October 2, 2022

 A Multi-pronged Strategy for Securing Internet Routing

By Henry Birge-Lee, Nick Feamster, Mihir Kshirsagar, Prateek Mittal, Jennifer Rexford

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is conducting an inquiry into how it can help protect against security vulnerabilities in the internet routing infrastructure. A number of large communication companies have weighed in on the approach the FCC should take. 

CITP’s Tech Policy Clinic convened a group of experts in information security, networking, and internet policy to submit an initial comment offering a public interest perspective to the FCC. This post summarizes our recommendations on why the government should take a multi-pronged strategy to promote security that involves incentives and mandates. Reply comments from the public are due May 11.

The core challenge in securing the internet routing infrastructure is that the original design of the network did not prioritize security against adversarial attacks. Instead, the original design focused on how to route traffic through decentralized networks with the goal of delivering information packets efficiently, while not dropping traffic. 

At the heart of this routing system is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which allows independently-administered networks (Autonomous Systems or ASes) to announce reachability to IP address blocks (called prefixes) to neighboring networks. But BGP has no built-in mechanism to distinguish legitimate routes from bogus routes. Bogus routing information can redirect internet traffic to a strategic adversary, who can launch a variety of attacks, or the bogus routing can lead to accidental outages or performance issues. Network operators and researchers have been actively developing measures to counteract this problem.

At a high level, the current suite of BGP security measures depend on building systems to validate routes. But for these technologies to work, most participants have to adopt them or the security improvements will not be realized. In other words, it has many of the hallmarks of a “chicken and egg” situation. As a result, there is no silver bullet to address routing security.

Instead, we argue, the government needs a cross-layer strategy that embraces pushing different elements of the infrastructure to adopt security measures that protect legitimate traffic flows using a carrot-and-stick approach. Our comment identifies specific actions Internet Service Providers, Content Delivery Networks and Cloud Providers, Internet Exchange Points, Certificate Authorities, Equipment Manufacturers, and DNS Providers should take to improve security. We also recommend that the government funds and supports academic research centers that collect real-time data from a variety of sources that measure traffic and how it is routed across the internet.  

We anticipate several hurdles to our recommended cross-layer approach: 

First, to mandate the cross-layer security measures, the FCC has to have regulatory authority over the relevant players. And, to the extent a participant does not fall under the FCC’s authority, the FCC should develop a whole-of-government approach to secure the routing infrastructure.

Second, large portions of the internet routing infrastructure lie outside the jurisdiction of the United States. As such, there are international coordination issues that the FCC will have to navigate to achieve the security properties needed. That said, if there is a sufficient critical mass of providers who participate in the security measures, that could create a tipping point for a larger global adoption.

Third, the package of incentives and mandates that the FCC develops has to account for the risk that there will be recalcitrant small and medium sized firms who might undermine the comprehensive approach that is necessary to truly secure the infrastructure.

Fourth, while it is important to develop authenticated routes for traffic to counteract adversaries, there is an under-appreciated risk from a flipped threat model – the risk that an adversary takes control of an authenticated node and uses that privileged position to disrupt routing. There are no easy fixes to this threat – but an awareness of this risk can allow for developing systems to detect such actions, especially in international contexts.  

Attackers exploit fundamental flaw in the web’s security to steal $2 million in cryptocurrency

By Henry Birge-Lee, Liang Wang, Grace Cimaszewski, Jennifer Rexford and Prateek Mittal

On Thursday, Feb. 3, 2022, attackers stole approximately $2 million worth of cryptocurrency from users of the Korean crypto exchange KLAYswap. This theft, which was detailed in a Korean-language blog post by the security firm S2W, exploited systemic vulnerabilities in the Internet’s routing ecosystem and in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), leaving the Internet’s most sensitive financial, medical and other websites vulnerable to attack.

Remarkably, years earlier, researchers at Princeton University predicted such attacks in the wild and successfully developed initial countermeasures against it, which we will describe here. But unless these flaws are addressed holistically, a vast number of applications can be compromised by the exact same type of attack.

