December 26, 2024

Archives for 2009

Thoughts on juries for intellectual property lawsuits

Here’s a thought that’s been stuck in my head for the past few days. It would never be practical, but it’s an interesting idea to ponder. David Robinson tells me I’m not the first one to have this idea, either, but anyway…

Consider what happens in intellectual property lawsuits, particularly concerning infringement of patents or misappropriation of trade secrets. Ultimately, a jury is being asked to rule on essential questions like whether a product meets all the limitations of a patent’s claims, or whether a given trade secret was already known to the public. How does the jury reach a verdict? They’re presented with evidence and with testimony from experts for the plaintiff and experts for the defendant. The jurors then have to sort out whose arguments they find most persuasive. (Of course, a juror who doesn’t follow the technical details could well favor an expert who they find more personable, or better able to handle the pressure of a hostile cross-examination.)

One key issue in many patent cases is the interpretation of particular words in the patent. If they’re interpreted narrowly, then the accused product doesn’t infringe, because it doesn’t have the specific required feature. Conversely, if the claims are interpreted broadly enough for the accused product to infringe the patent, then the prior art to the patent might also land within the broader scope of the claims, thus rendering the patent invalid as either anticipated by or rendered obvious by the prior art. Even though the court will construe the claims in its Markman ruling, there’s often still plenty of room for argument. How, then, does the jury sort out the breadth of the terms of a patent? Again, they watch dueling experts, dueling attorneys, and so forth, and then reach their own conclusions.

What’s missing from this game is a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (PHOSITA). One of the jobs of an expert is to interpret the claims of a patent from the perspective of a PHOSITA. Our hypothetical PHOSITA’s perspective is also essential to understanding how obvious a patent’s invention is relative to the prior art. The problem I want to discuss today is that in most cases, nobody on the jury is a PHOSITA or anywhere close. What would happen if they were?

With a hypothetically jury of PHOSITAs, they would be better equipped to read the patent themselves and directly answer questions that are presently left for experts to argue. Does this patent actually enable a PHOSITA to build the gadget (i.e., to “practice the invention”)? Would the patent in question be obvious given a description of the prior art at the time? Or, say in a trade secret case, is the accused secret something that’s actually well-known? With a PHOSITA jury, they could reason about these questions from their own perspective. Imagine, in a software-related case, being able to put source code in front of a jury and have them be able to read it independently. This idea effectively rethinks the concept of a jury of one’s peers. What if juries on technical cases were “peers” with the technology that’s on trial? It would completely change the game.

This idea would never fly for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, good luck finding enough people with the right skill sets and lacking any conflict of interest. Even if our court system had enough data on the citizenry to be able to identify suitable jury candidates (oh, the privacy concerns!), some courts’ jurisdictions simply don’t have enough citizens with the necessary skills and lack of conflicts. What would you do? Move the lawsuit to a different jurisdiction? How many parts of the country have a critical mass of engineers/scientists with the necessary skills? Furthermore, a lot of the wrangling in a lawsuit boils down to controlling what information is and is not presented to the jury. If the jury shows up with their own knowledge, they may reach their own conclusions based on that knowledge, and that’s something that many lawyers and courts would find undesirable because they couldn’t control it.

Related discussion shows up in a recent blog post by Julian Sanchez and a followup by Eric Rescorla. Sanchez’s thesis is that it’s much easier to make a scientific argument that sounds plausible, while being completely bogus, than it is to refute such a argument, because the refutation could well require building up an explanation of the relevant scientific background. He’s talking about climate change scientists vs. deniers or about biologists refuting “intelligent design” advocates, but the core of the argument is perfectly applicable here. A PHOSITA jury would have a better chance of seeing through bogus arguments and consequently they would be more likely to reach a sound verdict.

Fascinating New Blog: ComputationalLegalStudies.com

I was inspired to post the essay I discussed in the prior post by the debut of the best new law blog I have seen in a long time, Computational Legal Studies, featuring the work of Daniel Katz and Michael Bommarito, both graduate students in the University of Michigan’s political science department.

