On Election Day, November 8, 2022, every voting machine in every polling place in Mercer County, New Jersey failed to work. Voters in each precinct filled in the ovals in their preprinted optical-scan paper ballots, but the voting machines couldn’t read them. So voters were instructed to put their ballots into “slot 3” of the […]
Is Internet Voting Secure? The Science and the Policy Battles
September 12, 2022 by
I will be presenting a similarly titled paper at the 2022 Symposium Contemporary Issues in Election Law run by the University of New Hampshire Law review, October 7th in Concord, NH. The paper will be published in the UNH Law Review in 2023 and is available now on SSRN. I have already serialized parts of […]
The anomaly of cheap complexity
August 3, 2022 by
Why are our computer systems so complex and so insecure? For years I’ve been trying to explain my understanding of this question. Here’s one explanation–which happens to be in the context of voting computers, but it’s a general phenomenon about all our computers: There are many layers between the application software that implements an electoral […]
Magical thinking about Ballot-Marking-Device contingency plans
July 21, 2022 by
The Center for Democracy and Technology recently published a report, “No Simple Answers: A Primer on Ballot Marking Device Security”, by William T. Adler. Overall, it’s well-informed, clearly presents the problems as of 2022, and it’s definitely worth reading. After explaining the issues and controversies, the report presents recommendations, most of which make a lot […]
Switzerland’s E-voting: The Threat Model
July 1, 2022 by
Part 5 of a 5-part series starting here Switzerland commissioned independent expert reviews of the E-voting system built by Swiss Post. One of those experts concluded, “as imperfect as the current system might be when judged against a nonexistent ideal, the current system generally appears to achieve its stated goals, under the corresponding assumptions […]
