November 25, 2024

CleanFlicks Ruled an Infringer

Joe Gratz writes,

Judge Richard P. Matsch of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado [on] Wednesday filed this opinion granting partial summary judgment in favor of the movie studios, finding that CleanFlicks infringes copyright. This is not a terribly surprising result; CleanFlicks’ business involves selling edited DVD-Rs of Hollywood movies, buying and warehousing one authorized DVD of the movie for each edited copy it sells.

CleanFlicks edited the movies by bleeping out strong language, and removing or obscuring depictions of explicit sex and violence. (Tim Lee also has interesting commentary: 1 2 3.)

The opinion is relatively short, and worth reading if you’re interested in copyright. The judge ruled that CleanFlicks violated the studios’ exclusive rights to make copies of the movies, and to distribute copies to the public. He said that what CleanFlicks did was not fair use.

There are at least four interesting aspects to the opinion.

First, the judge utterly rejected CleanFlicks’s public policy argument. CleanFlicks had argued that public policy should favor allowing its business, because it enables people with different moral standards to watch movies, and it lets people compare the redacted and unredacted versions to decide whether the language, sex, and violence are really necessary to the films. The judge noted that Congress, in debating and passing the Family Movie Act, during the pendency of this lawsuit, had chosen to legalize redaction technologies that didn’t make a new DVD copy, but had not legalized those like CleanFlicks that did make a copy. He said, reasonably, that he did not want to overrule Congress on this policy issue. But he went farther, saying that this public policy argument is “inconsequential to copyright law” (page 7).

Second, the judge ruled that the redacted copies of the movies are not derivative works. His reasoning here strikes me as odd. He says first that the redaction is not a transformative use, because it removes material but doesn’t add anything. He then says that because the redacted version is not transformative, it is not a derivative work (page 11). If it is true in general that redaction does not create a derivative work, this has interesting consequences for commercial-skipping technologies – my understanding is that the main copyright-law objection to commercial-skipping is that it creates an unauthorized derivative work by redacting the commercials.

Third, the judge was unimpressed with CleanFlicks’s argument that it wasn’t reducing the studios’ profits, and was possibly even increasing them by bringing the movie to people who wouldn’t have bought it otherwise. (Recall that for every redacted copy it sold, CleanFlicks bought and warehoused one ordinary studio-issued DVD; so every CleanFlicks sale generated a sale for the studio.) The judge didn’t much engage this economic argument but instead stuck to a moral-rights view that CleanFlicks was injuring the artistic integrity of the films:

The argument [that CleanFlicks has no impact or a positive impact on studio revenues] has superficial appeal but it ignores the intrinsic value of the right to control the content of the copyrighted work which is the essence of the law of copyright.

(page 11)

Finally, the judge notes that the studios did not make a DMCA claim, even though CleanFlicks was circumventing the encryption on DVDs into order to enable its editing. (The studios say they could have brought such a claim but chose not to.) Why they chose not to is an interesting question. I think Tim Lee is probably right here: the studios were feeling defensive about the overbreadth of the DMCA, so they didn’t want to generate more conservative opponents of the DMCA by winning this case on DMCA grounds.

There also seems to have been no claim that CleanFlicks fostered infringement by releasing its copies as unencrypted DVDs, when the original studio DVDs had been encrypted with CSS (the standard, laughably weak DVD encryption scheme). The judge takes care to note that CleanFlicks and its co-parties all release their edited DVDs in unencrypted form, but his ruling doesn’t seem to rely on this fact. Presumably the studios chose not to make this argument either, perhaps for reasons similar to their DMCA non-claim.

In theory CleanFlicks can appeal this decision, but my guess is that they’ll run out of money and fold before any appeal can happen.

Does the Great Firewall Violate U.S. Law?

Clayton, Murdoch, and Watson have an interesting new paper describing technical mechanisms that the Great Firewall of China uses to block online access to content the Chinese government doesn’t like.

The Great Firewall works in two parts. One part inspects data packets that cross the border between China and the rest of the world, looking for “bad” content. The other part tries to shut down cross-border connections that have contained “bad” content. I’ll focus here on the shutdown part.

The shutdown part attacks the TCP protocol, which is used (among many other things) to transfer Web pages and email. TCP allows two computers on the Net to establish a virtual “connection” and then send data over that connection. The technical specification for TCP says that either of the two computers can send a so-called Reset packet, which informs the computer on the other end that some unspecified error has occurred so the connection should be shut down immediately.