Unlike many attacks that are caused by zero-day vulnerabilities (which are often patched rapidly) or a blatant disregard for security precautions, the KLAYswap attack was not related to any software or security configuration used by KLAYswap. Rather, it was a well-crafted example of a cross-layer attack exploiting weaknesses across the routing system, public key infrastructure, and web development practices. We’ll discuss defenses more in a subsequent blog post, but protecting against this attack demands security improvements across all layers of the web ecosystem.

The vulnerabilities exploited in this attack have not been mitigated. They are just as viable today as they were when this attack was launched. That is because the hack exploited structural vulnerabilities in the trust the PKI places in the Internet’s routing infrastructure


The February 3 attack happened precisely at 1:04:18 a.m. GMT (10:04 a.m. Korean Time), when KLAYswap was compromised using a fundamental vulnerability in the trust placed in various layers of the web’s architecture. 

KLAYswap is an online cryptocurrency exchange that offers users a web interface for trading cryptocurrency. As part of their platform, KLAYswap relied on a javascript library written by Korean tech company Kakao Corp. When users were on the cryptocurrency exchange, their browsers would load Kakao’s javascript library directly from Kakao’s servers at the following URL (see diagram):


It was actually this URL that was the attacker’s target, not any of the resources operated by KLAYswap itself. Attackers exploited a technique known as a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack to launch this attack. A BGP hijack happens when a malicious network essentially lies to neighboring networks about what Internet addresses (or IP addresses) it can reach. If the neighboring networks believe this lie, they will route the victim’s traffic to the malicious network for delivery instead of the networks connecting to the legitimate owner of those IP addresses, allowing it to be hijacked. 

Specifically, the domain name in the URL above: developers.kakao.com resolves to two IP addresses: and Packets going to these IP addresses are supposed to be routed to Kakao. During the attack, the adversary’s malicious network announced two IP prefixes (i.e., blocks of IP addresses that are used when routing traffic) that caused traffic to these addresses to be routed to the adversary

When KLAYswap customers requested kakao.min.js from the adversary, the adversary served them a malicious javascript file that caused users’ cryptocurrency transactions to transfer funds to the adversary instead of the intended destination. After running the attack for several hours, the adversary withdrew its route and cashed out by converting its coins to untraceable currencies. By the time the dust settled, the adversary had stolen approximately $2 million worth of various currencies from users of KLAYswap and walked away with approximately $1 million dollars worth of various cryptocurrencies. (Some losses were due to fees and exchange rates associated with exfiltrating the currencies from the KLAYswap ecosystem.) 

But what about cryptography?

The second and most dangerous element of the attack was its neutralization of the Internet’s encryption defenses. While there is a moderate level of complexity associated with BGP hijacks, they do happen relatively often (some of the most egregious examples involve China Telecom routing about 15 percent of Internet traffic through its network for 18 minutes and Pakistan Telecom accidently taking down Youtube in a botched attempt at local censorship). 

What is unprecedented in this attack (to our knowledge) is the complete bypassing of the cryptographic protections offered by the TLS protocol. TLS is the workhorse of encryption of the World Wide Web and is part of the reason the web is trusted with more and more secure applications like financial services and medical systems. Among other security properties, TLS is designed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of user data. TLS allows a web service and a client (like a user of KLAYswap) to securely exchange data even over a potentially untrusted network (like the adversary’s network in the event of this attack) and also ensure (in theory) they are talking to the legitimate endpoint. 

Yet, ironically, KLAYswap and Kakao were properly using TLS, and it was not a vulnerability in the TLS protocol that was exploited during the attack. Instead, the attack exploited the false trust that TLS places in the routing infrastructure. TLS relies on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to confirm the identity of the web servers. The PKI is tasked with distributing digitally signed certificates that verify the server’s identity (in this case the domain name like developers.kakao.com) and the server’s cryptographic key. If a server presents a valid certificate, even if there is another network in the middle, a client can encrypt data that only the real server can read.

