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No Warrant Necessary to Seize Your Laptop

January 27, 2010 by

The U.S. Customs may search your laptop and copy your hard drive when you cross the border, according to their policy. They may do this even if they have no particularized suspicion of wrongdoing on your part. They claim that the Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless search and seizure does not apply. The Customs justifies this policy on the grounds that “examinations of documents and electronic devices are a crucial tool for detecting information concerning” all sorts of bad things, including terrorism, drug smuggling, contraband, and so on.

Historically the job of Customs was to control the flow of physical goods into the country, and their authority to search you for physical goods is well established. I am certainly not a constitutional lawyer, but to me a Customs exemption from Fourth Amendment restrictions is more clearly justified for physical contraband than for generalized searches of information.

The American Civil Liberties Union is gathering data about how this Customs enforcement policy works in practice, and they request your help. If you’ve had your laptop searched, or if you have altered your own practices to protect your data when crossing the border, staff attorney Catherine Crump would be interested in hearing about it.

Meanwhile, the ACLU has released a stack of documents they got by FOIA request.
The documents are here, and their spreadsheets analyzing the data are here. They would be quite interested to know what F-to-T readers make of these documents.

ACLU Queries for F-to-T readers:
If the answer to any of the questions below is yes, please briefly describe your experience and e-mail your response to laptopsearch at aclu.org. The ACLU promises confidentiality to anyone responding to this request.
(1) When entering or leaving the United States, has a U.S. official ever examined or browsed the contents of your laptop, PDA, cell phone, or other electronic device?

(2) When entering or leaving the United States, has a U.S. official ever detained your laptop, PDA, cell phone, or other electronic device?

(3) In light of the U.S. government’s policy of conducting suspicionless searches of laptops and other electronic devices, have you taken extra steps to safeguard your electronic information when traveling internationally, such as using encryption software or shipping a hard drive ahead to your destination?

(4) Has the U.S. government’s policy of conducting suspicionless searches of laptops and other electronic devices affected the frequency with which you travel internationally or your willingness to travel with information stored on electronic devices?

Filed Under: National Security & Surveillance, Privacy & Security Tagged With: ,

Information Technology Policy in the Obama Administration, One Year In

January 27, 2010 by

[Last year, I wrote an essay for Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, summarizing the technology policy challenges facing the incoming Obama Administration. This week they published my follow-up essay, looking back on the Administration’s first year. Here it is.]

Last year I identified four information technology policy challenges facing the incoming Obama Administration: improving cybersecurity, making government more transparent, bringing the benefits of technology to all, and bridging the culture gap between techies and policymakers. On these issues, the Administration’s first-year record has been mixed. Hopes were high that the most tech-savvy presidential campaign in history would lead to an equally transformational approach to governing, but bold plans were ground down by the friction of Washington.

Cybersecurity : The Administration created a new national cybersecurity coordinator (or “czar”) position but then struggled to fill it. Infighting over the job description — reflecting differences over how to reconcile security with other economic goals — left the czar relatively powerless. Cyberattacks on U.S. interests increased as the Adminstration struggled to get its policy off the ground.

Government transparency: This has been a bright spot. The White House pushed executive branch agencies to publish more data about their operations, and created rules for detailed public reporting of stimulus spending. Progress has been slow — transparency requires not just technology but also cultural changes within government — but the ship of state is moving in the right direction, as the public gets more and better data about government, and finds new ways to use that data to improve public life.

Bringing technology to all: On the goal of universal access to technology, it’s too early to tell. The FCC is developing a national broadband plan, in hopes of bringing high-speed Internet to more Americans, but this has proven to be a long and politically difficult process. Obama’s hand-picked FCC chair, Julius Genachowski, inherited a troubled organization but has done much to stabilize it. The broadband plan will be his greatest challenge, with lobbyists on all sides angling for advantage as our national network expands.

Closing the culture gap: The culture gap between techies and policymakers persists. In economic policy debates, health care and the economic crisis have understandably taken center stage, but there seems to be little room even at the periphery for the innovation agenda that many techies had hoped for. The tech policy discussion seems to be dominated by lawyers and management consultants, as in past Administrations. Too often, policymakers still see techies as irrelevant, and techies still see policymakers as clueless.

In recent days, creative thinking on technology has emerged from an unlikely source: the State Department. On the heels of Google’s surprising decision to back away from the Chinese market, Secretary of State Clinton made a rousing speech declaring Internet freedom and universal access to information as important goals of U.S. foreign policy. This will lead to friction with the Chinese and other authoritarian governments, but our principles are worth defending. The Internet can a powerful force for transparency and democratization, around the world and at home.

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: , , ,

Software in dangerous places

January 26, 2010 by

Software increasingly manages the world around us, in subtle ways that are often hard to see. Software helps fly our airplanes (in some cases, particularly military fighter aircraft, software is the only thing keeping them in the air). Software manages our cars (fuel/air mixture, among other things). Software manages our electrical grid. And, closer to home for me, software runs our voting machines and manages our elections.

