December 22, 2024

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Archives for December 2002

Just Ask

December 4, 2002 by

Sasha Volokh tells an amusing story about asking record companies for permission to tape recorded music. Once they realized he was serious, the companies almost all gave him permission and thanked him for asking.

We should do more of this. When companies make silly overreaching claims about the extent of their copyrights, don’t just ignore them. Call them and ask for exceptions. Call WalMart and ask permission to tell your friends about their prices. (WalMart told FatWallet’s ISP that that’s infringement.) Call Turner Broadcasting and ask permission to fast-forward through the commercials in their shows. (Turner Broadcasting CEO Jamie Kellner told Cableworld that commercial skipping is illegal.) Call Adobe and ask permission to read their e-book of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to your kid. (One of Adobe’s licenses prohibited this.)

Don’t call these companies just to harrass them. But if you do want an exception to their stated rules, go ahead and call.

(If any of you do try calling, please let me know what happens.)

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You Are Where You Live

December 4, 2002 by

Ever wondered why you get so much junkmail that obviously isn’t designed for people like you? The website You Are Where You Live is an enlightening view into the world of marketing overgeneralization. Enter your ZIP code, and it will tell you which of about fifty demographic “clusters” you belong to, and what characterizes your cluster. It’ll even tell you about where you like to eat and what you read! I tried it out on myself and it was predictably wrong.

I am not where I live. Are you?

[link credit: Man Without Qualities]

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Why Unbreakable Codes Don't Make Unbreakable DRM

December 3, 2002 by

It’s commonly understood among independent security experts that DRM (i.e., copy prevention) technology is fundamentally insecure, at least based on today’s state of the art. Non-experts often misunderstand why this is true. They often ask, “When you say DRM is insecure, isn’t that just another way of saying that any code can be broken?” Actually, it’s not. Let me explain why.

First of all, unbreakable codes do exist. Claude Shannon proved (in the strict, mathematical sense of “proof”) in 1949 that a code called the “one time pad” cannot be broken by any method. One time pads reportedly are used on the Washington-Moscow “hot line”.

One time pads are rarely used in practice, because there are certain other codes that present other advantages and are nearly unbreakable. (By “nearly unbreakable” I mean that the odds of their being broken are so low that it is pointless to worry about that possibility.) These are the codes used in “secure” web transactions.

Yet unbreakable codes, whether theoretically impregnable or practically untouchable, do not imply that DRM is possible.

To understand why, imagine that you can build an impregnable armored truck. This truck can carry bags of money anywhere; and as long as you keep the doors closed nobody can rob the truck. The problem is that the truck is useless unless you open its doors. Suppose you want to carry the day’s sales from a WalMart store to the Bank. You have to open the doors at WalMart to put money in, and you have to open them again at the Bank to get the money out. Robbers can strike when you open the doors at WalMart or at the Bank.

The armored truck doesn’t solve your problem because it doesn’t provide end-to-end protection. The middle part of the money’s journey from customer to bank account is protected, but the first part and the last part of the journey happen outside the truck, and the money is vulnerable there.

The same is true for encryption-based DRM. End-to-end protection requires that the material be protected all the way from the performer, to the customer’s eyes and ears. If you leave the content unprotected anywhere along that path, it’s vulnerable. And encryption can’t protect the entire path, in the same way that the armored truck can’t protect the money’s entire path. You can’t seal the content inside its envelope of encryption until after it has been recorded, and you have to unseal it before you can play it for the customer.

The lack of end-to-end protection is especially serious for DRM systems, where one of the endpoints is under the control of the customer – who is the presumed adversary. It’s as if, in the armored-truck scenario, a criminal had control over the bank. If you have to open the truck’s doors at the bank, and the bank is controlled by a bad guy, then you’re sunk. It doesn’t matter how strong your armored truck is.

This is the predicament that DRM faces. The content needs to be unwrapped at the endpoint, and the system doesn’t control the endpoint. The content is vulnerable, regardless of how strong your codes are.

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Software and Export Control

December 2, 2002 by

Today’s New York Times, in an article by John Schwartz, reports on the availability of export-controlled software outside the U.S. Certain software that has defense applications is not allowed to be shipped to “pariah countries” such as North Korea and Iraq. Unauthorized copies of such software are available for sale in China, and presumably the Chinese sellers would be willing to ship them anywhere.

The article works hard to conflate export violations with copyright infringement, even using the word “piracy” in the title, and claiming that “Digital piracy … has moved into more dangerous territory” as “[a] black market has emerged for scientific and engineering software powerful enough to fall under United States export restrictions.”

The implication is that the Internet is a big part of the problem. And yet a careful reading of the article reveals no evidence that the illicit copies of the software left the U.S. via the Internet (as opposed to being mailed or hand-carried). Certainly the black market in export-controlled software was flourishing long before the Internet became popular.

The real problem is the illusion that a software package can be sold widely, even to customers outside the U.S., without its becoming available to a motivated adversary who wants it. Even if it were somehow made impossible to copy export-controlled software packages, our adversaries would still be able to buy or steal authorized copies.

This is obvious to people who have experience in the export-control wars. Stewart Baker, who was General Counsel at the National Security Agency during the crypto export control debates, points out the folly of the current approach:

To his mind, Mr. Baker said, [these] problems are part of a broader trend of mistakenly looking at national security issues as problems for law enforcement. “O.K., you can’t prosecute ’em,” he said. “Well, duh.”

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