Using its BGP hijack, the adversary first targeted the PKI and launched a man-in-the-middle attack on the certificate distribution process.  Only after it had acquired a valid digital certificate for the target domain did it aim its attack towards real users by serving its malicious javascript file over an encrypted connection.

Certificate Authorities (or CAs, the entities that sign digital certificates in the PKI) have a similar identity problem to the one in TLS connections. CAs are approached by customers with requests to sign certificates. The CA needs to make sure the customer requesting a certificate actually controls the associated domain name. To verify identity (and thus bootstrap trust for the entire TLS ecosystem), CAs perform domain control validation requiring users to prove control of the domain listed in their certificate requests. Since the server might be getting a TLS certificate for the first time, domain control validation is often performed over no-security-attached HTTP. 

But now we are back to square one: the adversary simply needs to perform a BGP hijack to attract the domain control validation traffic from the CA, pretend to be the victim website, and serve the content the CA requested. After receiving a signed certificate for the victim’s domain, the adversary can serve real users over the supposedly “secure” TLS connection. This is indeed what happened in the KLAYswap attack and makes the attack particularly scary for other secure applications across the Internet. The attackers hijacked developers.kakao.com, approached the certificate authority ZeroSSL, requested a certificate for developers.kakao.com, and served this certificate to KLAYswap users that were downloading the javascript library over presumably “secure” TLS.

While Princeton researchers anticipated this attack and effectively deployed the first countermeasures against it, fully securing the web from it is still an ongoing effort.

Ever since our live demo of this type of attack at HotPETS’17 and our USENIX Security ‘18 paper “Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with BGP” that developed a taxonomy of BGP attacks on the PKI, we have actively been working on developing defenses against it. The defense that has had the biggest impact (that our group developed in our 2018 USENIX Security paper) is known as multiple vantage point domain control verification. 

In multiple vantage point verification, a CA performs domain control validation from many vantage points spread throughout the Internet instead of a single vantage point that can easily be affected by a BGP attack. As we measured in our 2021 USENIX Security paper, this is effective because many BGP attacks are localized to only a part of the Internet, so it becomes significantly less likely that an adversary will hijack all of a CAs diverse vantage points (compared to traditional domain control validation). We have worked with Let’s Encrypt, the world’s largest web PKI CA, to fully deploy multiple vantage point validation, and every certificate they sign is validated using this technology (over a billion since the deployment in Feb 2020). Cloudflare also has developed a deployment as well, which is available for other interested CAs.

But multiple vantage point validation at just a single CA is still not enough. The Internet is only as strong as its weakest link. Currently, Let’s Encrypt is the only certificate authority using multiple vantage point validation and an adversary can, for many domains, pick which CA to use in an attack. To prevent this, we advocate for universal adoption through the CA/Browser Forum (the governing body for CAs). 

Additionally, some BGP attacks can still fool all of a CA’s vantage points. To reduce the impact of BGP attacks, we need security improvements in the routing infrastructure as well. In the short term, deployed routing technologies like the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) could significantly limit the spread of BGP attacks and make them much less likely to be successful. Today only about 35 percent of the global routing table is covered by RPKI, but this is rapidly growing as more networks adopt this new technology. In the long run, we need a much more secure underlying routing layer for the Internet. Examples of this are BGPsec, where routers cryptographically sign and verify BGP update messages (although current router hardware cannot perform the cryptographic operations quickly enough) and clean-slate initiatives like SCION that change the format of IP packets to offer significantly more secure packet forwarding and routing decisions.

Overall, seeing an adversary execute this attack in the real world puts immense importance on securing the PKI from routing attacks. Moving forward with RPKI and multiple vantage point domain validation is a must if we want to continue trusting the web with secure applications. In the meantime, thousands of secure applications that trust TLS to protect against network attacks are vulnerable the same way KLAYswap was.