Every single blog they have posted has caused me to smack my head once for not having thought of the idea first, and a second time for not having their datasets and skillz. Their visualization of who has gotten TARP funds and how they’re connected to legislators deserves to be printed on posters and hung up in newsrooms across the country (not to mention in offices on Capitol Hill). They’ve also shown good taste by building a bridge to this blog, linking favorably back to the great CITP work led by David Robinson on government openness.

I will have more to say about Dan and Mike’s new blog in the weeks and months to come, but for now it is enough to welcome them to the blogosphere.

Computer Programming and the Law: A New Research Agenda

By my best estimate, at least twenty different law professors on the tenure track at American law schools once held a job as a professional computer programmer. I am proud to say that two of us work at my law school.

Most of these hyphenate lawprof-coders rarely write any code today, and this is a shame. There are many good reasons why the world would be a better place if we began to integrate computer programming into legal scholarship (and more generally, into law and policy).

Two years ago, I wrote a blog post for a lawprof blog exploring this idea. I promised a follow-up post, but never delivered. A year later, I expanded the idea into an essay, which the good people at the Villanova Law Review agreed to publish sometime later this year. With this post, I am releasing a slightly-outdated draft of the essay for the first time to the public. You can download it at SSRN.

In the abstract, I say:

This essay proposes a new interdisciplinary research agenda called Computer Programming and the Law. By harnessing the power of computer programming, legal scholars can develop better tools, data, and insights for advancing their research interests. This essay presents the case for this new research agenda, highlights some examples of those who have begun to blaze the trail, and includes code samples to demonstrate the power and potential of developing software for legal scholarship. The code samples in this essay can be run like a piece of software—thanks to a technique known as literate programming—making this the world’s first law review article that is also a working computer program.

If you have any interest in the intersection of technology and policy (in other words, if you read this blog), please read the essay and let me know what you think. Unlike many law review articles, this one is short. And how bad could it be? It contains 350 lines of perl! (Wait, don’t answer that!)

A "Social Networking Safety Act"

At the behest of the state Attorney General, legislation to make MySpace and Facebook safer for children is gaining momentum in the New Jersey State Legislature.

The proposed Social Networking Safety Act, heavily marked-up with floor amendments, is available here. An accompanying statement describes the Legislative purpose. Explanations of the floor amendments are available here.

This bill would deputize MySpace and Facebook to serve as a branch of law enforcement. It does so in a very subtle way.

On the surface, it appears to be a perfectly reasonable response to concerns about cyberbullies in general and to the Lori Drew case in particular. New Jersey was the first state in the nation to pass Megan’s Law, requiring information about registered sex offenders to be made available to the public, and state officials hope to play a similar, pioneering role in the fight against cyberbullying.

The proposed legislation creates a civil right of action for customers who are offended by what they read on MySpace or Facebook. It allows the social network provider to sue customers who post “sexually offensive” or “harassing” communications. Here’s the statutory language:

No person shall transmit a sexually offensive communication through a social networking website to a person located in New Jersey who the actor knows or should know is less than 13 years of age, or is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and at least four years younger than the actor. A person who transmits a sexually offensive communication in violation of this subsection shall be liable to the social networking website operator in a civil action for damages of $1,000, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, for each violation. A person who transmits a sexually offensive communication in violation of this subsection shall also be liable to the recipient of the communication in a civil action for damages in the amount of $5,000, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, or actual damages…

The bill requires social network providers to design their user interfaces with icons that will allow customers to report “sexually offensive” or “harassing” communications:

A social networking website operator shall not be deemed to be in violation … if the operator maintains a reporting mechanism available to the user that meets the following requirements: (1) the social networking website displays, in a conspicuous location, a readily identifiable icon or link that enables a user or third party to report to the social networking website operator a sexually offensive communication or harassing communication transmitted through the social networking website.

