January 10, 2025

Wiley's Super-Worm

Brandon Wiley writes about the possibility of a “super-worm” that would use sophisticated methods to infect a large fraction of Internet hosts, and to maintain and evolve the infection over time. This is scary stuff. I have two comments to add.

First, the worst case is probably even worse than Wiley suggests. His paper may only scratch the surface of what a really sophisticated bad guy could do.

Second, Wiley’s paper points out the double-edged nature of basic security technology. The methods we use to protect ourselves against attacks – encryption, redundancy, decentralization, code patching – are the same methods that Wiley’s bad guy would use to protect himself against our counterattacks. To counterattack, we would need to understand the flaws in these methods, and to know how to attack them. If we ban or stigmatize discussion of these flaws, we put ourselves at risk.

Wishful Thinking

In recent debates about copyright and technology, pro-regulation people have started using an interesting rhetorical tactic. Rather than trying to rebut challenges to the workability of their proposed solutions, they talk instead about how intensely they want their proposals to be workable.

For example, my Fritz’s Hit List series points out a serious flaw in Sen. Hollings’ regulatory proposal. Here is the response from the Senator’s office (from the Oct. 21 New York Times):

Andy Davis, a spokesman for Mr. Hollings, said the technology-minded critics of the bill were “missing the thrust of the senator’s argument,” which is that there is need for more protection of copyright works if online content and broadband Internet access are to flourish.

I don’t doubt that Senator Hollings wants very badly for there to be a solution to this problem. But wishing for a solution is not the same thing as having one.

The same phenomenon is at work when pro-regulation people “debate” the regulation issue by repeating statistics about copyright infringement. By now, everybody knows that there is a serious problem with copyright compliance, and (almost) everybody wishes for a solution to that problem.

Again, saying that you want a solution doesn’t imply that a solution is possible. And it certainly doesn’t imply that the “solution” you are currently peddling is any good.

Fritz's Hit List #27

Today on Fritz’s Hit List: talking dog collars.

These devices allow you to record a brief audio clip on your dog’s collar, so that your dog can be returned to you if it wanders off. Since these devices record (possibly copyrighted) audio in digital form, they qualify for regulation as “digital media devices” under the Hollings CBDTPA. If the CBDTPA passes, any newly manufactured talking dog collars will have to incorporate government-approved copy restriction technology.

Fight piracy – regulate dog collars!

[Thanks to Sean Lytle for suggesting this item.]

Schoen vs. Stallman on "Trusted Computing"

Seth Schoen raises two interesting issues in his response to Richard Stallman’s essay on “trusted computing.” (To see Seth’s posting, click here and scroll down to the “Trusted computing” heading.)

Stallman says

[Trusted computing] is designed to stop your computer from functioning as a general-purpose computer.

Schoen responds:

Neither of these concerns is applicable at all to Palladium (as Microsoft has described it to us) or to TCPA (as the TCPA has specified it and as it has been implemented). While Microsoft could be misleading us about Palladium, the TCPA specification is public and implementations of it have already been made.

It’s possible that some other trusted computing system could have such a misfeature, but the design of TCPA and Palladium doesn’t require these properties at all, as far as I can tell, and they seem to be more or less independent.

Schoen is right here – Palladium and TCPA do not do what Stallman says it does. Stallman seems too eager to blame Microsoft for the sins of others.

The conversation then moves on to the connection between Palladium and the Hollings CBDTPA. The Hollings bill mandates that some kind of “trusted computing” restrictions be made mandatory in essentially all digital devices. But what kind of restrictions would be mandated?

Stallman implies strongly that the CBDTPA would mandate the use of Palladium. Schoen disagrees, saying that he is “not convinced that something like Palladium is the infrastructure contemplated by the CBDTPA.”

Here I don’t know who is right. The CBDTPA is cleverly constructed so that it doesn’t say what it is mandating – it leaves that to be decided later, either by the FCC or by a vaguely-specified industry consortium. This gives CBDTPA advocates a way to dodge hard questions about the bill’s effects, by invoking a hoped-for perfect technical solution that is just around the corner. Given the track record of copy restriction and its advocates, I think we should insist on taking a test drive before we buy this used car.

Fritz's Hit List #26

Today on Fritz’s Hit List: the ceremonial bugle.

This device, which is inserted into the horn of a military bugle and plays “Taps,” was developed by the U.S. military for use in military funerals for which no trained bugler is available. Because it plays “Taps” from a digital recording, this device qualifies for regulation as a “digital media device” under the Hollings CBDTPA. If the CBDTPA passes, any newly manufactured ceremonial bugles will have to incorporate government-approved copy restriction technology.

Fight piracy – regulate military bugles!

[Thanks to W. S. Higgins for suggesting this item.]