Donna Wentworth offers a pithy summary of the commentary on Lessig’s DRM piece, over at Copyfight.
Lessig, DRM, and Palladium
As I noted yesterday, Lessig’s Red Herring piece on Palladium has generated a lot of interesting talk among techno-law-bloggers. (See e.g. Copyfight, Ernie the Attorney, Lessig, and Frank Field.)
This is all interesting, but it’s very speculative. As Bruce Schneier points out, in the best technical perspective on Palladium I’ve seen, we really know very little about how Palladium will actually work. When it comes to security, the devil is in the details; and we know only the barest outline of how Palladium will work.
Even if we did know the technical details of Palladium, it is far from obvious what effect it would have on the everyday practice of computing. My own view is that Palladium will make less difference than people expect. It won’t do much to prevent viruses and network attacks, since it doesn’t address the vulnerabilities that those attacks usually exploit.
More to the point, even if we assume that Palladium is totally bulletproof, I doubt that it will enable the kind of pervasive DRM that some people seem to want – at least, it won’t do so without making the PC essentially useless for ordinary computing tasks. (I plan to elaborate on this argument in a future posting.) A pervasive-DRM “computer” will be more like a CD player than like a computer.
Real computers are so useful that people will insist on having them, and the market will continue to provide them. Most likely it will provide them by pressuring software vendors into not using any draconian features of Palladium.
Lessig on Microsoft and DRM
Larry Lessig has a provocative piece in Red Herring on Microsoft’s plans regarding DRM and Palladium. Lessig says that Palladium is not as bad as some people say, and that Palladium may in fact benefit consumers (at least compared to the alternatives).
This piece has provoked some really interesting discussion over on Copyfight, Ernie the Attorney (read the comments on Ernie’s site too), and Lessig’s blog.
There is enough material here for a dozen postings. Unfortunately I don’t have time to write any of them today. Tune in tomorrow.
China Stops Blocking Google
AP reports that China is no longer blocking Google. (Ben Edelman’s site at Harvard confirms this.)
Reed: LaGrande Another 432?
David Reed has an interesting perspective on Intel’s LaGrande proposal.
Reed likens LaGrande to the Intel 432 processor. Few non-techies have heard of the 432, but in the processor-design community the 432 is a legendary failure. As Reed says, the 432 was “Intel’s attempt to create an ‘object oriented’ processor that would embed all the great ideas of object oriented computing in a revolutionary new architecture.”
The 432 died because it tried to build into hardware ideas that were still under development. Of all the parts of a computer system, the hardware is the most expensive to change, and the most difficult. It follows that you only want to put a particular function in hardware if you know that that function is necessary, and you know exactly how to do it. Because if you decide a year later that you want to do it differently, you’re out of luck. Hardware is much harder to change than software.
The Japanese “Fifth Generation” project from the 80’s is another example of a disaster caused by committing too early to a speculative design approach. Fifth Generation was going to reorganize the computing world around logic-based programming. This seemed like a good idea at first, but when it became evident that the right answer lay elsewhere, it was too late to reorient the project.
Reed has a good point, but I think he goes too far. The 432 and the Fifth Generation were both radical departures from existing practice; they wanted to tear up and redesign the whole processor. LaGrande seems much less ambitious. But Reed is right on target in saying that building security features into processor hardware is a risky engineering decision.