December 28, 2024

Copyright, Technology, and Access to the Law

James Grimmelmann has an interesting new essay, “Copyright, Technology, and Access to the Law,” on the challenges of ensuring that the public has effective knowledge of the laws. This might sound like an easy problem, but Grimmelmann combines history and explanation to show why it can be difficult. The law – which includes both legislators’ statutes and judges’ decisions – is large, complex, and ever-changing.

Suppose I gave you a big stack of paper containing all of the laws ever passed by Congress (and signed by the President). This wouldn’t be very useful, if what you wanted was to know whether some action you were contemplating would violate the law. How would you find the laws bearing on that action? And if you did find such a law, how would you determine whether it had been repealed or amended later, or how courts had interpreted it?

Making the law accessible in practice, and not just in theory, requires a lot of work. You need reliable summaries, topic-based indices, reverse-citation indices (to help you find later documents that might affect the meaning of earlier ones), and so on. In the old days of paper media, all of this had to be printed and distributed in large books, and updated editions had to be published regularly. How to make this happen was an interesting public policy problem.

The traditional answer has been copyright. Generally, the laws themselves (statutes and court opinions) are not copyrightable, but extra-value content such as summaries and indices can be copyrighted. The usual theory of copyright applies: give the creators of extra-value content some exclusive rights, and the profit motive will ensure that good content is created.

This has some similarity to our Princeton model for government transparency, which urges government to publish information in simple open formats, and leave it to private parties to organize and present the information to the public. Here government was creating the basic information (statutes and court opinions) and private parties were adding value. It wasn’t exactly our model, as government was not taking care to publish information in the form that best facilitated private re-use, but it was at least evidence for our assertion that, given data, private parties will step in and add value.

All of this changed with the advent of computers and the Internet, which made many of the previously difficult steps cheaper and easier. For example, it’s much easier to keep a website up to date than to deliver updates to the owners of paper books. Computers can easily construct citation indices, and a search engine provides much of the value of a printed index. Access to the laws can be cheaper and easier now.

What does this mean for public policy? First, we can expect more competition to deliver legal information to the public, thanks to the reduced barriers to entry. Second, as competition drives down prices we’ll see fewer entities that are solely in the business of providing access to laws; instead we’ll see more non-profits, along with businesses providing free access. More competition and lower prices will mean better and more effective access to the law for citizens. Third, copyright will still play a role by supporting the steps that remain costly, such as the writing of summaries.

Finally, it will matter more than ever exactly how government provides access to the raw information. If, as sometimes happens now, government provides the raw information in an awkward or difficult-to-use form, private actors must invest in converting it into a more usable form. These investments might not have mattered much in the past when the rest of the process was already expensive; but in the Internet age they can make a big difference. Given access to the right information in the right format, one person can produce a useful mashup or visualization tool with a few weeks of spare-time work. Government, by getting the details of data publication right, can enable a flood of private innovation, not to mention a better public debate.

Study Shows DMCA Takedowns Based on Inconclusive Evidence

A new study by Michael Piatek, Yoshi Kohno and Arvind Krishnamurthy at the University of Washington shows that copyright owners’ representatives sometimes send DMCA takedown notices where there is no infringement – and even to printers and other devices that don’t download any music or movies. The authors of the study received more than 400 spurious takedown notices.

Technical details are summarized in the study’s FAQ:

Downloading a file from BitTorrent is a two step process. First, a new user contacts a central coordinator [a “tracker” – Ed] that maintains a list of all other users currently downloading a file and obtains a list of other downloaders. Next, the new user contacts those peers, requesting file data and sharing it with others. Actual downloading and/or sharing of copyrighted material occurs only during the second step, but our experiments show that some monitoring techniques rely only on the reports of the central coordinator to determine whether or not a user is infringing. In these cases whether or not a peer is actually participating is not verified directly. In our paper, we describe techniques that exploit this lack of direct verification, allowing us to frame arbitrary Internet users.

The existence of erroneous takedowns is not news – anybody who has seen the current system operating knows that some notices are just wrong, for example referring to unused IP addresses. Somewhat more interesting is the result that it is pretty easy to “frame” somebody so they get takedown notices despite doing nothing wrong. Given this, it would be a mistake to infer a pattern of infringement based solely on the existence of takedown notices. More evidence should be required before imposing punishment.

