this won't make you feel any better about them: The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine — the door that protects the memory card that......
So, ummm, when are you (collectively) going to rise up to the man? What more evidence is needed that you're (collectively) being played for patsies?
I miss the old America... you know, the sane one.
Wow, this is great news! You mean to say that election officials can use their Diebold Voting Machine keys to steal from minibars! Are these hotels stupid or what, don't they know anything about security? You'd have thought they'd know better than to buy minibars from Diebold!!!
(for people in the USA, this is called irony, and we Brits find it amusing)
[...] Source: Freedom to Tinker Posted by Michael Kolanos Filed in Vote Fraud [...]
[...] “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines [...]
I have to say, there are a couple of things about this story that surprise me. The first is that Christ Tengi recognize the alphanumeric code as matching one on a key he had used on a job 15 years ago to open a file cabinet or a VAX access panel! This would not have been a key that played an important or emotional role in his life, and he had presumably not used it for 15 years, yet on site he recognized that a new key had the same alphanumeric code. Rain Man himself would have trouble duplicating that feat of memory. Doesn't that strike anyone else as remarkable?
The second oddity is the apparent lack of distinction between a key and a key blank. I understand that these keys only have a modest degree of variation, but still, it's not literally true that they are all identical, is it? Not every key wlil open every lock that it can be crammed into? It sounds like you would need more information to open up a Diebold machine than just that it used a certain brand of lock. You'd need to know the code for the key used by that particular machine; not all keys fit all machines. Is that right?
Last, I don't suppose anyone here wants to even consider whether this failure of physical security might point to the possibility of similar failures in other aspects of the election process, including handling of paper. It's nicer to imagine that this failure is limited to Diebold and is a general manifestation of the company's evil nature and/or incompetence, than to conclude that the same tendency towards choosing economy over security might apply to other, even non-electronic, voting technologies.
[...] Freedom to Tinker » Blog Archive » “Hotel Minibar†Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine — the door that protects the memory card that stores the votes, and is the main barrier to the injection of a virus — can be opened with a standard key that is widely available on the Internet. [...]
[...] The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine – the door that protects the memory card that stores the votes, and is the main barrier to the injection of a virus – can be opened with a standard key that is widely available on the Internet…read more | digg story [...]
To the guy who thinks "bump keys" will open this lock:
Learn more about locks. Cheap wafer tumbler locks, like those used on mini-bars, equipment cabinets, and (apparently) voting machines are not susceptible to "bumping". Bumping only works on pin tumbler locks. Regular wafer locks, though, are incredibly easy to pick.
I have to say, there are a couple of things about this story that surprise me. The first is that Christ Tengi recognize the alphanumeric code as matching one on a key he had used on a job 15 years ago to open a file cabinet or a VAX access panel! This would not have been a key that played an important or emotional role in his life, and he had presumably not used it for 15 years, yet on site he recognized that a new key had the same alphanumeric code. Rain Man himself would have trouble duplicating that feat of memory. Doesn't that strike anyone else as remarkable?'s remarkable is the continuing display of your lack of reading comprehension skills.He still had the key. Perhaps a memento? I have such things.I know this will be difficult for you to parse, but bear with me here: People keep mementos (wholesale lingerie)because they inspire memories. Thus Tengi's recognition of the number is not "remarkable
See it all in action right here...
Lynching by Laptop Part 2
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=29166033447680735&q=Lynching+by+...
the original...
Lynching by Laptop
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=832266622252138740&q=Lynching+by...
Politics is the entertainment branch of industry. -Frank Zappa
Although I'm a big supporter of electronic voting _in theory_ the technology's current downhill slide continues to get more discouraging everyday. At this point, we might as well consider running one of those simple polls on a website. Perhaps www.blogthings.com could host our next Presidential Election? At least we'd have our choice of output formats and we can alway print out our responses as proof. And, although one could easily hack a website, I'd imagine actually getting to the servers blogthings is on would be a lot more difficult than getting into a "secure" electronic voting system like Diebold's.
Ugh...
[...] Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse … But sure to check this out from Freedom to Tinker. [...]