October 30, 2024

Bill Gates: Is he an IP Maximalist, or an Open Access Advocate?

Maybe both. On July 20, the Wall Street Journal reported:

Frustrated that over two decades of research have failed to produce an AIDS vaccine, Microsoft Corp. Chairman Bill Gates is tying his foundation’s latest, biggest AIDS-vaccine grants to a radical concept: Those who get the money must first agree to share the results of their work in short order.

I can’t link to the full article because the Wall Street Journal – the only major American newspaper whose online operation is in the black – puts nearly all of its online content behind a paywall. But as it happens, there isn’t a great deal more to say on this topic because the Gates foundation has declined to specify the legal details of the sharing arrangement it will mandate.

Grant recipients and outside observers were unsure whether data-sharing requirements of the grants could pose potential legal or patent conflicts with Mr. Gates’s vow to respect intellectual property. Foundation officials said this week researchers would still be free to commercialize their discoveries, but they must develop access plans for people in the developing world.

The foundation declined to make its attorney available to address these concerns.

As David Bollier noted, the lack of detail from the Gates Foundation makes it difficult to know how the tradeoffs between sharing discoveries, on the one hand, and using IP to harness their value, on the other, will actually be made. But be that as it may, there seems to be a general question here about Mr. Gates’s views on intellectual property. As Mr. Bollier put it, it may appear that hell has frozen over: that Mr. Gates, whose business model depends on the IP regime he frequently and vigorously defends, is retreating from his support of extremely strong intellectual property rights.

But hell has (as usual) probably not frozen over. The appearance of an inherent conflict between support for strong intellectual property rights and support for open access is, in general, illusory. Why? Because the decision to be carefully selective in the exercise of one’s intellectual property rights is independent of the policy questions about exactly how far those rights should extend. If anything, the expansion of IP rights actually strengthens arguments for open access, creative commons licenses, and other approaches that carefully exercise a subset of the legally available rights.

If copyright, say, only extends to a specified handful of covered uses for the protected work, then an author or publisher may be well advised to reserve full control over all of those uses with an “all rights reserved” notice. But as the space of “reservable” rights, if you will, expands, the argument for reserving all of them necessarily weakens, since it depends on the case for reserving whichever right one happens to have the least reason to reserve.

And just as it is the case that stronger IP regimes strengthen the case for various forms of creative commons, open access and the like, the reverse is also true: The availability of these infrastructures and social norms for partial, selective “copyleft” strengthens the case for expansive IP regimes by reducing the frequency with which the inefficient reservations of rights made legally possible by such regimes will actually take place.

That, I think, may be Mr. Gates’s genius. By supporting open access (of some kind), he can show the way to a world in which stronger IP rights do not imply a horrifyingly inefficient “lockdown” of creativity and innovation.

More on Meta-Freedom

Tim Lee comments:

The fact that you can waive your free speech rights via contract doesn’t mean that it would be a good idea to enact special laws backing up those contracts with criminal penalties. I think you’re missing an important middle ground here. The choice isn’t between no tinkering rights and constitutionally mandated tinkering rights. There’s a third option: the the law should neither restrict nor guarantee tinkering rights. You’re welcome to tinker, but you’re also welcome to contract away your freedom to tinker.

The DMCA sticks its thumbs on the “no tinkering” side of the scale by giving DRM creators rights beyond those available to parties in ordinary contract disputes, and by roping third parties into the DRM “contract” whether they’ve agreed to it or not. If I sign a NDA, and then I break it, the company can sue me. But they can’t have me thrown in jail. And they can’t necessarily sue the journalist to whom I divulged the NDA’d information.

But repealing the DMCA would not create an inalienable right to tinker. It would simply put the freedom to tinker on the same plane as all our other rights: you’d have the right to sign them away by contract, but in the absence of a contract you would retain them.