The Great Firewall tries to sever TCP connections by forging Reset packets. Each endpoint machine is sent a series of Reset packets purporting to come from the other machine (but really coming from the Great Firewall). The endpoints usually respond by shutting down the connection. If they try to connect again, they’ll get more forged Reset packets, and so on.

This trick of forging Reset packets has been used by denial-of-service attackers in the past, and there are well-known defenses against it that have been built into popular networking software. However, these defenses generally don’t work against an attacker who can see legitimate traffic between the target machines, as the Great Firewall can.

What the Great Firewall is doing, really, is launching a targeted denial of service attack on both ends of the connection. If I visit a Chinese website and access certain content, the Great Firewall will send denial of service packets to a machine in China, which probably doesn’t violate Chinese law. But it will also send denial of service packets to my machine, here in the United States. Which would seem to implicate U.S. law.

The relevant U.S. statute is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030), which makes it an offense to “knowingly cause[] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause[] damage without authorization, to a protected computer”, as long as certain other conditions are met (about which more below). Unpacking this, and noting that any computer that can communicate with China will meet the definition of “protected computer”, the only part of this requirement that requires any discussion is “damage”. The statute defines “damage” as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information”, so that the unavailability to me of the information on the Chinese website I tried to visit would count as damage.

But the offense has another requirement, which is intended to ensure that it is serious enough to merit legal attention. The offense must also cause, or attempt to cause, one of the following types of harm:

(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;

(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;

(iii) physical injury to any person;

(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or

(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security;

This probably wouldn’t apply to an attack on my computer, but attacks on certain U.S. government entities would trigger part (v), and there is a decent argument that the aggregate effect of such attacks on U.S. persons could add up to more than $5000 in damage, which would trigger part (i). I don’t know whether this argument would succeed. And I’m not a lawyer, so I’m relying on real lawyers to correct me in the comments if I’m missing something here.

But even if the Great Firewall doesn’t violate U.S. law now, the law could be changed so that it did. A law banning the sending of forged packets to the U.S. with intent to deny availability of content lawful in the U.S., would put the Great Firewall on the wrong side of U.S. law. And it would do so without reaching across the border to regulate how the Chinese government interacts with its citizens. If we can’t stop the Chinese government from censoring their own citizens’ access to the Net, maybe we can stop them from launching denial of service attacks against us.

(link via Bruce Schneier)

Long-Tail Innovation

Recently I saw a great little talk by Cory Ondrejka on the long tail of innovation. (He followed up with a blog entry.)

For those not in the know, “long tail” is one of the current buzzphrases of tech punditry. The term was coined by Chris Anderson in a famous Wired article. The idea is that in markets for creative works, niche works account for a surprisingly large fraction of consumer demand. For example, Anderson writes that about one-fourth of Amazon’s book sales come from titles not among the 135,000 most popular. These books may sell in ones and twos, but there are so many of them that collectively they make up a big part of the market.

Traditional businesses generally did poorly at meeting this demand. A bricks-and-mortar book superstore stocks at most 135,000 titles, leaving at least one-fourth of the demand unmet. But online stores like Amazon can offer a much larger catalog, opening up the market to these long tail works.

Second Life, the virtual world run by Cory’s company, Linden Lab, lets users define the behavior of virtual items by writing software code in a special scripting language. Surprisingly many users do this, and the demand for scripted objects looks like a long tail distribution. If this is true for software innovation in general, Cory asked, what are the implications for business and for public policy?

The implications for public policy are interesting. Much of the innovation in the long tail is not motivated mainly by profit – the authors know that their work will not be popular. Policymakers should remember that not all valuable creativity is financially motivated.

But innovation can be deterred by imposing costs on it. The key issue is transaction costs. If you have to pay $200 to somebody before you can innovate, or if you have to involve lawyers, the innovation won’t happen. Or, just as likely, the innovation will happen anyway, and policymakers will wonder why so many people are ignoring the law. That’s what has happened with music remixes; and it could happen again for code.

Freeing the Xbox

When Microsoft shipped its Xbox game console, Linux programmers salivated. The Xbox was a pretty nice computer, priced at $149. The Xbox had all the hardware needed to run Linux and its applications. Problem was, Microsoft had tried to lock down the Xbox hardware to prevent unauthorized programs – such as the Linux kernel – from running on it. An article at xbox-linux.org explains how this lockdown plan failed. The technical details are quite interesting, but nontechies can learn from this story too.

