May 30, 2024

Archives for November 2006

Microsoft to Pay Per-Processor License on Zune

Last week Universal Music Group (UMG), one of the major record companies, announced a deal with Microsoft, under which UMG would receive a royalty for every Zune music player Microsoft sells. (Zune is Microsoft’s new iPod competitor.)

This may be a first. Apple doesn’t pay a per-iPod fee to record companies; instead it pays a royalty for every song it sells at its iTunes Music Store. UM hailed the Zune deal as a breakthrough. Here’s Doug Morris, UMG’s CEO (quoted by Engadget): “We felt that any business that’s built on the bedrock of music we should share in.” The clear subtext is that UMG wanted a fee for the pirated UMG music that would inevitably end up on some Zunes.

There’s less here than meets the eye, I think. Microsoft needed to license UMG music to sell to Zune users. Microsoft could have paid UMG a per-song fee like Apple does. Instead, UMG presumably lowered the per-song fee in exchange for adding a per-Zune fee. Microsoft, in a weak bargaining position, had little choice but to go along. If there’s a precedent here, it’s that new entrants in the music player market may have to accept unwanted terms from record companies.

There’s an interesting echo here from Microsoft’s antitrust history. Once upon a time, Microsoft insisted that PC makers pay it a royalty for every PC they sold, whether or not that PC came with Windows. This was called a per-processor license. PC makers, in a weak bargaining position, went along. Microsoft said this was only fair, claiming that most non-Windows PCs ended up with pirated copies of Windows.

Eventually the government forced Microsoft to abandon this practice, because of its anticompetitive effect on other operating system vendors – users would be less likely to buy alternative operating systems if they were already paying for Windows.

To be sure, the parallel between the UMG and Windows per-processor licenses has its limits. For one thing, UMG doesn’t have nearly the lock on the recorded music market that Microsoft had on the OS market, so anticompetitive tactics are less available to UMG than they were to Microsoft. Also, the UMG license is partial, reducing per-song costs a bit in exchange for a relatively small per-processor royalty, where the Microsoft license was total, eliminating per-copy costs of Windows on covered PCs in exchange for a hefty per-processor royalty. Both factors make the UMG deal less of a market-restrictor than the Windows deals were.

My guess is that the UMG/Zune deal is not the start of a trend but just a concession extracted from one company that needed UMG more than UMG needed it.

Post-Election Review

How did e-voting technologies hold up in Tuesday’s election? It’s too early to tell for sure, but it looks as if there weren’t any major disasters.

We saw the usual list of crashing, misbehaving, and non-functional machines. Some of these are just routine glitches or procedural problems. If somebody forgets to deliver power cords to the polling place, that’s just an isolated mistake. If a machine just won’t turn on in the morning, that’s probably just a maintenance issue.

But other kinds of “glitches” can indicate deeper problems. Experienced engineers know that certain behaviors, especially complex ones that are supposed to be impossible, are clues that something has gone badly wrong in the system’s internals. If the inside of your fridge is at room temperature, you probably have a simple problem. If the liquids in your fridge are boiling, you have an Engineering Issue.

The most alarming error report I saw from Tuesday’s election came from Avi Rubin, a respected computer scientist and e-voting expert who is a precinct worker in Maryland, where they use the Diebold AccuVote-TS, the same machine my colleagues and I recently studied. Here is Avi’s story:

So, while we were watching the last handful of voters cast their ballots … one of the chief judges came up to me and said that there was a “situation”. I was called over where a voter was explaining to one of the judges what had happened, and he repeated his story to me. The voter had made his selections and pressed the “cast ballot” button on the machine. The machine spit out his smartcard, as it is supposed to do, but his summary screen remained, and it did not appear that his vote had been cast. So, he pushed the smartcard back in, and it came out saying that he had already voted. But, he was still in the screen that showed he was in the process of voting. The voter then pressed the “cast ballot” again, and an error message appeared on the screen that said that he needs to call a judge for assistance. The voter was very patient, but was clearly taking this very seriously, as one would expect. After discussing the details about what happened with him very carefully, I believed that there was a glitch with his machine, and that it was in an unexpected state after it spit out the smartcard.

This is supposed to be impossible. Having examined a similar version of Diebold’s software, I know that when the Cast Vote button is pressed, the system is supposed to (1) invalidate the smartcard, then (2) record the vote, then (3) kill the voting screens, then (4) eject the smartcard. This voter saw Steps 1 and 4 happen, but not Step 3. (We don’t know whether Step 2, recording the vote, happened.) At least one voting screen was still there, and that screen was active: something happened when the Cast Vote button on that screen was pressed, but it wasn’t the something that would normally happen.

It’s hard to see how this can happen, absent a subtle, serious bug in this part of Diebold’s software. And by “this part” I mean the part that carries out the four-step procedure that includes recording the vote. Could this bug have affected vote recording for other voters? What other problems could it have caused? We don’t know. We could probably tell, given access to a Maryland voting machine.

Another thing we don’t know is how many times this bug showed up in Maryland on Tuesday. It’s hard to believe that the problem didn’t happen elsewhere too. If it were going to happen only once, what are the odds that that one occurrence would be in a precinct with an evoting-savvy computer scientist blogger election judge? Pretty slim.

Fortunately, Avi was there and was able to recognize the relevance of this particular machine misbehavior. How many other poll workers, not being experts in computer science, saw a similar problem and just shrugged it off as a routine glitch?

Unattended Voting Machines Already Showing Up

I was going about my business this morning when I was surprised to see some unattended electronic voting machines that had already been delivered to a polling place in advance of Tuesday’s election. I wasn’t looking for voting machines in this location, not knowing that it served as a polling place, but the machines were pretty hard to miss. They were Sequoia AVC Advantage machines, the most common model in New Jersey. I don’t know how long they had been sitting unprotected.

Here’s a photo, taken this morning, of me with one of the machines.

Cuyahoga County Possibly Exposed Election System to Computer Virus

The Election Science Institute just released a statement revealing that the memory cards that will be used to store votes on Election Day in Cuyahoga County, Ohio were stuck into ordinary laptop computers in September.

The release points to an online video shot by Cleveland-area filmmaker Jeffrey Kirkby, shows a group of election workers sitting at tables, each with a laptop computer. An official explains that these laptops were gathered from around the office, and some are the personal laptops of election workers. Each worker has a laptop and a stack of memory cards, and is inserting the memory cards one by one into the laptop.

Our e-voting study) showed that the memory cards used in Diebold touchscreen voting systems can carry computer viruses that can infect voting machines and steal votes on the infected machines.

The risk here is that one of the laptops is infected with malicious software that could infect a memory card that will eventually be inserted into a voting machine. Safe procedures call for memory cards to be inserted only into computers that are carefully secured and never connected to the Internet. Using ordinary laptop computers, borrowed from offices and homes, to process memory cards is dangerous.

Voting machine vendors and election officials often argue that rigorous procedures can compensate for the technical weaknesses of voting machines. Some jurisdictions implement such procedures well, but many do not. Talking about procedural controls is easy. Putting them into practice is much harder.