October 2, 2022

New Study Analyzing Political Advertising on Facebook, Google, and TikTok

By Orestis Papakyriakopoulos, Christelle Tessono, Arvind Narayanan, Mihir Kshirsagar

With the 2022 midterm elections in the United States fast approaching, political campaigns are poised to spend heavily to influence prospective voters through digital advertising. Online platforms such as Facebook, Google, and TikTok will play an important role in distributing that content. But our new study – How Algorithms Shape the Distribution of Political Advertising: Case Studies of Facebook, Google, and TikTok — that will appear in the Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Society conference in August, shows that the platforms’ tools for voluntary disclosures about political ads do not provide the necessary transparency the public needs. More details can also be found on our website: campaigndisclosures.princeton.edu.

Our paper conducts the first large-scale analysis of public data from the 2020 presidential election cycle to critically evaluate how online platforms affect the distribution of political advertisements. We analyzed a dataset containing over 800,000 ads about the 2020 U.S. presidential election that ran in the 2 months prior to the election, which we obtained from the ad libraries of Facebook and Google that were created by the companies to offer more transparency about political ads. We also collected and analyzed 2.5 million TikTok videos from the same time period. These ad libraries were created by the platforms in an attempt to stave off potential regulation such as the Honest Ads Act, which sought to impose greater transparency requirements for platforms carrying political ads. But our study shows that these ad libraries fall woefully short of their own objectives to be more transparent about who pays for the ads and who sees the ads, as well the objectives of bringing greater transparency about the role of online platforms in shaping the distribution of political advertising. 

We developed a three-part evaluative framework to assess the platform disclosures: 

1. Do the disclosures meet the platforms’ self-described objective of making political advertisers accountable?

2. How do the platforms’ disclosures compare against what the law requires for radio and television broadcasters?

3. Do the platforms disclose all that they know about the ad targeting criteria, the audience for the ads, and how their algorithms distribute or moderate content?

Our analysis shows that the ad libraries do not meet any of the objectives. First, the ad libraries only have partial disclosures of audience characteristics and targeting parameters of placed political ads. But these disclosures do not allow us to understand how political advertisers reached prospective voters. For example, we compared ads in the ad libraries that were shown to different audiences with dummy ads that we created on the platforms (Figure 1). In many cases, we measured a significant difference between the calculated cost-per-impression between the two types of ads, which we could not explain with the available data.

  • Figure 1. We plot the generated cost per impression of ads in the ad-libraries that were (1) targeted to all genders & ages on Google, (2) to Females, between 25-34 on YouTube, (3) were seen by all genders & ages in the US on Facebook, and (4) only by females of all ages located in California on Facebook.  For Facebook, lower & upper bounds are provided for the impressions. For Google, lower & upper bounds are provided for cost & impressions, given the extensive “bucketing” of the parameters performed by the ad libraries when reporting them, which are denoted in the figures with boxes. Points represent the median value of the boxes. We compare the generated cost-per impression of ads with the cost-per impression of a set of dummy ads we placed on the platforms with the exact same targeting parameters & audience characteristics. Black lines represent the upper and lower boundaries of an ad’s cost-per-impression as we extracted them from the dummy ads. We label an ad placement as “plausible targeting”, when the ad cost-per-impression overlaps with the one we calculated, denoting that we can assume that the ad library provides all relevant targeting parameters/audience characteristics about an ad.  Similarly, an placement labeled as `”unexplainable targeting’”  represents an ad whose cost-per-impression is outside the upper and lower reach values that we calculated, meaning that potentially platforms do not disclose full information about the distribution of the ad.

Second, broadcasters are required to offer advertising space at the same price to political advertisers as they do to commercial advertisers. But we find that the platforms charged campaigns different prices for distributing ads. For example, on average, the Trump campaign on Facebook paid more per impression (~18 impressions/dollar) compared to the Biden campaign (~27 impressions/dollar). On Google, the Biden campaign paid more per impression compared to the Trump campaign. Unfortunately, while we attempted to control for factors that might account for different prices for different audiences, the data does not allow us to probe the precise reason for the differential pricing. 