Microsoft had two reasons for locking down the hardware. It wanted to stop people from running Xbox games that had been illegally copied. And it wanted to stop people from running other (noninfringing) software such as Linux. The latter goal is the more interesting one. Microsoft did this because it wanted to sell the Xbox hardware at a loss, and make up the difference by charging a premium for games. To do this, it needed to stop unauthorized software – otherwise people might buy the Xbox, install another operating system on it, and never buy an Xbox game.

A group of clever engineers, calling themselves the Xbox Linux Project, set out to discover how Microsoft had tried to lock down the Xbox hardware, and how they could overcome Microsoft’s lockdown and install Linux. We would expect them to succeed – in computer security, physical control of a device almost always can be leveraged to control the device’s behavior – and indeed they did. The bulk of the Xbox-Linux article describes the technical details of how Microsoft’s lockdown worked, how they reverse engineered it, and the tricks they discovered for capturing effective control of the Xbox and installing Linux on it.

Opponents of this kind of tinkering often argue that it is really just a front for copyright infringement – that the tinkerers really just want to run illegally copied games. But the article describes a group of people who just want to run Linux on their Xboxes, and are willing to take steps to stop their work being misappropriated by game copiers. For example, the article says that once they had figured out a trick, which the article calls a “hack”, for installing new software on the Xbox, they tried to use it responsibly:

But the Xbox Linux Project did not blindly release this hack. The first … proof of concept exploit had been finished in January 2003. After that, a lot of energy was invested in finding out a way to free the Xbox for homebrew development and Linux, but not allowing game copies. Microsoft was contacted, but without any success. They just ignored the problem.

Finally in July, the hack was released, with heavy obfuscation, and lockout code for non-Linux use. It was obvious that this would only slow down the “hacking of the hack”, so eventually, people would be able to use this vulnerability for copied games, but since Microsoft showed no interest in finding a solution, there was no other option than full disclosure. The suggestion of the Xbox Linux Project would have been to work together with Microsoft to silently close the security holes and, in return, work on a method to let homebrew and Linux run on the Xbox.

What should public policy have to say about this? Given that the Xbox Linux folks apparently weren’t trying to copy games but simply wanted to run noninfringing software on lawfully purchased hardware, and given that they took steps to hinder the use of their work for infringing purposes, it’s hard to object to their work on copyright grounds. The real action here is in Microsoft’s strategy of selling the Xbox hardware as a loss leader, and the tendency of the Xbox Linux work to frustrate this strategy. Xbox Linux creates value for its users. Should public policy be willing to destroy this value in order to enable Microsoft’s pricing strategy? My instinct is that it should not, though there is a plausible argument on the other side.

What is clear, though, is that this is not really a copyright issue. At bottom, it’s not about the right of Microsoft to be paid for the Xboxes it builds, or about the right of game authors to be paid for the copies of their games that users get. Instead, it’s about whether Microsoft can control how people use its products. In general, the law does not give the maker of a product the right to control its use. Why should the Xbox be any different?

Princeton-Microsoft IP Conference Liveblog

Today I’m at the Princeton-Microsoft Intellectual Property Conference. I’ll be blogging some of the panels as they occur. There are parallel sessions, and I’m on one panel, so I can’t cover everything.

The first panel is on “Organizing the Public Interest”. Panelists are Yochai Benkler, David Einhorn, Margaret Hedstrom, Larry Lessig, and Gigi Sohn. The moderator is Paul Starr.

Yochai Benker (Yale Law) speaks first. He has two themes: decentralization of creation, and emergence of a political movement around that creation. Possibility of altering the politics in three ways. First, the changing relationship between creators and users and growth in the number of creators changes how people relate to the rules. Second, we see existence proofs of the possible success of decentralized production: Linux, Skype, Flickr, Wikipedia. Third, a shift away from centralized, mass, broadcast media. He talks about political movements like free culture, Internet freedom, etc. He says these movements are coalescing and allying with each other and with other powers such as companies or nations. He is skeptical of the direct value of public reason/persuasion. He thinks instead that changing social practices will have a bigger impact in the long run.

David Einhorn (Counsel for the Jackson Laboratory, a research institution) speaks second. “I’m here to talk about mice.” Jackson Lab has lots of laboratory mice – the largest collection (community? inventory?) in the world. Fights developed around access to certain strains of mice. Gene sequences created in the lab are patentable, and research institutions are allowed to exploit those patents (even if the university was government-funded). This has led to some problems. There is an inherent tension between patent exploitation and other goals of universities (creation and open dissemination of knowledge). Lines of lab mice were patentable, and suddenly lawyers were involved whenever researchers used to get mice. It sounds to me like Jackson Lab is a kind of creative commons for mice. He tells stories about how patent negotiations have blocked some nonprofit research efforts.

