April 28, 2024

Archives for October 2008

Why is printing so hard?

Recently I bought a mildly used laser printer and wanted to set it up on my home network. In a better world, this would be a trivial exercise — just connect the printer to the network and let the computers discover it. In the actual world, it was a forty-five minute project that only a reasonably handy network jockey could have hoped to complete. (If you care about what exactly I had to do, see below.)

John Hartman says, “Printing is the hardest problem in computer science.” It often seems that way. But why?

Plug-and-play printing seems pretty simple, compared to many of the things that computers do routinely without trouble. Granted, it’s not trivial to get the full variety of printers to work with the full variety of computers, but our collective failure to do so is — or should be — surprising.

There must be some lesson here about engineering, or human nature, or something. Lately I’ve gone around asking people why printing is so hard. I’ve gotten some interesting answers, but I don’t think I really understand the issue yet.

What do you think? Why is printing so hard?

[For the record, here’s what I had to do to get our newly acquired HP LaserJet 2200DN printer working on our home network: I plugged the printer in to our network, but the Windows PCs couldn’t auto-discover the printer. I Googled the printer’s user manual, which said the printer had a built-in webserver. But I didn’t know the printer’s IP address, so I had to log in to our router and look at its DHCP tables. Knowing the IP address, I could connect to the printer’s webserver, which had a page telling me what URL to use for IPP printing. (I had to know what IPP was.) After that, I assigned the printer a static IP address, so the IPP URL (containing an IP address) would keep working across reboots. Now that I had a stable IPP URL, I could set up the PCs for printing. Finally, I had to guess which of driver to use on Windows — two drivers were offered, with no advice about which one to use, but only one of the offered drivers supports duplex printing. Total elapsed time: about 45 minutes.]

California Issues Emergency Election Audit Regulations

The Office of the California Secretary of State has issued a set of proposed emergency regulations for post-election manual tallying of paper election records. In this post, my first at FTT, I’ll try to explain and contextualize this development.

Since her election to office, California Secretary of State (CA SoS) Debra Bowen has methodically studied the shortcomings in California’s election equipment. She first initiated a Top-To-Bottom review (TTBR) of California’s voting systems that found them to be of poor technical quality and vulnerable to a myriad of security vulnerabilities, accessibility flaws, reliability issues and inadequate documentation and testing (a number of FTT regulars participated in the TTBR). For this year’s presidential primary in California, Bowen worked to mitigate these problems by decertifying this equipment and then recertifying it subject to a list of about 40 different conditions. One such condition is that the usual 1% manual tally under California law — counties must randomly choose and hand tally ballots cast in 1% of precincts — would be modified to include escalation that would mandate increased tallying for close races (where even small amounts of possible fraud and/or error could make a difference in the outcome of a contest).

Bowen issued these additional requirements (the “PEMT Requirements”) under her authority as CA SoS to regulate election technologies (here are the original PEMT Requirements). Unfortunately, the Registrar in San Diego County sued Bowen arguing that she 1) didn’t have such broad authority and 2) that, even if she did, she could only issue the PEMT Requirements through the California regulatory procedure (specified by the CA Administrative Procedure Act). A state Superior Court found in favor of the CA SoS but a Court of Appeal found that the PEMT Requirements did indeed betray characteristics of regulations and should therefore have gone through the regulatory procedure (for the legal eagles out there, see: County of San Diego v. Debra Bowen (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 501).

By the time the Court of Appeal had made its decision on August 29, there was no time to follow the normal regulatory process, which takes about four months. Instead, the CA SoS had to follow the process for adopting an emergency regulation which applies when a regulation “is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, or general welfare.”

What is so special about these emergency manual tally provisions? First, it represents the increasing relevance and importance of adversarial considerations in the design of an election audit process. As we describe in the NYU Brennan Center / UC Berkeley Samuelson Clinic report on post-election audits (“Post-Election Audits: Restoring Trust In Elections”), fixed-percentage audits of election records are only particularly useful in detecting wide-ranging anomalies in vote counts. Methods that “tune” the amount of records audited depending on the margin in contests on the ballot do a much better job of ensuring that they’ll find evidence of possible error or fraud. Per the emergency PEMT Regulations, any contest with a margin (difference between the winning and losing choice in a contest) of 0.5% or lower is subject to a 10% manual tally, an order of magnitude more scrutiny than the statutory default.

Second, the CA SoS’ emergency PEMT Regulations reflect many best practices from audit theory and research: precincts to audit must be chosen randomly; the precincts to audit are only chosen after the semi-official vote tallies are arrived at; tally activities must be announced publicly and available for public observation; tallies must be conducted under “blind count” rules where the talliers do not know the totals in the precincts they’re tallying; differences between machine and hand counts must be explained or investigated.