Moreover, the social network provider must investigate complaints, call the police when “appropriate” and banish offenders:

A social networking website operator shall not be deemed to be in violation … if … (2) the operator conducts a review, in the most expedient time possible without unreasonable delay, of any report by a user or visitor, including investigation and referral to law enforcement if appropriate, and provides users and visitors with the opportunity to determine the status of the operator’s review or investigation of any such report.

Finally, if the social network provider fails to take action, it can be sued for consumer fraud:

[I]t shall be an unlawful practice and a violation of P.L.1960, c.39 (C.56:8-1 et seq.) [the state Consumer Fraud Act] for a social networking website operator to fail to revoke, in the most expedient time possible without unreasonable delay, the website access of any user or visitor upon receipt of information that provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the visitor has violated [this statute]”

So what’s the problem? It’s not a criminal statute, and we do want to shut down sex offenders and cyberbullies. How could anyone object to this proposed measure?

First, the proposed law puts a special burden on one specific type of technology. It’s as if the newfangledness of social networking—and its allure for kids—have made it a special target for our fears about sex offenders and cyberbullies. No similar requirements are being placed on e-mail providers, wikis, blogs or the phone company.

Second, it deputizes private companies to do the job of law enforcement. Social network providers will have to evaluate complaints and decide when to call the police.

Third, it’s the thin edge of the wedge. If social network providers have to investigate and report criminal activity, they will be enlisted to do more. Today, sex offenders and cyberbullies. Tomorrow, drug deals, terrorist threats and pornography.

Fourth, this raises First Amendment concerns. Social network providers, if they are called upon to monitor and punish “offensive” and “harassing” speech, effectively become an arm of law enforcement. To avoid the risk of lawsuits under the Consumer Fraud Act, they will have an incentive to ban speech that is protected under the First Amendment.

Fifth, the definitions of “offensive” and “harassing” are vague. The bill invokes the “reasonable person” standard, which is okay for garden-variety negligence cases, but not for constitutional issues like freedom of speech. It’s not clear just what kinds of communication will expose customers to investigation or liability.

If the bill is enacted, MySpace and Facebook could mount a legal challenge in federal court. They could argue that Congress intended to occupy the field of internet communication, and thus pre-empt state law, when it adopted the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

The bill probably violates the Dormant Commerce Clause as well. It would affect interstate commerce by differentially regulating social networking websites. Social networking services outside New Jersey can simply ignore the requirements of state law. Federal courts have consistently struck down these sorts of laws, even when they are designed to protect children.

In my opinion, the proposed legislation projects our worst fears about stalkers and sex predators onto a particular technology—social networking. There are already laws that address harassment and obscenity, and internet service providers are already obliged to cooperate with law enforcement.

Studies suggest that for kids online, education is better than restriction. This is the conclusion of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force of State Attorneys General of the United States, Enhancing Child Safety and Online Technologies. According to another study funded by the MacArthur Foundation, social networking provides benefits, including opportunities for self-directed learning and independence.

Possible Opportunity for Outstanding Law Graduates

We are constantly looking for scholars of digital technology and public life to join us at the Center for Information Technology Policy. We’ll be making several appointments soon, and look forward to announcing them. Meanwhile, I wanted to highlight a possible opportunity for graduating law students who have a strong scholarly interest in cyberlaw (reflected in student notes or other publications) and who find themselves in a position to pursue a research project over the coming months.

A growing number of law firms are pushing back the start dates for graduating law students who they have hired as new associates. In some cases, the firms are offering stipends to pay for these new hires to do public interest or academic work in the months before their start dates.

If you happen to be in the overlap between these two groups—a cyber-inclined graduating law student, with support from your firm to do academic work in the coming months—then you should know that CITP may be a logical home for you.

This is part of our larger openness, in general, to externally supported research fellowships. Under the right circumstances, we can provide an intellectual home, complete with workspace and Princeton’s excellent scholarly infrastructure, for exceptional researchers who have a clear project in view and who have a continuing affiliation with their long-term employer (in this case, the law firm).

If you want to know more, feel free to contact me.