Margaret Hedstrom (Univ. of Michigan) speaks third. She talks about the impact of IP law on libraries and archives, and how those communities have organized themselves. In the digital world, there has been a shift from buying copies of materials, to licensing materials – a shift from the default copyright rules to the rules that are in the license. This means, for instance, that libraries may not be able to lend out material, or may not be able to make archival copies. Some special provisions in the law apply to libraries and archives, but not to everybody who does archiving (e.g., the Internet Archive is in the gray area). The orphan works problem is a big deal for libraries and archives, and they are working to chip away at this and other narrow legal issues. They are also talking to academic authors, urging them to be more careful about which rights they assign to journals who publish their articles.

Larry Lessig (Stanford Law) speaks fourth. He starts by saying that most of his problems are caused by his allies, but his opponents are nicer and more predictable in some ways. Why? (1) Need to unite technologists and lawyers. (2) Need to unite libertarians and liberals. Regarding tech and law, the main conflict is about what constitutes success. He says technologists want 99.99% success, lawyers are happy with 60%. (I don’t think this is quite right.) He says that fair use and network neutrality are essentially the same issue, but they’re handled inconsistently. He dislikes the fair use system (though he likes fair use itself) because the cost and uncertainty of the system bias so strongly against use without permission, even when those uses ought to be fair – people don’t want to be right, they want to avoid having suits filed against them. Net neutrality, he says, is essentially the same problem as fair use, because it is about how to limit the ability of properties owners who have monopoly power (i.e., copyright owners or ISPs) to use their monopoly property rights against the public interest. The challenge is how to keep the coalition together while addressing these issues.

Gigi Sohn (PublicKnowledge) is the last speaker. Her topic is “what it’s like to be a public interest advocate on the ground.” PublicKnowledge plays a key role in doing thiis, as part of a larger coalition. She lists six strategies that are used in practice to change the debate: (1) day to day, face to face advocacy with policymakers; (2) coalition-building with other NGOs, such as Consumers Union, librarians, etc., and especially industry (different sectors on different issues); (3) message-building, both push and pull communications; (4) grassroots organizing; (5) litigation, on offense and defense (with a shout-out to EFF); (6) working with scholars to build a theoretical framework on these topics. How has it worked? “We’ve been very good at stopping bad things”: broadcast flag, analog hole, database protection laws, etc. She says they/we haven’t been so successful at making good things happen.

Time for Q&A. Tobias Robison (“Precision Blogger”) asks Gigi how to get the financial clout needed to continue the fight. Gigi says it’s not so expensive to play defense.

Sandy Thatcher (head of Penn State University Press) asks how to reconcile the legitimate needs of copyright owners with their advocacy for narrower copyright. He suggests that university presses need the DMCA to survive. (I want to talk to him about that later!) Gigi says, as usual, that PK is interested in balance, not in abolishing the core of copyright. Margaret Hedstrom says that university presses are in a tough spot, and we don’t need to have as many university presses as we have. Yochai argues that university presses shouldn’t act just like commercial presses – if university presses are just like commercial presses why should universities and scholars have any special loyalty to them?

Anne-Marie Slaughter (Dean of the Woodrow Wilson Schoel at Princeton) suggests that some people will be willing to take less money in exchange for the pyschic satisfaction of helping people by spreading knowledge. She suggests that this is a way of showing leadership. Larry Lessig answers by arguing that many people, especially those with smaller market share, can benefit financially from allowing more access. Margaret Hedstrom gives another example of scholarly books released permissively, leading to more sales.

Wes Cohen from Duke Uhiversity asserts that IP rulings (like Madey v. Duke, which vastly narrowed the experimental use exception in patent law) have had relatively litle impact on the day-to-day practice of scientific research. He asks David Einhorn whether his matches his experience. David E. says that bench scientists “are going to do what they have always done” and people are basically ignoring these rules, just hoping that one research organization will sue another and that damages will be small anyway. But, he says, the law intrudes when one organization has to get research materials from another. He argues that this is a bad thing, especially when (as in most biotech research) both organizations are funded by the same government agency. Bill [didn’t catch the last name], who runs tech transfer for the University of California, says that there have been problems getting access to stem cell lines.

The second panel is on the effect of patent law. Panelists are Kathy Strandburg, Susan Mann, Wesley Cohen, Stephen Burley, and Mario Biagioli. Moderator is Rochelle Dreyfuss.