Now it’s not entirely crazy to send some kind of soft “warning” to a user based on the kind of evidence described in the Washington paper. Most of the people who received such warnings would probably be infringers, and if it’s nothing more than a warning (“Hey, it looks like you might be infringing. Don’t infringe.”) it could be effective, especially if the recipients know that with a bit more work the copyright owner could gather stronger evidence. Such a system could make sense, as long as everybody understood that warnings were not evidence of infringement.

So are copyright owners overstepping the law when they send takedown notices based on inconclusive evidence? Only a lawyer can say for sure. I’ve read the statute and it’s not clear to me. Readers who have an informed opinion on this question are encouraged to speak up in the comments.

Whether or not copyright owners can send warnings based on inconclusive evidence, the notification letters they actually send imply that there is strong evidence of infringement. Here’s an excerpt from a letter sent to the University of Washington about one of the (non-infringing) study computers:

XXX, Inc. swears under penalty of perjury that YYY Corporation has authorized XXX to act as its non-exclusive agent for copyright infringement notification. XXX’s search of the protocol listed below has detected infringements of YYY’s copyright interests on your IP addresses as detailed in the attached report.

XXX has reasonable good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of in the attached report is not authorized by YYY, its agents, or the law. The information provided herein is accurate to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, this letter is an official notification to effect removal of the detected infringement listed in the attached report. The attached documentation specifies the exact location of the infringement.

The statement that the search “has detected infringements … on your IP addresses” is not accurate, and the later reference to “the detected infringement” also misleads. The letter contains details of the purported infringement, which once again give the false impression that the letter’s sender has verified that infringement was actually occurring:

Evidentiary Information:
Notice ID: xx-xxxxxxxx
Recent Infringement Timestamp: 5 May 2008 20:54:30 GMT
Infringed Work: Iron Man
Infringing FileName: Iron Man TS Kvcd(A Karmadrome Release)KVCD by DangerDee
Infringing FileSize: 834197878
Protocol: BitTorrent
Infringing URL: http://tmts.org.uk/xbtit/announce.php
Infringers IP Address: xx.xx.xxx.xxx
Infringer’s DNS Name: d-xx-xx-xxx-xxx.dhcp4.washington.edu
Infringer’s User Name:
Initial Infringement Timestamp: 4 May 2008 20:22:51 GMT

The obvious question at this point is why the copyright owners don’t do the extra work to verify that the target of the letter is actually transferring copyrighted content. There are several possibilities. Perhaps BitTorrent clients can recognize and shun the detector computers. Perhaps they don’t want to participate in an act of infringement by sending or receiving copyrighted material (which would be necessary to know that something on the targeted computer is willing to transfer it). Perhaps it simply serves their interests better to send lots of weak accusations, rather than fewer stronger ones. Whatever the reason, until copyright owners change their practices, DMCA notices should not be considered strong evidence of infringement.

DRM Not Dead, Just Temporarily Indisposed, Says RIAA Tech Head

The RIAA’s head technology guy says that the move away from DRM (anti-copying) technology by record labels is just a phase, according to a Greg Sandoval story at News.com:

“(Recently) I made a list of the 22 ways to sell music, and 20 of them still require DRM,” said David Hughes, who heads up the RIAA’s technology unit, during a panel discussion at the Digital Hollywood conference. “Any form of subscription service or limited play-per-view or advertising offer still requires DRM. So DRM is not dead.”

Last January, when Sony BMG became the last major recording company to sell DRM-free tracks at Amazon, plenty of observers considered the technology buried. Since then, a growing number of online stores have begun offering at least some open MP3s, including Walmart.com, Zune’s Marketplace, Amazon, as well as iTunes.

Not so fast, said Hughes, who predicted that DRM would reemerge in a big way. “I think there is going to be a shift,” he told the audience. “I think there will be a movement towards subscription services, and (that) will eventually mean the return of DRM.”

The imminent success of subscription services with DRM is more or less what the record industry was predicting several years ago. It didn’t happen, mostly because customers found the services clunky and inflexible – DRM at its worst. Nothing has changed to make DRMed subscription services more attractive. If anything, these services look even worse in light of the trend toward selling DRM-free tracks.

I can see the argument for selling large bundles of music rather than selling one track at a time. Bundling makes economic sense, given the huge storage capacity of today’s devices. The iPod of the future won’t be filled one track at a time.

But clunky DRM-based subscription services aren’t the only way to sell bundles of songs, and there are probably good ways to sell subscriptions without DRM. If you’re worried that a customer will subscribe for one month, download a zillion songs, cancel the subscription and keep the songs,then you can limit the number of downloads per month, or require a longer subscription period. If you can sell songs without DRM – and we know now that you can – there ought to be a way to sell a friendly subscription service too.