(Mis)conceptions About the Impact of Surveillance

Does surveillance impact behavior? Or is its effect, if real, only temporary or trivial? Government surveillance is back in the news thanks to the so-called “Nunes memo”, making this is a perfect time to examine new research on the impact of surveillance. This includes my own recent work, as my doctoral research at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford  examined “chilling effects” online, that is, how online surveillance, and other regulatory activities, may impact, chill, or deter people’s activities online.

Though the controversy surrounding the Nunes memo critiquing FBI surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is primarily political, it takes place against the backdrop of the wider debate about Congressional reauthorization of FISA’s Section 702, which allows the U.S. Government to intercept and collect emails, phone records, and other communications of foreigners residing abroad, without a warrant. On that count, civil society groups have expressed concerns about the impact of government surveillance like that available under FISA, including “chilling effects” on rights and freedoms. Indeed, civil liberties and rights activists have long argued, and surveillance experts like David Lyon long explained, that surveillance and similar threats can have these corrosive impacts.

Yet, skepticism about such claims is common and persistent. As Kaminski and Witov recently noted, many “evince skepticism over the effects of surveillance” with deep disagreements over the “effects of surveillance” on “intellectual queries” and “development”.  But why?  The answer is complicated but likely lies in the present (thin) state of research on these issues, but also common conceptions, and misconceptions, about surveillance and impact on people and broader society.

Skepticism and assumptions about impact
Skepticism about surveillance impacts like chilling effects is, as noted, persistent with commentators like Stanford Law’s Michael Sklansky insisting there is “little empirical support” for chilling effects associated with surveillance or Leslie Kendrick, of UVA Law, labeling the evidence supporting such claims “flimsy” and calling for more systematic research on point. Part of the problem is precisely this: the impact of surveillance—both mass and targeted forms—is difficult to document, measure, and explore, especially chilling effects or self-censorship. This is because demonstrating self-censorship or chill requires showing a counterfactual state of affairs: that a person would have said something or done something but for some surveillance threat or awareness.

But another challenge, just as important to address, concerns common assumptions and perceptions as to what surveillance impact or chilling effects might look like. Here, both members of the general public as well as experts, judges, and lawyers often assume or expect surveillance to have obvious, apparent, and pervasive impact on our most fundamental democratic rights and freedoms—like clear suppression of political speech or the right to peaceful assembly.

A great example of this assumption, leading to skepticism about whether surveillance may promote self-censorship or have broader societal chilling effects—is here expressed by University of Chicago Law’s Eric Posner. Posner, a leading legal scholar who also incorporates empirical methods in his work, conveys his skepticism about the “threat” posed by National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance in a New York Times “Room for Debate”  discussion, writing:

This brings me to another valuable point you made, which is that when people believe that the government exercises surveillance, they become reluctant to exercise democratic freedoms. This is a textbook objection to surveillance, I agree, but it also is another objection that I would place under “theoretical” rather than real.  Is there any evidence that over the 12 years, during the flowering of the so-called surveillance state, Americans have become less politically active? More worried about government suppression of dissent? Less willing to listen to opposing voices? All the evidence points in the opposite direction… It is hard to think of another period so full of robust political debate since the late 1960s—another era of government surveillance.

For Posner, the mere existence of “robust” political debate and activities in society is compelling evidence against claims about surveillance chill.

Similarly, Sklansky argues not only that there is “little empirical support” for the claim that surveillance would “chill independent thought, robust debate, personal growth, and intimate friendship”— what he terms “the stultification thesis”—but like Posner, he finds persuasive evidence against the claim “all around us”. He cites, for example, the widespread “sharing of personal information” online (which presumably would not happen if surveillance was having a dampening effect); how employer monitoring has not deterred employee emailing nor freedom of information laws deterred “intra-governmental communications”; and how young people, the “digital natives” that have grown up with the internet, social media, and surveillance, are far from stultified and conforming but arguably even more personally expressive and experimental than previous generations.  In light of all that, Sklansky dismisses surveillance chill as simply not “worth worrying about”.