He is right. There is an important middle ground possible that calls for DMCA repeal without calling for the contracts that restrict tinkering rights to be unenforceable. There is certainly a great deal to be said in favor of such a position. I would still say that the mixture-of-motives issue applies, because when people are allowed to sign away their tinkering rights, many of them will, and this outcome will be particularly unwelcome among power users and technology policy activists.

CleanFlicks Ruled an Infringer

Joe Gratz writes,

Judge Richard P. Matsch of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado [on] Wednesday filed this opinion granting partial summary judgment in favor of the movie studios, finding that CleanFlicks infringes copyright. This is not a terribly surprising result; CleanFlicks’ business involves selling edited DVD-Rs of Hollywood movies, buying and warehousing one authorized DVD of the movie for each edited copy it sells.

CleanFlicks edited the movies by bleeping out strong language, and removing or obscuring depictions of explicit sex and violence. (Tim Lee also has interesting commentary: 1 2 3.)

The opinion is relatively short, and worth reading if you’re interested in copyright. The judge ruled that CleanFlicks violated the studios’ exclusive rights to make copies of the movies, and to distribute copies to the public. He said that what CleanFlicks did was not fair use.

There are at least four interesting aspects to the opinion.

First, the judge utterly rejected CleanFlicks’s public policy argument. CleanFlicks had argued that public policy should favor allowing its business, because it enables people with different moral standards to watch movies, and it lets people compare the redacted and unredacted versions to decide whether the language, sex, and violence are really necessary to the films. The judge noted that Congress, in debating and passing the Family Movie Act, during the pendency of this lawsuit, had chosen to legalize redaction technologies that didn’t make a new DVD copy, but had not legalized those like CleanFlicks that did make a copy. He said, reasonably, that he did not want to overrule Congress on this policy issue. But he went farther, saying that this public policy argument is “inconsequential to copyright law” (page 7).

Second, the judge ruled that the redacted copies of the movies are not derivative works. His reasoning here strikes me as odd. He says first that the redaction is not a transformative use, because it removes material but doesn’t add anything. He then says that because the redacted version is not transformative, it is not a derivative work (page 11). If it is true in general that redaction does not create a derivative work, this has interesting consequences for commercial-skipping technologies – my understanding is that the main copyright-law objection to commercial-skipping is that it creates an unauthorized derivative work by redacting the commercials.

Third, the judge was unimpressed with CleanFlicks’s argument that it wasn’t reducing the studios’ profits, and was possibly even increasing them by bringing the movie to people who wouldn’t have bought it otherwise. (Recall that for every redacted copy it sold, CleanFlicks bought and warehoused one ordinary studio-issued DVD; so every CleanFlicks sale generated a sale for the studio.) The judge didn’t much engage this economic argument but instead stuck to a moral-rights view that CleanFlicks was injuring the artistic integrity of the films:

The argument [that CleanFlicks has no impact or a positive impact on studio revenues] has superficial appeal but it ignores the intrinsic value of the right to control the content of the copyrighted work which is the essence of the law of copyright.

(page 11)

Finally, the judge notes that the studios did not make a DMCA claim, even though CleanFlicks was circumventing the encryption on DVDs into order to enable its editing. (The studios say they could have brought such a claim but chose not to.) Why they chose not to is an interesting question. I think Tim Lee is probably right here: the studios were feeling defensive about the overbreadth of the DMCA, so they didn’t want to generate more conservative opponents of the DMCA by winning this case on DMCA grounds.

There also seems to have been no claim that CleanFlicks fostered infringement by releasing its copies as unencrypted DVDs, when the original studio DVDs had been encrypted with CSS (the standard, laughably weak DVD encryption scheme). The judge takes care to note that CleanFlicks and its co-parties all release their edited DVDs in unencrypted form, but his ruling doesn’t seem to rely on this fact. Presumably the studios chose not to make this argument either, perhaps for reasons similar to their DMCA non-claim.

In theory CleanFlicks can appeal this decision, but my guess is that they’ll run out of money and fold before any appeal can happen.

