November 23, 2024

Archives for 2002

Wireless Tracking of Everything

Arnold Kling at The Bottom Line points to upcoming technologies that allow the attachment of tiny tags, which can be tracked wirelessly, to almost anything. He writes:

In my view, which owes much to David Brin, we should be encouraging the use of [these tags], while making sure that no single agency or elite has a monopoly on the ability to engage in tracking. Brin’s view is that tracking ability needs to be symmetric. We need to be able to keep track of politicians, government officials, and corporate executives. The danger is living in a society where one side can track but not be tracked.

Kling’s vision is of a world where nearly every object emits a kind of radio beacon identifying itself, and where these beacons are freely observable, allowing any person or device to take a census of the objects around it. It’s easy to see how this might be useful. Whether it is wise is another question entirely (which I’ll leave aside for now).

One thing is for sure: this vision is wildly implausible. Yes, tracking technology is practical, and may be inevitable. But tracking technology will evolve quickly to make Kling’s vision impossible.

First-generation tracking technolgy works by broadcasting a simple beacon, detectable by anyone, saying something like, “Device #67532712 is here.” If that were the end of the technological story, Kling might be right.

Like all technologies, tracking tags will evolve rapidly. Later generations won’t be so open. A tag might broadcast its identity in encrypted form, so that only authorized devices can track it. It might “lurk,” staying quiet until an authorized device sends it a wakeup signal. It might gossip with other tags across encrypted channels. Rather than being a passive identity tag, it will be an active agent, doing whatever it is programmed to do.

Once this happens, economics will determine what can be tracked by whom. It will be cheap and easy to put a tag into almost anything, but tracking the tag will be impossible without getting a cryptographic secret key that only the owner of the object, or the distributor of the beacon, can provide. And this key will be provided only if doing so is in the interest of the provider.

It’s interesting to contemplate what kinds of products and services will develop in such a world. The one thing that seems pretty certain is that it won’t be the simple, open world that Kling envisions.

Live On-Line Feed of Tomorrow's House "Piracy" Hearings

Tomorrow (Thu 26 Sept) at 9:00 AM (Eastern time), the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, will hold a hearing on “Piracy Of Intellectual Property On Peer-to-Peer Networks.” A live feed will be available during the hearing.

[link credit: Ray Ozzie]

Fritz's Hit List #3

Today on Fritz’s Hit List: the Philips digital baby monitor.

This product, which transmits audio in digital form from one part of a house to another, qualifies for regulation as a “digital media device” under the Hollings CBDTPA. If the CBDTPA passes, any newly manufactured digital baby monitors will have to incorporate government-approved copy protection technology.

Fight piracy – regulate baby monitors!

Finkelstein on Spam-Blocking vs. Censorware

Seth Finkelstein offers interesting comments on my previous post about the spam-blocking of Schneier’s CryptoGram.

I wrote

I’m amazed at the number of people who scoff at the feasibility of automated Web-porn filtering, while simultaneously putting their faith in automated spam filtering.

Seth replies (in part):

The distinction between keeping people from something they want to read, and forcing on people something they don’t want to read, makes the problems architecturally different.

He’s right, of course. This distinction would make it harder to distinguish spam from non-spam than to distinguish porn from non-porn, since the spammer has a stronger motivation to change his content in order to avoid being blocked. The porn publisher may be perfectly happy to be visited only by consenting adults, but the spammer wants to reach non-consenting readers too.

(Porn blocking faces the complementary problem: the end user is more motivated to bypass porn blocking than spam blocking.)

Seth also derides the use of magical thinking by pro-blocking people. He’s right on target again. The point I was trying to make in my original post is that too often, the same people who ridicule magical thinking about porn blocking, adopt nearly the same magical “reasoning” when the topic changes to spam blocking.

Schneier's CryptoGram Misclassified as Spam

Seth Schoen reports that Bruce Schneier’s CryptoGram email newsletter is misclassified as spam by SpamAssassin and Razor. Seth Finkelstein explains why SpamAssassin gets it wrong.

Schneier’s worst offense, according to SpamAssassin, is using the phrase “100% free”. Second worst: using the same all-caps word twice on the same line. (The offending word is “BES,” which is the name of an encryption algorithm.)

I’m amazed at the number of people who scoff at the feasibility of automated Web-porn filtering, while simultaneously putting their faith in automated spam filtering.