Dan Simon notes a scary NYT op-ed, “Terrorism and the Biology Lab,” by Henry C. Kelly. Kelly argues convincingly that ordinary molecular biology students will soon be able to make evil bio-weapons. Simon points out the analogy to computer viruses, which are easily made and easily released. If serious bio-weapons become as common as computer viruses, we are indeed in deep trouble.
Eric Rescorla responds by noting that the computer viruses we actually see do relatively little damage, at least compared to what they might have done. Really malicious viruses, that is, ones engineered to do maximum damage, are rare. What we see instead are viruses designed to get attention and to show that the author could have done damage. The most likely explanation is that the authors of well-known viruses have written them as a sort of (twisted) intellectual exercise rather than out of spite. [By the way, don’t miss the comments on Eric’s post.]
This reminds me of a series of conversations I had a few years ago with a hotshot mo-bio professor, about the national-security implications of bio-attacks versus cyber-attacks. I started out convinced that the cyber-attack threat, while real, was overstated; but bio-attacks terrified me. He had the converse view, that bio-attacks were possible but overhyped, while cyber-attacks were the real nightmare scenario. Each of us tried to reassure the other that really large-scale malicious attacks of the type we knew best (cyber- for me, bio- for him) were harder to carry out, and less likely, than commonly believed.
It seems to me that both of us, having spent many days in the lab, understood how hard it really is to make a novel, sophisticated technology work as planned. Since nightmare attacks are, by definition, novel and sophisticated and thus not fully testable in advance, the odds are pretty high that something would go “wrong” for the attacker. With a better understanding of how software can go wrong, I fully appreciated the cyber-attacker’s problem; and with a better understanding of how bio-experiments can go wrong, my colleague fully appreciated the bio-attacker’s problem. If there is any reassurance here, it is in the likelihood that any would-be attacker will miss some detail and his attack will fizzle.
BioWeapons vs. Computer Viruses
Does the evolution of computer viruses and hacker tools hold any lessons about the future potential for bioterror? The question recently prompted a fascinating discussion among computer security experts. Dan Simon noted an NYTimes op-ed by Henry Kelly …