November 21, 2024

White House Cybersecurity Plan: On Life Support?

The White House’s “National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” initially slated for release on Wednesday, has been delayed, the Washington Post reports. This comes on the heels of the removal of some of the report’s proposals, and a leak of the draft proposal.

It looks like the report will end up as an eloquent expression of good intentions, coupled with few if any effective action items. Once the decision was made that the report would be changed to make all of the stakeholders happy, this result became inevitable. There are just too many agendas in play to reach any kind of consensus on this issue.

This is not necessarily a bad thing. The government can improve the security of its own systems, but there is little it can do to make ordinary non-government computing more secure. Our main problem is that the market doesn’t reward vendors for investing the large amounts of time and money necessary to build highly secure systems. There isn’t much the government can do to change that.

ABC News Hires "Hackers" to Disrupt Police

ABC News reports on their own hiring of “hackers” to disrupt the Huntington Beach, CA police department. (Start reading at the “Testing the system” heading.)

They tried to trick an officer into leaving his post to investigate a false “emergency.” They tried to infect the Chief’s computer with a virus. (Fortunately, neither of these attacks ended up working; but it wasn’t for lack of trying.)

What was ABC News thinking? Trying to disrupt a working police department, which the citizens were relying upon to cope with any real emergencies that developed, was an amazingly irresponsible thing to do.

The article implies, but does not directly say, that the police department consented to this test, but was kept in the dark about which day it would occur. If so, then the police department needs their heads examined just as badly as ABC News does.

I’m all in favor of testing critical systems, but not by mounting surprise attacks on the systems that ordinary citizens’ lives depend upon.

[Link credit: disLEXia]

Serious Linux Worm

New.com reports on a new worm infecting Linux/Apache servers. (A “worm” is a malicious standalone program that propagates on its own, without requiring any human action.)

A new worm that attacks Linux Web servers has compromised more than 3,500 machines, creating a rogue peer-to-peer network that has been used to attack other computers with a flood of data, security experts said Saturday.

It was only a matter of time before this happened. Linux in particular, and open-source software in general, are not immune to malware such as worms and viruses. Linux has gotten a free pass for a while, because malware developers, like all software developers, tend to target their code for the most popular platforms. Now that Linux is so popular on servers, it becomes a more natural target for malware.

Of course, whoever did this is a criminal and deserves to be punished.

If there is a silver lining here, it is that this serves as a wake-up call for those who view the poor state of computer security as a “Microsoft problem” or a “closed-source problem.” All software is riddled with bugs, and all security-critical software is riddled with security-critical bugs. We just don’t know how to build large, complex programs without them. Rather than pointing the finger at others, who might or might not have a few more bugs than we do, we all need to figure out how to do radically better than any of us are doing today.

Rebecca Mercuri on the Florida Voting Fiasco

Rebecca Mercuri writes, in the RISKS Forum:

Well, Florida’s done it again.

Tuesday’s Florida primary election marked its first large-scale roll-out of tens of thousands of brand-new voting machines that were promised to resolve the problems of the 2000 Presidential election. Instead, from the very moment the polls were supposed to open, problems emerged throughout the state, especially in counties that had spent millions of dollars to purchase touchscreen electronic balloting devices.

Mercuri goes on to discuss the problems in detail. She is perhaps the leading independent expert on voting technology, and is well worth reading if you’re interested in that topic.

Voting poses a particularly difficult information security problem, because so much is at stake, and because the requirements are so difficult. (For example, the secret ballot is a particularly troublesome requirement.) My sense is that we are still far from having an all-electronic system that deserves our trust.

[Link credit: Dan Gillmor]

Reed: LaGrande Another 432?

David Reed has an interesting perspective on Intel’s LaGrande proposal.

Reed likens LaGrande to the Intel 432 processor. Few non-techies have heard of the 432, but in the processor-design community the 432 is a legendary failure. As Reed says, the 432 was “Intel’s attempt to create an ‘object oriented’ processor that would embed all the great ideas of object oriented computing in a revolutionary new architecture.”

The 432 died because it tried to build into hardware ideas that were still under development. Of all the parts of a computer system, the hardware is the most expensive to change, and the most difficult. It follows that you only want to put a particular function in hardware if you know that that function is necessary, and you know exactly how to do it. Because if you decide a year later that you want to do it differently, you’re out of luck. Hardware is much harder to change than software.

The Japanese “Fifth Generation” project from the 80’s is another example of a disaster caused by committing too early to a speculative design approach. Fifth Generation was going to reorganize the computing world around logic-based programming. This seemed like a good idea at first, but when it became evident that the right answer lay elsewhere, it was too late to reorient the project.

Reed has a good point, but I think he goes too far. The 432 and the Fifth Generation were both radical departures from existing practice; they wanted to tear up and redesign the whole processor. LaGrande seems much less ambitious. But Reed is right on target in saying that building security features into processor hardware is a risky engineering decision.