The elephant in the room is always Los Angeles County; LA is so amazingly enormous for an election jurisdiction that some things simply aren’t possible. (For example, they frequently pick up ballot materials from precincts in helicopters; that is, traffic in LA is so bad and there are so many polling places (~5,000 or so) that the most reliable form of ballot transmission is via helicopter.) These rules are going to be exceedingly difficult for LA to comply with. I expect they will hire an army of tally managers and talliers to perform their tally and that it will be a race against the clock, counting 24 hours a day, seven days per week, to try and get it all done in the 28-calendar day canvass period.

Counting Electronic Votes in Secret

Things are not looking good for open government when it comes to observing poll workers on Election Night. Our state election laws, written for the old lever machines, now apply to Sequoia electronic voting machines. Andrew Appel and I have been asking a straightforward question: Can ordinary members of the public watch the procedures used by poll workers to count the votes?

I submitted a formal request to the Board of Elections of Mercer County (where Princeton University is located), seeking permission to watch the poll workers when they close the polls (on Sequoia AVC Advantage voting computers) and announce the results. They said no!

The Election Board said this election is “too important” to permit extra people in the polling place.

They even went so far as to suggest that my written application was fraudulent. I applied on behalf of five people: two Princeton University students, two professors, and myself. In an abundance of caution, I requested authorization in the form of “challenger badges” which the Board of Elections can issue at its discretion. By phone, I explained our interest in merely watching the poll workers.

Of course we understand that they might not want extra people getting in the way on Election Night — that’s why we took measures to get special authorization. To ensure that we could be lawfully present, we asked for challenger badges as non-partisan proponents and opponents of two Public Questions on the ballot, as permitted by NJSA 19:7-2. My request was entirely in compliance with state law, as all the prospective challengers are registered to vote in Mercer County.

In spite of this, the Board expressed reluctance, based on the identities of the prospective challengers. In particular, they cited Andrew’s status as an expert on Sequoia voting machines as a “concern,” and provided assurances that Sequoia has fixed all the problems he identified in past elections.

Other counties in New Jersey permit members of the public to watch the poll workers “read” the election results. Combined with Judge Feinberg’s decision to suppress Andrew’s report on the security of the Sequoia machines, Mercer County conveys the unfortunate impression it does not welcome scrutiny of its electronic voting process.

Piracy Statistics and the Importance of Journalistic Skepticism

If you’ve paid attention to copyright debates in recent years, you’ve probably seen advocates for more restrictive copyright laws claim that “counterfeiting and piracy” cost the US economy as much as $250 billion. When pressed, those who make these kinds of claims are inevitably vague about exactly where these figures come from. For example, I contacted Thomas Sydnor, the author of the paper I linked above, and he was able to point me to a 2002 press release from the FBI, which claims that “losses to counterfeiting are estimated at $200-250 billion a year in U.S. business losses.”

There are a couple of things that are notable about this. In the first place, notice that the press release says counterfeiting, which is an entirely different issue from copyright infringement. Passing stronger copyright legislation in order to stop counterfeiting is a non-sequitur.

But the more serious issue is that the FBI can’t actually explain how it arrived at these figures. And indeed, it appears that nobody knows who came up with these figures and how they were computed. Julian Sanchez has done some sleuthing and found that these figures have literally been floating around inside the beltway for decades. Julian contacted the FBI, which wasn’t able to point to any specific source. Further investigation led him to a 1993 Forbes article:

Ars eagerly hunted down that issue and found a short article on counterfeiting, in which the reader is informed that “counterfeit merchandise” is “a $200 billion enterprise worldwide and growing faster than many of the industries it’s preying on.” No further source is given.

Quite possibly, the authors of the article called up an industry group like the IACC and got a ballpark guess. At any rate, there is nothing to indicate that Forbes itself had produced the estimate, Mr. Conyers’ assertion notwithstanding. What is very clear, however, is that even assuming the figure is accurate, it is not an estimate of the cost to the U.S. economy of IP piracy. It’s an estimate of the size of the entire global market in counterfeit goods. Despite the efforts of several witnesses to equate them, it is plainly not on par with the earlier calculation by the ITC that many had also cited.

It’s not surprising that no one is able to cite a credible source because the figure is plainly absurd. For example, the Institute for Policy Innovation, a group that pushes for more restrictive copyright law, has claimed that copyright infringement costs the economy $58.0 billion. As I’ve written before, these estimates vastly overstate losses because IPI used a dubious methodology that double- and triple-counts each lost sale. The actual figure—even accepting some of the dubious assumptions in the IPI estimate, is almost certainly less than $20 billion. But whether it’s $10, $20, or $58 billion, it’s certainly not $250 billion.

There are a couple of important lessons here. One concerns the importance of careful scholarship. Before citing any statistic, you should have a clear understanding of what that figure is measuring, who calculated it, and how. The fact that this figure has gotten repeated so many times inside the beltway suggests that the people using the figure have not been doing their homework. It’s not surprising that lobbyists cite the largest figures they can find, but public servants have a duty to be more skeptical.

