December 5, 2024

Open-source Governance in Bitcoin

Josh Kroll, Ian Davey, and I have a new paper, The Economics of Bitcoin Mining, or Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries, from the Workshop on Economics of Information Security. Our paper looks at the dynamics of Bitcoin, how resilient it would be in the face of attacks, and how Bitcoin is governed. Today I […]

HTC Willfully Violates the GPL in T-Mobile's New G2 Android Phone

[UPDATE (Oct 14, 2010): HTC has released the source code. Evidently 90-120 days was not in fact necessary, given that they managed to do it 7 days after the phone’s official release. It is possible that the considerable pressure from the media, modders, kernel copyright holders, and other kernel hackers contributed to the apparently accelerated release.]

[UPDATE (Nov 10, 2010): The phone has been permanently rooted.]

Last week, the hottest new Android-based phone arrived on the doorstep of thousands of expectant T-Mobile customers. What didn’t arrive with the G2 was the source code that runs the heart of the device — a customized Linux kernel. Android has been hailed as an open platform in the midst of other highly locked-down systems, but as it makes its way out of the Google source repository and into devices this vision has repeatedly hit speedbumps. Last year, I blogged about one such issue, and to their credit Google sorted out a solution. This has ultimately been to everyone’s benefit, because the modified versions of the OS have routinely enabled software applications that the stock versions haven’t supported (not to mention improved reliability and speed).

When the G2 arrived, modders were eager to get to work. First, they had to overcome one of the common hurdles to getting anything installed — the “jailbreak”. Although the core operating system is open source, phone manufacturers and carriers have placed artificial restrictions on the ability to modify the basic system files. The motivations for doing so are mixed, but the effect is that hackers have to “jailbreak” or “root” the phone — essentially obtain super-user permissions. In 2009, the Copyright Office explicitly permitted such efforts when they are done for the purpose of enabling third-party programs to run on a phone.

G2 owners were excited when it appeared that an existing rooting technique worked on the G2, but were dismayed when their efforts were reversed every time the phone rebooted. T-Mobile passed the buck to HTC, the phone manufacturer:

The HTC software implementation on the G2 stores some components in read-only memory as a security measure to prevent key operating system software from becoming corrupted and rendering the device inoperable. There is a small subset of highly technical users who may want to modify and re-engineer their devices at the code level, known as “rooting,” but a side effect of HTC’s security measure is that these modifications are temporary and cannot be saved to permanent memory. As a result the original code is restored.

As it turned out, the internal memory chip included an option to make certain portions of memory read-only, which had the effect of silently discarding all changes upon reboot. However, it appears that this can be changed by sending the right series of commands to the chip. This effectively moved the rooting efforts into the complex domain of hardware hacking, with modders trying to figure out how to send these commands. Doing so involves writing some very challenging code that interacts with the open-source Linux kernel. The hackers haven’t yet succeeded (although they still could), largely because they are working in the dark. The relevant details about how the Linux kernel has been modified by HTC have not been disclosed. Reportedly, the company is replying to email queries with the following:

Thank you for contacting HTC Technical Assistance Center. HTC will typically publish on developer.htc.com the Kernel open source code for recently released devices as soon as possible. HTC will normally publish this within 90 to 120 days. This time frame is within the requirements of the open source community.

Perhaps HTC (and T-Mobile, distributor of the phone) should review the actual contents of the GNU Public License (v2), which stipulate the legal requirements for modifying and redistributing Linux. They state that you may only distribute derivative code if you “[a]ccompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code.” Notably, there is no mention of a “grace period” or the like.

The importance of redistributing source code in a timely fashion goes beyond enabling phone rooting. It is the foundation of the “copyleft” regime of software licensing that has led to the flourishing of the open source software ecosystem. If every useful modification required waiting 90 to 120 days to be built upon, it would have taken eons to get to where we are today. It’s one thing for a company to choose to pursue the closed-source model and to start from scratch, but it’s another thing for it to profit from the goodwill of the open source community while imposing arbitrary and illegal restrictions on the code.

Tinkering with Disclosed Source Voting Systems

As Ed pointed out in October, Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. (“Sequoia”) announced then that it intended to publish the source code of their voting system software, called “Frontier”, currently under development. (Also see EKR‘s post: “Contrarianism on Sequoia’s Disclosed Source Voting System”.)

Yesterday, Sequoia made good on this promise and you can now pull the source code they’ve made available from their Subversion repository here:
http://sequoiadev.svn.beanstalkapp.com/projects/

Sequoia refers to this move in it’s release as “the first public disclosure of source code from a voting systems manufacturer”. Carefully parsed, that’s probably correct: there have been unintentional disclosures of source code (e.g., Diebold in 2003) and I know of two other voting industry companies that have disclosed source code (VoteHere, now out of business, and Everyone Counts), but these were either not “voting systems manufacturers” or the disclosures were not available publicly. Of course, almost all of the research systems (like VoteBox and Helios) have been truly open source. Groups like OSDV and OVC have released or will soon release voting system source code under open source licenses.

I wrote a paper ages ago (2006) on the use of open and disclosed source code for voting systems and I’m surprised at how well that analysis and set of recommendations has held up (the original paper is here, an updated version is in pages 11–41 of my PhD thesis).

The purpose of my post here is to highlight one point of that paper in a bit of detail: disclosed source software licenses need to have a few specific features to be useful to potential voting system evaluators. I’ll start by describing three examples of disclosed source software licenses and then talk about what I’d like to see, as a tinkerer, in these agreements.

Sequoia Announces Voting System with Published Code

Sequoia Voting Systems, one of the major e-voting companies, announced Tuesday that it will publish all of the source code for its forthcoming Frontier product. This is great news–an important step toward the kind of transparency that is necessary to make today’s voting systems trustworthy.

To be clear, this will not be a fully open source system, because it won’t give users the right to modify and redistribute the software. But it will be open in a very important sense, because everyone will be free to inspect, analyze, and discuss the code.

Significantly, the promise to publish code covers all of the systems involved in running the election and reporting results, “including precinct and central count digital optical scan tabulators, a robust election management and ballot preparation system, and tally, tabulation, and reporting applications”. I’m sure the research community will be eager to study this code.

The trend toward publishing election system source code has been building over the last few years. Security experts have long argued that public scrutiny tends to increase security, and is one of the best ways to justify public trust in a system. Independent studies of major voting vendors’ source code have found code quality to be disappointing at best, and vendors’ all-out resistance to any disclosure has eroded confidence further. Add to this an increasing number of independent open-source voting systems, and secret voting technologies start to look less and less viable, as the public starts insisting that longstanding principles of election transparency be extended to election technology. In short, the time had come for this step.

Still, Sequoia deserves a lot of credit for being the first major vendor to open its technology. How long until the other major vendors follow suit?