Sunday’s NY Times Magazine has an extended piece about faulty radiation delivery for cancer treatment. The article details two particular fault modes: procedural screwups and software bugs.

The procedural screwups (e.g., treating a patient with stomach cancer with a radiation plan intended for somebody else’s breast cancer) are heartbreaking because they’re something that could be completely eliminated through fairly simple mechanisms. How about putting barcodes on patient armbands that are read by the radiation machine? “Oops, you’re patient #103 and this radiation plan is loaded for patent #319.”

The software bugs are another matter entirely. Supposedly, medical device manufacturers, and software correctness people, have all been thoroughly indoctrinated in the history of Therac-25, a radiation machine from the mid-80’s whose poor software engineering (and user interface design) directly led to several deaths. This article seems to indicate that those lessons were never properly absorbed.

What’s perhaps even more disturbing is that nobody seems to have been deeply bothered when the radiation planning software crashed on them! Did it save their work? Maybe you should double check? Ultimately, the radiation machine just does what it’s told, and the software than plans out the precise dosing pattern is responsible for getting it right. Well, if that software is unreliable (which the article clearly indicates), you shouldn’t use it again until it’s fixed!

What I’d like to know more about, and which the article didn’t discuss at all, is what engineering processes, third-party review processes, and certification processes were used. If there’s anything we’ve learned about voting systems, it’s that the federal and state certification processes were not up to the task of identifying security vulnerabilities, and that the vendors had demonstrably never intended their software to resist the sorts of the attacks that you would expect on an election system. Instead, we’re told that we can rely on poll workers following procedures correctly. Which, of course, is exactly what the article indicates is standard practice for these medical devices. We’re relying on the device operators to do the right thing, even when the software is crashing on them, and that’s clearly inappropriate.

Writing “correct” software, and further ensuring that it’s usable, is a daunting problem. In the voting case, we can at least come up with procedures based on auditing paper ballots, or using various cryptographic techniques, that allow us to detect and correct flaws in the software (although getting such procedures adopted is a daunting problem in its own right, but that’s a story for another day). In the aviation case, which I admit to not knowing much about, I do know they put in sanity-checking software, that will detect when the the more detailed algorithms are asking for something insane and will override it. For medical devices like radiation machines, we clearly need a similar combination of mechanisms, both to ensure that operators don’t make avoidable mistakes, and to ensure that the software they’re using is engineered properly.

Filed Under: Uncategorized Tagged With: ,

Cyber Détente Part III: American Procedural Negotiation

January 20, 2010 by

The first post in this series rebutted the purported Russian motive for renewed cybersecurity negotiations and the second advanced more plausible self-interested rationales. This third and final post of the series examines the U.S. negotiating position through both substantive and procedural lenses.

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American interest in a substantive cybersecurity deal appears limited, and the U.S. is rightly skeptical of Russian motives (perhaps for the reasons detailed in the prior two posts). Negotiators have publicly expressed support for institutional cooperation on the closely related issue of cybercrime, but firmly oppose an arms control or cyberterrorism treaty. This tenuous commitment is further implicated by the U.S. delegation’s composition. Representation of the NSA, State, DoD, and DHS suggests only a preliminary willingness to hear the Russians out and minimal consideration of a full-on bilateral negotiation.

While the cybersecurity talks may thus be substantively vacuous, they have great procedural merit when viewed in the context of shifting Russian relations and perceptions of cybersecurity.

The Bush administration’s Russia policy was marked by antagonism; proposed missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine particularly rankled the Kremlin. Upon taking office the Obama administration committed to “press[ing] the reset button” on U.S.-Russia relations by recommitting to cooperation in areas of shared interest.

Cybersecurity talks may best be evaluated as a facet of this systemic “reset.” Earnest discussions – including fruitless ones – may contribute towards a collegial relationship and further other more substantively promising negotiations between the two powers. The cybersecurity topic is particularly well suited for this role in that it brings often less-than-friendly defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies to the same table.

Inside-the-beltway perceptions of cybersecurity have also experienced a sea change. In the early Bush administration cybersecurity problems were predominantly construed as cybercrime problems, and consequently within the purview of law enforcement. For example, one of the first “major actions” advocated by the White House’s 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was, “[e]nhance law enforcement’s capabilities for preventing and prosecuting cyberspace attacks.” But by the Obama administration cybersecurity was perceived as a national security issue; the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review located primary responsibility for cybersecurity in the National Security Council.

This shift suggests additional procedural causes for renewed U.S.-Russia and UN cybersecurity talks. Not only do the discussions reflect the new perception of cybersecurity as a national security issue, but also they nudge other nations towards that view. And directly engaging defense and intelligence agencies accustoms them to viewing cybersecurity as an international issue within their domain.

The U.S. response of simultaneously substantively balking at and procedurally engaging with Russia on cybersecurity appears well-calibrated. Where meager opportunity exists for concluding a meaningful cybersecurity instrument given the Russian motives discussed earlier, the U.S. is nonetheless generating value.