I sometimes call this the “Orwell effect”—the common assumption, likely thanks to the immense impact Orwell’s classic novel 1984 has had on popular culture, that surveillance will have dystopian societal impact, with widespread suppression of personal sharing, expression, and political dissent. When Posner and Sklansky (and others that share these common expectations) do not see these more obvious and far reaching impacts, they then discount more subtle and less apparent impacts and effects that may, over the long term, be just as concerning for democratic rights and freedoms. Of course, theorists and scholars like Daniel Solove have long interrogated and critiqued Orwell’s impact on our understanding of privacy and Sklansky is himself wary of Orwell’s influence, so it is no surprise his work also shapes common beliefs and conceptions about the impact of surveillance.  That influence is compounded by the earlier noted lack of systematic empirical research providing more grounded insights and understanding.

This is not only an academic issue. Government surveillance powers and practices are often justified with reference to other national security concerns and threats like terrorism, as this House brief on the FISA re-authorization illustrates. If concerns about chilling effects associated with surveillance and other negative impacts are minimized or discounted based on misconceptions or thin empirical grounding, then challenging surveillance powers and their expansion is much more difficult, with real concrete implications for rights and freedoms.

So, the challenge for documenting, exploring, and understanding the impact of surveillance is really two-fold. The first is one of research methodology and design: designing research to document the impact of surveillance, and a second concerns common assumptions and perceptions as to what surveillance chilling effects might look like—with even experts like Posner or Sklansky assuming widespread speech suppression and conformity due to surveillance.

New research, new insights
Today, new systematic empirical research on the impact of surveillance is being done, with several recent studies having documented surveillance chilling effects in different contexts, including recent studies by  Stoycheff [1], Marthews and Tucker [2], as well as my own recent research.  This includes an empirical legal study[3] on how the Snowden revelations about NSA surveillance impacted Wikipedia use—which received extensive media coverage in the U.S. and internationally— and a more recent study[4], which I wrote about recently in Slate, that examined among other things how state and corporate surveillance impact or “chill” certain people or groups differently. A lot of this new work was not possible in previous times, as it is based on new forms of data being made available to researchers and insights gleaned from analyzing public leaks and disclosures concerning surveillance like the Snowden revelations.

The story these and other new studies tell when it comes to the impact of surveillance is more complicated and subtle, suggesting the common assumptions of Posner and Sklansky are actually misconceptions. Though more subtle, these impacts are no less concerning and corrosive to democratic rights and freedoms, a point consistent with the work of surveillance studies theorists like David Lyon[5] and warnings from researchers at places like the Citizen Lab[6], Berkman Klein Center[7], and here at the CITP[8].  In subsequent posts, I will discuss these studies more fully, to paint a broader picture of surveillance effects today and, in light of increasingly sophisticated targeting and emerging automation technologies, tomorrow. Stay tuned.

* Jonathon Penney is a Research Affiliate of Princeton’s CITP, a Research Fellow at the Citizen Lab, located at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs, and teaches law as an Assistant Professor at Dalhousie University. He is also a research collaborator with Civil Servant at the MIT Media Lab. Find him on twitter at @jon_penney

[1] Stoycheff, E. (2016). Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. doi: 10.1177/1077699016630255

[2] Marthews, A., & Tucker, C. (2014). Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior. MIT Sloane Working Paper No. 14380.

[3] Penney, J. (2016). Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use. Berkeley Tech. L.J., 31, 117-182.

[4] Penney, J. (2017). Internet surveillance, regulation, and chilling effects online: A comparative case study. Internet Policy Review, forthcoming

[5] See for example: Lyon, D. (2015). Surveillance After Snowden. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press; Lyon, D. (2006). Theorizing surveillance: The panopticon and beyond. Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing; Lyon, D. (2003). Surveillance After September 11. Cambridge, MA: Polity. See also Marx, G.T., (2002). What’s New About the ‘New Surveillance’? Classifying for Change and Continuity. Surveillance & Society, 1(1), pp. 9-29;  Graham, S. & D. Wood. (2003). Digitising Surveillance: Categorisation, Space, Inequality, Critical Social Policy, 23(2): 227-248.