On this issue, the RIAA’s members may be ahead of the RIAA itself. There are encouraging signs that some of the major record companies are recognizing the need to rebuild their business strategy for the Internet era.

Voluntary Collective Licensing and Extortion

Reihan Salam has a new piece at Slate about voluntary collective licensing of music (which was also the topic of an online symposium organized by our center at Princeton). I’m generally a fan of Reihan’s work, but this time I think he got it wrong. His piece starts like this:

What would you do if a bully—let’s call him “Joey Giggles”—kept snatching your ice-cream cone? OK, now what if Joey Giggles then told you, “If you pay me five bucks a month, I’ll stop snatching your ice cream.” Depending on how much you hate getting beaten up, and how much you love ice-cream cones, you might decide that caving in is the way to go. This is what’s called a protection racket. It’s also potentially the new model for how we’ll buy and listen to music.

[…]

Now Big Music is mulling the Joey Giggles approach. Warner Music Group is trying to rally the rest of the industry behind a plan to charge Internet service providers $5 per customer per month, an amount that would be added to your Internet bill. In exchange, music lovers would get all the online tunes they want, meaning that anyone who spends more than $60 a year on music will come out way ahead. Download whatever you want and pay nothing! No more DRM! Swap files to your heart’s content—we promise, we won’t sue you (or snatch your ice-cream cone)!

This idea, that collective licenses amount to extortion – pay us or we’ll sue you – is often heard, but I don’t think it’s a valid criticism of collective licenses. The reason is pretty simple: if this is extortion, then all of copyright is extortion. The basic mechanism of copyright is that the creator of a work gets certain exclusive rights in the work. Exclusive rights means that there are certain things that nobody else can do with the work, without the creator’s permission. “Nobody else can do X” is another way of saying that if somebody else does X, the creator can sue them. When you buy a licensed copy of a work instead of downloading it illegally, what you’re buying is an enforceable promise that you won’t be sued (plus the knowledge that you’re playing by the rules, but that is intimately connected to the lawsuit protection). So the basic mechanism of copyright involves people paying a copyright owner for a promise not to sue them.

To put it another way, if you accept our current copyright system at all – even if you accept only a streamlined, improved version of it – then you’ve already accepted the kind of “extortion” that would be used to sell voluntary collective licenses. The only alternative is a complete redesign of the system, more complete even than a voluntary collective license.

Reihan does recommend a redesign. He endorses Terry Fisher’s suggestion of a government tax on broadband access, with the revenue used to pay musicians based on the popularity of their songs. This system has its benefits (though on balance I don’t think it’s good policy). But if you start out worried about strong-arm extraction of money from citizens, a mandatory tax scheme is an odd place to end up.

This is the fundamental problem of copyright policy in the digital age. It’s easy for people to get copyrighted works without paying. So either you forgo payment entirely, or you give somebody the mandate to collect payment. Who would you prefer: record companies or the government?

Online Symposium: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music

Today we’re kicking off an online symposium on voluntary collective licensing of music, over at the Center for InfoTech Policy site.

The symposium is motivated by recent movement in the music industry toward the possibility of licensing large music catalogs to consumers for a fixed monthly fee. For example, Warner Music, one of the major record companies, just hired Jim Griffin to explore such a system, in which Internet Service Providers would pay a per-user fee to record companies in exchange for allowing the ISPs’ customers to access music freely online. The industry had previously opposed collective licenses, making them politically non-viable, but the policy logjam may be about to break, making this a perfect time to discuss the pros and cons of various policy options.

It’s an issue that evokes strong feelings – just look at the comments on David’s recent post.

We have a strong group of panelists:

  • Matt Earp is a graduate student in the i-school at UC Berkeley, studying the design and implementation of voluntary collective licensing systems.
  • Ari Feldman is a Ph.D. candidate in computer science at Princeton, studying computer security and information policy.
  • Ed Felten is a Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton.
  • Jon Healey is an editorial writer at the Los Angeles Times and writes the paper’s Bit Player blog, which focuses on how technology is changing the entertainment industry’s business models.
  • Samantha Murphy is an independent singer/songwriter and Founder of SMtvMusic.com.
  • David Robinson is Associate Director of the Center for InfoTech Policy at Princeton.
  • Fred von Lohmann is a Senior Staff Attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, specializing in intellectual property matters.
  • Harlan Yu is a Ph.D. candidate in computer science at Princeton, working at the intersection of computer science and public policy.

Check it out!