August 8, 2022

Archives for March 2006

Apples, Oranges, and DRM

Last week reported on its testing of portable music players, which showed that playing DRM (copy-protected) songs drained battery power 25% faster in Windows Media players, and 8% faster on iPods, than playing the same songs using the unprotected MP3 format. As more information came to light, it became clear that they hadn’t done a completely fair apples-to-apples comparison, and the story faded from view.

Critics pointed out that the story compared DRMed files at one level of compression to MP3 files at a different level of compression – the DRMed files were just bigger, so of course they would eat more battery power. It’s a valid criticism, but we shouldn’t let it obscure the real issue, because the battery-life story has something to teach us despite its flaws.

Different file formats offer different tradeoffs between storage space, battery life, and audio quality. And, of course, audio quality is not a single dimension – some dimensions of quality may matter more to you than to me. Your preference in formats may be different from mine. It may even be different from the preference you had last week – maybe you care more about storage space this week, or more about battery life, because you’ll be listening to music more, with fewer opportunities to recharge.

This is where DRM hurts you. In the absence of DRM, you’re free to store and use your music in the format, and the level of compression, that suits your needs best. DRM takes away that option, giving you only one choice, or at most a few choices. That leaves you with a service that doesn’t meet your needs as well as a non-DRM one would.

Grocery stores know the true point of the apples-to-oranges comparison. Apples and oranges are different. Some customers want one and some want the other. So why not offer both?

Nuts and Bolts of Net Discrimination: Encryption

I’ve written several times recently about the technical details of network discrimination, because understanding these details is useful in the network neutrality debate. Today I want to talk about the role of encryption.

Scenarios for network discrimination typically involve an Internet Service Provider (ISP) who looks at users’ traffic and imposes delays or other performance penalties on certain types of traffic. To do this, the ISP must be able to tell the targeted data packets apart from ordinary packets. For example, if the ISP wants to penalize VoIP (Internet telephony) traffic, it must be able to distinguish VoIP packets from ordinary packets.

One way for users to fight back is to encrypt their packets, on the theory that encrypted packets will all look like gibberish to the ISP, so the ISP won’t be able to tell one type of packet from another.

To do this, the user would probably use a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The idea is that whenever the user’s computer wanted to send a packet, it would encrypt that packet and then send the encrypted packet to a “gateway” computer that was outside the ISP’s network. The gateway computer would then decrypt the packet and send it on to its intended destination. Incoming packets would follow the same path in reverse – they would be sent to the gateway, where they would be encrypted and forwarded on to the user’s computer. The ISP would see nothing but a bi-directional stream of packets, all encrypted, flowing between the user’s computer and the gateway.

The most the user can hope for from a VPN is to force the ISP to handle all of the user’s packets in the same way. The ISP can still penalize all of the user’s packets, or it can single out randomly chosen packets for special treatment, but those are the only forms of discrimination available to it. The VPN has some cost – packets must be encrypted, decrypted, and forwarded – but the user might consider it worthwhile if it stops network discrimination.

(In practice, things are a bit more complicated. The ISP might be able to infer which packets are which by observing the size and timing of packets. For example, a sequence of packets, all of a certain size and flowing with metronome-like regularity in both directions, is probably a voice conversation. The user might use countermeasures, such as altering the size and timing of packets, but that can be costly too. To simplify our discussion, let’s pretend that the VPN gives the ISP no way to distinguish packets from each other.)

The VPN user and the ISP are playing an interesting game of chicken. The ISP wants to discriminate against some of the user’s packets, but doesn’t want to inconvenience the user so badly that the user discontinues the service (or demands a much lower price). The user responds by making his packets indistinguishable and daring the ISP to discriminate against all of them. The ISP can back down, by easing off on discrimination in order to keep the user happy – or the ISP can call the user’s bluff and hamper all or most of the user’s traffic.

But the ISP may have a different and more effective strategy. If the ISP wants to hamper a particular application, and there is a way to manipulate the user’s traffic that affects that application much more than it does other applications, then the ISP has a way to punish the targeted application. Recall my previous discussion of how VoIP is especially sensitive to jitter (unpredictable changes in delay), but most other applications can tolerate jitter without much trouble. If the ISP imposes jitter on all of the user’s packets, the result will be a big problem for VoIP apps, but not much impact on other apps.

So it turns out that even using a VPN, and encrypting everything in sight, isn’t necessarily enough to shield a user from network discrimination. Discrimination can work in subtle ways.

Facebook and the Campus Cops

An interesting mini-controversy developed at Princeton last week over the use of the web site by Princeton’s Public Safety officers (i.e., the campus police).

If you’re not familiar with Facebook, you must not be spending much time on a college campus. Facebook is a sort of social networking site for college students, faculty and staff (but mostly students). You can set up a home page with your picture and other information about you. You can make links to your friends’ pages, by mutual consent. You can post photos on your page. You can post comments on your friends’ pages. You can form groups based on some shared interest, and people can join the groups.

The controversy started with a story in the Daily Princetonian revealing that Public Safety had used Facebook in two investigations. In one case, a student’s friend posted a photo of the student that was taken during a party in the student’s room. The photo reportedly showed the student hosting a dorm-room party where alcohol was served, which is a violation of campus rules. In another case, there was a group of students who liked to climb up the sides of buildings on campus. They had set up a building-climbers’ group on Facebook, and Public Safety reportedly used the group to identify the group’s members, so as to have Serious Discussions with them.

Some students reacted with outrage, seeing this as an invasion of privacy and an unfair tactic by Public Safety. I find this reaction really interesting.

Students who stop to think about how Facebook works will realize that it’s not very private. Anybody with a email address can get an account on the Princeton Facebook site and view pages. That’s a large group, including current students, alumni, faculty, and staff. (Public Safety officers are staff members.)

And yet students seem to think of Facebook as somehow private, and they continue to post lots of private information on the site. A few weeks ago, I surfed around the site at random. Within two or three minutes I spotted Student A’s page saying, in a matter of fact way, that Student A had recently slept with Student B. Student B’s page confirmed this event, and described what it was like. Look around on the site and you’ll see many descriptions of private activities, indiscretions, and rule-breaking.

I have to admit that I find this pretty hard to understand. Regular readers of this blog know that I reveal almost nothing about my personal life. If you have read carefully over the last three and a half years, you have learned that I live in the Princeton area, am married, and have at least one child (of unspecified age(s)). Not exactly tabloid material. Some bloggers say more – a lot more – but I am more comfortable this way. Anyway, if I did write about my personal life, I would expect that everybody in the world would find out what I wrote, assuming they cared.

It’s easy to see why Public Safety might be interested in reading Facebook, and why students might want to keep Public Safety away. In the end, Public Safety stated that it would not hunt around randomly on Facebook, but it would continue to use Facebook as a tool in specific investigations. Many people consider this a reasonable compromise. It feels right to me, though I can’t quite articulate why.

Expect this to become an issue on other campuses too.