[6] See for example, recent works: Parsons, C., Israel, T., Deibert, R., Gill, L., and Robinson, B. (2018). Citizen Lab and CIPPIC Release Analysis of the Communications Security Establishment Act. Citizen Lab Research Brief No. 104, January 2018; Parsons, C. (2015). Beyond Privacy: Articulating the Broader Harms of Pervasive Mass Surveillance. Media and Communication, 3(3), 1-11; Deibert, R. (2015). The Geopolitics of Cyberspace After Snowden. Current History, (114) 768 (2015): 9-15; Deibert, R. (2013) Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart).  See also

[7] See for example, recent work on the Surveillance Project, Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University.

[8] See for example, recent work: Su, J., Shukla, A., Goel, S., Narayanan, A., De-anonymizing Web Browsing Data with Social Networks. World Wide Web Conference 2017; Zeide, E. (2017). The Structural Consequences of Big Data-Driven Education. Big Data. June 2017, 5(2): 164-172, https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2016.0061;MacKinnon, R. (2012) Consent of the networked: The worldwide struggle for Internet freedomNew YorkBasic Books.; Narayanan, A. & Shmatikov, V. (2009). See also multiple previous Freedom to Tinker posts discussing research/issues point.


How Will Consumers Use Faster Internet Speeds?

This week saw an exciting announcement about the experimental deployment of DOCSIS 3.1 in limited markets in the United States, including Philadelphia, Atlanta, and parts of northern California, which will bring gigabit-per-second Internet speeds to many homes over the existing cable infrastructure. The potential for gigabit speeds over the existing cable networks bring hope that more consumers will ultimately enjoy much higher-speed Internet connectivity both in the United States and elsewhere.

This development is also a pointed response to the not-so-implicit pressure from the Federal Communications Commission to deploy higher-speed Internet connectivity, which includes other developments such as the redefinition of broadband to a downstream throughput rate of 25 megabits per second, up from a previous (and somewhat laughable) definition of 4 Mbps; many commissioners have also stated their intentions to raise the threshold for the definition of a broadband network to a downstream throughput of 100 Mbps, as a further indication that ISPs will see increasing pressure for higher speed links to home networks. Yet, the National Cable and Telecommunications Association has also claimed in an FCC filing that such speeds are far more than a “typical” broadband user would require.

These developments and posturing beg the question: How will consumers change their behavior in response to faster downstream throughput from their Internet service providers? 

Ph.D. student Sarthak Grover, postdoc Roya Ensafi, and I set out to study this question with a cohort of about 6,000 Comcast subscribers in Salt Lake City, Utah, from October through December 2014. The study involved what is called a randomized controlled trial, an experimental method commonly used in scientific experiments where a group of users is randomly divided into a control group (whose user experience no change in conditions) and a treatment group (whose users are subject to a change in conditions).  Assuming the cohort is large enough and represents a cross-section of the demographic of interest, and that the users for the treatment group are selected at random, it is possible to observe differences between the two groups’ outcomes and conclude how the treatment affects the outcome.

In the case of this specific study, the control group consisted of about 5,000 Comcast subscribers who were paying for (and receiving) 105 Mbps downstream throughput; the treatment group, on the other hand, comprised about 1,500 Comcast subscribers who were paying for 105 Mbps but at the beginning of the study period were silently upgraded to 250 Mbps. In other words, users in the treatment group were receiving faster Internet service but was unaware of the faster downstream throughput of their connections. We explored how this treatment affected user behavior and made a few surprising discoveries:

“Moderate” users tend to adjust their behavior more than the “heavy” users. We expected that subscribers who downloaded the most data in the 250 Mbps service tier would be the ones causing the largest difference in mean demand between the two groups of users (previous studies have observed this phenomenon, and we do observe this behavior for the most aggressive users). To our surprise, however, the median subscribers in the two groups exhibited much more significant differences in traffic demand, particularly at peak times.  Notably, the 40% of subscribers with lowest peak demands more than double their daily peak traffic demand in response to service-tier upgrades (i.e., in the treatment group).