The more important lesson is for the journalistic profession. Far too many reporters at reputable media outlets credulously repeat these figures in news stories without paying enough attention to where they come from. If a statistic is provided by a party with a vested interest in the subject of a story—if, say, a content industry group provides a statistic on the costs of piracy—reporters should double-check that figure against more reputable sources. And, sadly, a government agency isn’t always a reliable source. Agencies like the BLS and BEA who are in the business of collecting official statistics are generally reliable. But it’s not safe to assume that other agencies have done their homework. The FBI, for example, has made little effort to correct the record on the $250 billion figure, despite the fact that it is regularly cited as the source of the figure and despite the fact that it has admitted that it can’t explain where the figure comes from.

Julian gives all the gory details on the origins of the $250 billion figure. He also digs into the oft-repeated claim that piracy costs 750,000 jobs, which dates back even further (to 1986) and is no more credible. And he offers some interesting theoretical reasons to think that the costs of copyright infringement are much, much less than $250 billion.

Lessons from the Fall of NebuAd

With three Congressional hearings held within the past four months, U.S. legislators have expressed increased concern about the handling of private online information. As Paul Ohm mentioned yesterday, the recent scrutiny has focused mainly on the ability of ISPs to intercept and analyze the online traffic of its users– in a word, surveillance. One of the goals of surveillance for ISPs is to yield new sources of revenue; so when a Silicon Valley startup called NebuAd approached ISPs last spring with its behavioral advertising technology, many were quick to sign on. But by summer’s end, the company had lost all of its ISP partners, their CEO had resigned, and they announced their intention to pursue “more traditional” advertising channels.

How did this happen and what can we learn from this episode?

The trio of high-profile hearings in Congress brought the issue of ISP surveillence into the public spotlight. Despite no new privacy legislation even being proposed in the area, the firm sentiment among the Committees’ members, particularly Rep. Edward “When did you stop beating the consumer?” Markey (D-MA), was enough to spawn more negative PR than the partner ISPs could handle. The lesson here, as it often times is, is that regulation is not the only way, and rarely even the best way, of dealing with bad actors, especially in highly innovative sectors like Internet technology. Proposed regulation of third-party online advertising by the New York State Assembly last year, for example, would have placed an undue compliance burden on legitimate online businesses while providing few tangible privacy benefits. Proponents of net neutrality legislation may want to heed this episode as a cautionary tale, especially in light of Comcast’s recent shift to more reasonable traffic management techniques.

Behind the scenes, the work of investigative technologists was key in substantiating the extent of consumer harm that, I presume, caught the eye of Congress members and their staffers. A damaging report by technologist Robb Topolski, published a month before the first hearing, exposed much of NebuAd’s most egregious practices such as IP packet forgery. Such technical efforts are critical in unveiling opaque consumer harms that may be difficult for lay users to detect themselves. To return to net neutrality, ISP monitoring projects such as EFF’s Switzerland testing tool and others will be essential in keeping network management practices in check. (Incidentally and perhaps not coincidentally, Topolski was also the first to reveal Comcast’s use of TCP reset packets to kill BitTorrent connections.)

ISPs and other online service providers are pushing for industry self-regulation in behavioral advertising, but it is not at all clear whether self-regulation will be sufficient to protect consumer privacy. Indeed, even the FTC favors self-regulatory principles, but the question of what “opt-in” actually means will determine the extent of consumer protection. Self-regulation seems unlikely in any case to protect consumers from unwittingly “opting-in” to traffic monitoring. ISPs have a monetary incentive to enroll their customers into monitoring and standard tricks will probably get the job done. We all have experience signing fine-print contracts without reading them, clicking blindly through browser-based security warnings, or otherwise sacrificing our privacy for trivial rewards and discounts (or even just a bar of chocolate).

Interestingly enough, a parallel fight is being waged in Europe over the exact same issue but with starkly contrasting results. Although Phorm develops online surveillance technologies for targeted advertising similar to NebuAd’s, a UK regulator recently declared that Phorm’s technologies may be able to be introduced “in a lawful, appropriate and transparent fashion” given “the knowledge and agreement of the customer.” As a result, Phorm has continued its trials of their Internet surveillance technology on British Telecom subscribers.

Why these two storylines have diverged so significantly is not apparent to me. One thought is that Phorm got itself in front of the issue of business legitimacy– whereas U.S. regulators saw NebuAd as a rogue business from the start, Phorm has been an active participant on the IAB’s Behavioural Advertising Task Force to develop industry best practices. Another thought is that the fight over Phorm is far from over since the European Commission is continuing its own investigation under EU laws. I hope readers here, who are more informed than I am about the the regulatory landscape in the EU and UK, can provide additional hypotheses about why Phorm has, thus far, not suffered the same fate as NebuAd.