University-Purchased Music Services a Bust

When universities buy music service subscriptions for their students, few students use them, according to Nick Timiraos’s story in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal. Students tend to download music illegally, or buy it from iTunes instead.

In explaining the popularity of Napster and other file-sharing systems, commentators have often overemphasized the price factor and underestimated convenience. Here we see students given the option of a free subscription service, and passing it up to use another free (though illegal) system, or a for-pay system that is more convenient than the free one. (These systems are free to the students, in the sense that using them costs no more than not using them.)

This error was particularly common when the original Napster was new. Before Napster, many people knew how to distribute music conveniently online, but licensing and payment issues were holding up the development of useful online music services. Napster cut the Gordian knot by building the distribution infrastructure and skipping the licensing and payment part. For Napster users, payment was not optional – there was no way to pay, even if the user wanted to. Napster users were choosing convenience, as much as they were choosing not to pay.

Thanks to the record companies’ insistence on intrusive DRM, most of today’s authorized online music services suffer from incompatibility and user frustration. iTunes offers the least intrusive DRM, and unsurprisingly it is by far the most successful online music store. Music fans want music they can actually listen to.

(link via Doug Tygar)

Princeton-Microsoft IP Conference Liveblog

Today I’m at the Princeton-Microsoft Intellectual Property Conference. I’ll be blogging some of the panels as they occur. There are parallel sessions, and I’m on one panel, so I can’t cover everything.

The first panel is on “Organizing the Public Interest”. Panelists are Yochai Benkler, David Einhorn, Margaret Hedstrom, Larry Lessig, and Gigi Sohn. The moderator is Paul Starr.

Yochai Benker (Yale Law) speaks first. He has two themes: decentralization of creation, and emergence of a political movement around that creation. Possibility of altering the politics in three ways. First, the changing relationship between creators and users and growth in the number of creators changes how people relate to the rules. Second, we see existence proofs of the possible success of decentralized production: Linux, Skype, Flickr, Wikipedia. Third, a shift away from centralized, mass, broadcast media. He talks about political movements like free culture, Internet freedom, etc. He says these movements are coalescing and allying with each other and with other powers such as companies or nations. He is skeptical of the direct value of public reason/persuasion. He thinks instead that changing social practices will have a bigger impact in the long run.

David Einhorn (Counsel for the Jackson Laboratory, a research institution) speaks second. “I’m here to talk about mice.” Jackson Lab has lots of laboratory mice – the largest collection (community? inventory?) in the world. Fights developed around access to certain strains of mice. Gene sequences created in the lab are patentable, and research institutions are allowed to exploit those patents (even if the university was government-funded). This has led to some problems. There is an inherent tension between patent exploitation and other goals of universities (creation and open dissemination of knowledge). Lines of lab mice were patentable, and suddenly lawyers were involved whenever researchers used to get mice. It sounds to me like Jackson Lab is a kind of creative commons for mice. He tells stories about how patent negotiations have blocked some nonprofit research efforts.

Margaret Hedstrom (Univ. of Michigan) speaks third. She talks about the impact of IP law on libraries and archives, and how those communities have organized themselves. In the digital world, there has been a shift from buying copies of materials, to licensing materials – a shift from the default copyright rules to the rules that are in the license. This means, for instance, that libraries may not be able to lend out material, or may not be able to make archival copies. Some special provisions in the law apply to libraries and archives, but not to everybody who does archiving (e.g., the Internet Archive is in the gray area). The orphan works problem is a big deal for libraries and archives, and they are working to chip away at this and other narrow legal issues. They are also talking to academic authors, urging them to be more careful about which rights they assign to journals who publish their articles.