With the exception of the most aggressive peak-time subscribers, the subscribers who are below the 40th percentile in terms of peak demands increase their peak demand more than users who initially had higher peak demands.

This result suggests a surprising trend: it’s not the aggressive data hogs who account for most of the increased use in response to faster speeds, but rather the “typical” Internet user, who tends to use the Internet more as a result of the faster speeds. Our dataset does not contain application information, so it is difficult to say what, exactly is responsible for the higher data usage of the median user. Yet, the result uncovers an oft-forgotten phenomena of faster links: even existing applications that do not need to “max out” the link capacity (e.g., Web browsing, and even most video streaming) can benefit from a higher capacity link, simply because they will see better performance overall (e.g., faster load times and more resilience to packet loss, particularly when multiple parallel connections are in use). It might just be that the typical user is using the Internet more with the faster connection simply because the experience is better, not because they’re interested in filling the link to capacity (at least not yet!).

Users may use faster speeds for shorter periods of time, not always during “prime time”. There has been much ado about prime-time video streaming usage, and we most certainly see those effects in our data. To our surprise, the average usage per subscriber during prime-time hours was roughly the same between the treatment and control groups, yet outside of prime time, the difference in usage was much more pronounced between the two groups, with average usage per subscriber in the treatment group exhibiting 25% more usage than that in the control group for non-prime-time weekday hours.  We also observe that the peak-to-mean ratios for usage in the treatment group are significantly higher than they are in the control group, indicating that users with faster speeds may periodically (and for short times) take advantage of the significantly higher speeds, even though they are not sustaining a high rate that exhausts the higher capacity.

These results are interesting for last-mile Internet service providers because they suggest that the speeds at the edge may not currently be the limiting factor for user traffic demand. Specifically, the changes in peak traffic outside of prime-time hours also suggest that even the (relatively) lower-speed connections (e.g., 105 Mbps) may be sufficient to satisfy the demands of users during prime-time hours. Of course, the constraints on prime-time demand (much of which is largely streaming) likely result from other factors, including both available content and perhaps the well-known phenomena of congestion in the middle of the network, rather than in the last mile. All of this points to the increasing importance of resolving the performance issues that we see as a result of interconnection. In the best case, faster Internet service moves the bottleneck from the last mile to elsewhere in the network (e.g., interconnection points, long-haul transit links); but, in reality, it seems that the bottlenecks are already there, and we should focus on mitigating those points of congestion.

Further reading and study. You’ll be able to read more about our study in the following paper: A Case Study of Traffic Demand Response to Broadband Service-Plan Upgrades. S. Grover, R. Ensafi, N. Feamster. Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM). Heraklion, Crete, Greece. March 2016. (We will post an update when the final paper is published in early 2016.) There is plenty of room for follow-up work, of course; notably, the data we had access to did not have information about application usage, and only reflected byte-level usage at fifteen-minute intervals. Future studies could (and should) continue to study the effects of higher-speed links by exploring how the usage of specific applications (e.g., streaming video, file sharing, Web browsing) changes in response to higher downstream throughput.

Where is Internet Congestion Occurring?

In my post last week, I explained how Netflix traffic was experiencing congestion along end-to-end paths to broadband Internet subscribers, and how the resulting congestion was slowing down traffic to many Internet destinations. Although Netflix and Comcast ultimately mitigated this particular congestion episode by connecting directly to one another in a contractual arrangement known as paid peering, several mysteries about the congestion in this episode and other congestion episodes that persist. In the congestion episodes between Netflix and Comcast in 2014, perhaps the biggest question concerns where the congestion was actually taking place. There are several theories about where congestion was occurring; one or more of them are likely the case. I’ll dissect these cases in a bit more detail, and then talk more generally about some of the difficulties with locating congestion in today’s Internet, and why there’s still work for us to do to shed more light on these mysteries.
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