Various groups that oppose paperless electronic voting have recommended an alternative: if you really want to be sure your vote is counted, vote absentee. Having studied e-voting, and living in a county with paperless e-voting, I sympathize with the desire for an alternative. But it should be noted that absentee voting offers iffy security as well.
The best alternative to risky e-voting, where feasible, is in-person voting with a paper ballot. This allows the main election safeguard, which is the presence of observers from diverse political parties, to operate: the observers can watch the voter check-in process, watch the ballot boxes, and watch the counting of ballots.
With absentee voting, by contrast, the distribution, validation, custody, and counting of ballots are generally less transparent. You’re pretty much stuck trusting the country clerk and his/her staff. I don’t want to cast aspersions on the virtue of any particular county clerk; but I hope you’ll agree that a more transparent system is better.
Absentee balloting also weakens the secret-ballot guarantee, which requires that nobody can verify how another person voted. This is an important safeguard against vote-buying and intimidation, as it frustrates the vote-buyer’s or intimidator’s ability to know that he got his way. Absentee voting allows the voter to prove to somebody else (say an employer, union boss, or abusive spouse) that the vote was cast a particular way. That’s a serious drawback.
Now it may be that you don’t want to sell your vote, you don’t fear intimidation, and you trust your county clerk. For you, absentee voting might be the best available substitute for e-voting in person. But encouraging widespread absentee voting is not a good public policy response to the e-voting problem.