Larry Lessig (Stanford Law) speaks fourth. He starts by saying that most of his problems are caused by his allies, but his opponents are nicer and more predictable in some ways. Why? (1) Need to unite technologists and lawyers. (2) Need to unite libertarians and liberals. Regarding tech and law, the main conflict is about what constitutes success. He says technologists want 99.99% success, lawyers are happy with 60%. (I don’t think this is quite right.) He says that fair use and network neutrality are essentially the same issue, but they’re handled inconsistently. He dislikes the fair use system (though he likes fair use itself) because the cost and uncertainty of the system bias so strongly against use without permission, even when those uses ought to be fair – people don’t want to be right, they want to avoid having suits filed against them. Net neutrality, he says, is essentially the same problem as fair use, because it is about how to limit the ability of properties owners who have monopoly power (i.e., copyright owners or ISPs) to use their monopoly property rights against the public interest. The challenge is how to keep the coalition together while addressing these issues.

Gigi Sohn (PublicKnowledge) is the last speaker. Her topic is “what it’s like to be a public interest advocate on the ground.” PublicKnowledge plays a key role in doing thiis, as part of a larger coalition. She lists six strategies that are used in practice to change the debate: (1) day to day, face to face advocacy with policymakers; (2) coalition-building with other NGOs, such as Consumers Union, librarians, etc., and especially industry (different sectors on different issues); (3) message-building, both push and pull communications; (4) grassroots organizing; (5) litigation, on offense and defense (with a shout-out to EFF); (6) working with scholars to build a theoretical framework on these topics. How has it worked? “We’ve been very good at stopping bad things”: broadcast flag, analog hole, database protection laws, etc. She says they/we haven’t been so successful at making good things happen.

Time for Q&A. Tobias Robison (“Precision Blogger”) asks Gigi how to get the financial clout needed to continue the fight. Gigi says it’s not so expensive to play defense.

Sandy Thatcher (head of Penn State University Press) asks how to reconcile the legitimate needs of copyright owners with their advocacy for narrower copyright. He suggests that university presses need the DMCA to survive. (I want to talk to him about that later!) Gigi says, as usual, that PK is interested in balance, not in abolishing the core of copyright. Margaret Hedstrom says that university presses are in a tough spot, and we don’t need to have as many university presses as we have. Yochai argues that university presses shouldn’t act just like commercial presses – if university presses are just like commercial presses why should universities and scholars have any special loyalty to them?

Anne-Marie Slaughter (Dean of the Woodrow Wilson Schoel at Princeton) suggests that some people will be willing to take less money in exchange for the pyschic satisfaction of helping people by spreading knowledge. She suggests that this is a way of showing leadership. Larry Lessig answers by arguing that many people, especially those with smaller market share, can benefit financially from allowing more access. Margaret Hedstrom gives another example of scholarly books released permissively, leading to more sales.

Wes Cohen from Duke Uhiversity asserts that IP rulings (like Madey v. Duke, which vastly narrowed the experimental use exception in patent law) have had relatively litle impact on the day-to-day practice of scientific research. He asks David Einhorn whether his matches his experience. David E. says that bench scientists “are going to do what they have always done” and people are basically ignoring these rules, just hoping that one research organization will sue another and that damages will be small anyway. But, he says, the law intrudes when one organization has to get research materials from another. He argues that this is a bad thing, especially when (as in most biotech research) both organizations are funded by the same government agency. Bill [didn’t catch the last name], who runs tech transfer for the University of California, says that there have been problems getting access to stem cell lines.

The second panel is on the effect of patent law. Panelists are Kathy Strandburg, Susan Mann, Wesley Cohen, Stephen Burley, and Mario Biagioli. Moderator is Rochelle Dreyfuss.

First speaker is Susan Mann (Director of IP Policy, or something like that) at Microsoft. She talks about the relation between patent law and the structure of the software industry. She says people tend not to realize how the contours of patent law shape how companies develop and design products. She gives a chronology of when and why patent law came to be applied to software. She argues that patents are better suited than copyright and trade secret for certain purposes, because patents are public, are only protected if novel and nonobvious, apply to methods of computation, and are more amenable to use in standards. She advocates process-oriented reforms to raise patent quality.