While this favorable outcome is reassuring, it is by no means guaranteed for future cybersecurity talks. There is already a noxious atmosphere of often unwarranted alarmism about cyberwarfare and free-form parallels drawn between cyberattack and weapons of mass destruction. Admix the recurrently prophesied “Digital Pearl Harbor” and it is easy to imagine how an international compact on cybersecurity could look all-too-appealing. This pitfall can only be avoided by training an informed, critical eye on states’ motives to develop the appropriate – if any – cybersecurity negotiating position.

Filed Under: Uncategorized

Cyber Détente Part II: Russian Diplomatic and Strategic Self-Interest

January 15, 2010 by

The first post in this series rebutted the purported Russian motive for negotiations, avoiding a security dilemma. This second post posits two alternative self-interested Russian inducements for rapprochement: legitimizing use of force and strategic advantage.

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An alternative rationale for talks advanced by the Russians is fear of “cyberterror” – not the capacity for offensive cyberwarfare, but its use against civilians. A weapons use treaty of this sort could have value in establishing a norm against civilian cyberattack… but there are already strong international treaties and norms against attacks aimed at civilians. And at any rate the untraceability of most cyberattacks will take the teeth out of any use-banning treaty of this sort.

The U.S. delegation is rightly skeptical of this motive; the Russians may well be raising cyberterror in the interest of legitimating use of conventional force. The Russians have repeatedly likened political dissidence to cyberterror, and a substantive cyberterrorism treaty may be submitted by Russia as license to pursue political vendettas with conventional force. To probe how such a treaty might function, consider first a hypothetical full-blown infrastructure-crippling act of cyberterror where the perpetrator is known – Russia already need not restrain itself in retaliating. On the other hand, consider the inevitable website defacements by Chechen separatists or Georgian sympathizers in the midst of increasing hostilities – acts of cyberterrorism in violation of a treaty will assuredly be added to the list of provocations should Russia elect to engage in armed conflict.

This simple thought experiment reveals the deep faultlines that will emerge in negotiating any cyberterrorism treaty. Where is the boundary between vandalism (and other petty cybercrime) and cyberterror? What if acts are committed, as is often the case, by nationals of a state but not its government? What proof is required to sustain an allegation of cyberterror? Doubtlessly the Russian delegation would advance a broad definition of cyberterror, while the Americans would propose a narrowly circumscribed definition. Even if, improbably, the U.S. and Russia negotiated to a shared definition of cyberterror, I fail to see how it could be articulated in a manner not prone to later manipulation. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, how trivial defacement of a bank’s website might be shoehorned into a narrow definition: “destructive acts targeting critical civilian infrastructure.”

Another compelling motive for the Russians is realist self-interest: the Russians may believe they will gain a strategic advantage with a capacity-limiting cyberwarfare treaty. At first blush this seems an implausible reading – the U.S., with its technologically advanced and integrated armed forces, appears a far richer target for cyberattack than Russia given its reliance on decrepit Soviet equipment. Moreover, anecdotally the U.S. military has proven highly vulnerable: multiple unattributed attacks have penetrated defense-related systems (most prominently in 2007), and late last year the Wall Street Journal reported Iraqi militants trivially intercepted live video from Predator drones. But looking ahead a Russian self-interest motive is more plausible. Russia has made no secret of its attempts to rapidly stand up modern, professional armed forces, and in 2009 alone increased military spending by over 25% (projects include a revamped navy and a satellite positioning system, among many others). To accomplish this end the Russians may rely to a large degree on information technology, and particularly on commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software. Lacking time and finances the Russians may be unable to secure their new military systems against cyberattack. Thus while at present the U.S. is more vulnerable, in future Russia may have greater weaknesses. Locking in a cyberwarfare arms control agreement now, while the U.S. is more likely to sign on, could therefore be in Russia’s long-term strategic self-interest.

The specific offensive capabilities Russia has reportedly sought to ban are strongly corroborative of this self-interest rationale. In prior negotiations the Russian delegation has signaled particular concern of deliberately planted software and hardware that would allow disabling or co-opting military equipment. The U.S. will likely have far greater success in developing assets of this sort given the at times close relationship between intelligence agencies and commercial IT firms (e.g. the NSA warrantless wiretapping scandal) and the prevalence of American IT worldwide in military applications (think Windows). Russia, on the other hand, would likely have to rely on human intelligence to place assets of this sort.

Russia’s renewed interest in bilateral cybersecurity negotiations also belies its purported security dilemma rationale. Russian interest in talks lapsed between 1996 and 2009, suggesting a novel stimulus is at work, not some long-standing fear of a security dilemma. The recent rise of alleged “cyberterror” and attempts to modernize Russian armed forces – especially in the wake of the 2008 South Ossetia War with Georgia – far better correlate with Russia’s eagerness to come to the table.

To put a point on these two posts, I submit legitimization of use of force and strategic self-interest are far more plausible Russian motives for cybersecurity negotiations than the purported rationale of avoiding a security dilemma and consequent arms race or destabilization. In the following post I will explore the U.S. delegation’s position and argue the American response to Russia’s proposals is well-calibrated.

Filed Under: Uncategorized