First speaker is Susan Mann (Director of IP Policy, or something like that) at Microsoft. She talks about the relation between patent law and the structure of the software industry. She says people tend not to realize how the contours of patent law shape how companies develop and design products. She gives a chronology of when and why patent law came to be applied to software. She argues that patents are better suited than copyright and trade secret for certain purposes, because patents are public, are only protected if novel and nonobvious, apply to methods of computation, and are more amenable to use in standards. She advocates process-oriented reforms to raise patent quality.

Stephen Burley (biotech researcher and entrepreneur) speaks second. He tells some stories about “me-too drugs”. Example: one of the competitors of Viagra differs from the Viagra molecule by only one carbon atom. Because of the way the viagra patent is written, the competitor could make their drug without licensing the Viagra patent. You might think this is pure free-riding, but in fact even these small differences have medical significance – in this case the drugs have the same primary effect but different side-effects. He tells another story where a new medical test cannot be independently validated by researchers because they can’t get a patent license. Here the patent is being used to prevent would-be customers from finding out about the quality of a product. (To a computer security researcher, this story sounds familiar.) He argues that the relatively free use of tools and materials in research has been hugely valuable.

Third speaker is Mario Biagioli (Harvard historian). He says that academic scientists have always been interested in patenting inventions, going back to Galileo, the Royal Society, Pascal, Huygens, and others. Galileo tried to patent the telescope. Early patents were given, not necessarily to inventors, but often to expert foreigners to give them an incentive to move. You might give a glassmaking patent to a Venetian glassmaker to give him an incentive to set up business in your city. Little explanation of how the invention worked was required, as long as the device or process produced the desired result. Novelty was not required. To get a patent, you didn’t need to invent something, you only needed to be the first to practice it in that particular place. The idea of specification – the requirement to describe the invention to the public in order to get a patent – was emphasized more recently.

Fourth speaker is Kathy Strandburg (DePaul Law). She emphasizes the social structure of science, which fosters incentives to create that are not accounted for in patent law. She argues that scientific creation is an inherently social process, with its own kind of economy of jobs and prestige. This process is pretty successful and we should be careful not to mess it up. She argues, too, that patent law doctrine hasn’t accounted adequately for innovation by users, and the tendency of users to share their innovations freely. She talks about researchers as users. When researchers are designing and using tools, they acting as both scientists and users, so both of the factors mentioned so far will operate, to make the incentive bigger than the standard story would predict. All of this argues for a robust research use exemption – a common position that seems to be emerging from several speakers so far.

Fifth and final speaker is Wesley Cohen (Duke economist). He presents his research on the impact of patents on the development and use of biotech research tools. There has been lots of concern about patenting and overly strict licensing of research tools by universities. His group did empirical research on this topic, in the biotech realm. Here are the findings. (1) Few scientists actually check whether patents might apply to them, even when their institutions tell them to check. (2) When scientists were aware of a patent they needed to license, licenses were almost always available at no cost. (3) Only rarely do scientists change their research direction because of concern over others’ patents. (4) Though patents have little impact, the need to get research materials is a bigger impediment (scientists couldn’t get a required input 20% of the time), and leads more often to changes in research direction because of inability to get materials. (5) When scientists withheld materials from their peers, the most common reasons were (a) research business activity related to the material, and (b) competition between scientists. His bottom-line conclusion: “law on the books is not the same as law in action”.

Now for the Q&A. Several questions to Wes Cohen about the details of his study results. Yochai Benkler asks, in light of the apparent practical irrelevance of patents in biotech research, what would happen if the patent system started applying strongly to that research. Wes Cohen answers that this is not so likely to happen, because there is a norm of reciprocity now, and there will still be a need to maintain good relations between different groups and institutions. It seems to me that he isn’t arguing that Benkler’s hypothetical woudn’t be harmful, just that the hypo is unlikely to happen. (Guy in the row behind me just fell asleep. I think the session is pretty interesting…)

After lunch, we have a speech by Sergio Sa Leitao, Brazil’s Minister of Cultural Policies. He speaks in favor of cultural diversity – “a read-only culture is not right for Brazil” – and how to reconcile it with IP. His theme is the need to face up to reality and figure out how to cope with changes brought on by technology. He talks specifically about the music industry, saying that they lots precious time trying to maintain a business model that was no longer relevant. He gives some history of IP diplomacy relating to cultural diversity, and argues for continued attention to this issue in international negotiations about IP policy. He speaks in favor of a UNESCO convention on cultural diversity.

In the last session of the day, I’ll be attending a panel on compulsory licensing. I’ll be on the panel, actually, so I won’t be liveblogging.