Stephen Burley (biotech researcher and entrepreneur) speaks second. He tells some stories about “me-too drugs”. Example: one of the competitors of Viagra differs from the Viagra molecule by only one carbon atom. Because of the way the viagra patent is written, the competitor could make their drug without licensing the Viagra patent. You might think this is pure free-riding, but in fact even these small differences have medical significance – in this case the drugs have the same primary effect but different side-effects. He tells another story where a new medical test cannot be independently validated by researchers because they can’t get a patent license. Here the patent is being used to prevent would-be customers from finding out about the quality of a product. (To a computer security researcher, this story sounds familiar.) He argues that the relatively free use of tools and materials in research has been hugely valuable.

Third speaker is Mario Biagioli (Harvard historian). He says that academic scientists have always been interested in patenting inventions, going back to Galileo, the Royal Society, Pascal, Huygens, and others. Galileo tried to patent the telescope. Early patents were given, not necessarily to inventors, but often to expert foreigners to give them an incentive to move. You might give a glassmaking patent to a Venetian glassmaker to give him an incentive to set up business in your city. Little explanation of how the invention worked was required, as long as the device or process produced the desired result. Novelty was not required. To get a patent, you didn’t need to invent something, you only needed to be the first to practice it in that particular place. The idea of specification – the requirement to describe the invention to the public in order to get a patent – was emphasized more recently.

Fourth speaker is Kathy Strandburg (DePaul Law). She emphasizes the social structure of science, which fosters incentives to create that are not accounted for in patent law. She argues that scientific creation is an inherently social process, with its own kind of economy of jobs and prestige. This process is pretty successful and we should be careful not to mess it up. She argues, too, that patent law doctrine hasn’t accounted adequately for innovation by users, and the tendency of users to share their innovations freely. She talks about researchers as users. When researchers are designing and using tools, they acting as both scientists and users, so both of the factors mentioned so far will operate, to make the incentive bigger than the standard story would predict. All of this argues for a robust research use exemption – a common position that seems to be emerging from several speakers so far.

Fifth and final speaker is Wesley Cohen (Duke economist). He presents his research on the impact of patents on the development and use of biotech research tools. There has been lots of concern about patenting and overly strict licensing of research tools by universities. His group did empirical research on this topic, in the biotech realm. Here are the findings. (1) Few scientists actually check whether patents might apply to them, even when their institutions tell them to check. (2) When scientists were aware of a patent they needed to license, licenses were almost always available at no cost. (3) Only rarely do scientists change their research direction because of concern over others’ patents. (4) Though patents have little impact, the need to get research materials is a bigger impediment (scientists couldn’t get a required input 20% of the time), and leads more often to changes in research direction because of inability to get materials. (5) When scientists withheld materials from their peers, the most common reasons were (a) research business activity related to the material, and (b) competition between scientists. His bottom-line conclusion: “law on the books is not the same as law in action”.

Now for the Q&A. Several questions to Wes Cohen about the details of his study results. Yochai Benkler asks, in light of the apparent practical irrelevance of patents in biotech research, what would happen if the patent system started applying strongly to that research. Wes Cohen answers that this is not so likely to happen, because there is a norm of reciprocity now, and there will still be a need to maintain good relations between different groups and institutions. It seems to me that he isn’t arguing that Benkler’s hypothetical woudn’t be harmful, just that the hypo is unlikely to happen. (Guy in the row behind me just fell asleep. I think the session is pretty interesting…)

After lunch, we have a speech by Sergio Sa Leitao, Brazil’s Minister of Cultural Policies. He speaks in favor of cultural diversity – “a read-only culture is not right for Brazil” – and how to reconcile it with IP. His theme is the need to face up to reality and figure out how to cope with changes brought on by technology. He talks specifically about the music industry, saying that they lots precious time trying to maintain a business model that was no longer relevant. He gives some history of IP diplomacy relating to cultural diversity, and argues for continued attention to this issue in international negotiations about IP policy. He speaks in favor of a UNESCO convention on cultural diversity.

In the last session of the day, I’ll be attending a panel on compulsory licensing. I’ll be on the panel, actually, so I won’t be liveblogging.