Third, the platforms do not disclose the detailed information about the audience characteristics that they make available to advertisers. They also do not explain how the algorithms distribute or moderate the ads. For example, we see that campaigns placed ads on Facebook that were not ostensibly targeted by age, but the ad was not distributed uniformly.  We also find that platforms applied their ad moderation policies inconsistently, with some instances of moderated ads being removed and some others not, and without any explanation for the decision to remove an ad. (Figure 2) 

  • Figure 2. Comparison of different instances of moderated ads across platforms. The light blue bars show how many instances of a single ad were moderated, and maroon bars show how many instances of the same ad were not. Results suggests an inconsistent moderation of content across platforms, with some instances of the same ad being removed and some others not.

Finally, we observed new forms of political advertising that are not captured in the ad libraries. Specifically, campaigns appear to have used influencers to promote their messages without adequate disclosure. For example, on TikTok, we document how political influencers, who were often linked with PACs, generated billions of impressions from their political content. This new type of campaigning still remains unregulated and little is known about the practices and relations between influencers and political campaigns.  

In short, the online platform self-regulatory disclosures are inadequate and we need more comprehensive disclosures from platforms to understand their role in the political process. Our key recommendations include:

– Requiring that each political entity registered with the FEC use a single, universal identifier for campaign spending across platforms to allow the public to track their activity.

– Developing a cross-platform data repository, hosted and maintained by a government or independent entity, that collects political ads, their targeting criteria, and the audience characteristics that received them. 

– Requiring platforms to disclose information that will allow the public to understand how the algorithms distribute content and how platforms price the distribution of political ads. 

– Developing a comprehensive definition of political advertising that includes influencers and other forms of paid promotional activity.

Holding Purveyors of “Dark Patterns” for Online Travel Bookings Accountable

Last week, my former colleagues at the New York Attorney General’s Office (NYAG), scored a $2.6 million settlement with Fareportal – a large online travel agency that used deceptive practices, known as “dark patterns,” to manipulate consumers to book online travel.

The investigation exposes how Fareportal, which operates under several brands, including CheapOair and OneTravel — used a series of deceptive design tricks to pressure consumers to buy tickets for flights, hotels, and other travel purchases. In this post, I share the details of the investigation’s findings and use them to highlight why we need further regulatory intervention to prevent similar conduct from becoming entrenched in other online services.

The NYAG investigation picks up on the work of researchers at Princeton’s CITP that exposed the widespread use of dark patterns on shopping websites. Using the framework we developed in a subsequent paper for defining dark patterns, the investigation reveals how the travel agency weaponized common cognitive biases to take advantage of consumers. The company was charged under the Attorney General’s broad authority to prohibit deceptive acts and practices. In addition to paying $2.6 million, the New York City-based company agreed to reform its practices.

Specifically, the investigation documents how Fareportal exploited the scarcity bias by displaying, next to the top two flight search results, a false and misleading message about the number of tickets left for those flights at the advertised price. It manipulated consumers through adding 1 to the number of tickets the consumer had searched for to show that there were only X+1 tickets left at that price. So, if you searched for one round trip ticket from Philadelphia to Chicago, the site would say “Only 2 tickets left” at that price, while a consumer searching for two such tickets would see a message stating “Only 3 tickets left” at the advertised price. 

In 2019, Fareportal added a design feature that exploited the bandwagon effect by displaying how many other people were looking at the same deal. The site used a computer-generated random number between 28 and 45 to show the number of other people “looking” at the flight. It paired this with a false countdown timer that displayed an arbitrary number that was unrelated to the availability of tickets. 

Similarly, Fareportal exported its misleading tactics to the making of hotel bookings on its mobile apps. The apps misrepresented the percentage of rooms shown that were “reserved” by using a computer-generated number keyed to when the customer was trying to book a room. So, for example, if the check-in date was 16-30 days away, the message would indicate that between 41-70% of the hotel rooms were booked, but if it was less than 7 days away, it showed that 81-99% of the rooms were reserved. But, of course, those percentages were pure fiction. The apps used a similar tactic for displaying the number of people “viewing” hotels in the area. This time, they generated the number based on the nightly rate for the fifth hotel returned in the search by using the difference between the numerical value of the dollar figure and the numerical value of the cents figure. (If the rate was $255.63, consumers were told 192 people were viewing the hotel listings in the area.)

Fareportal used these false scarcity indicators across its websites and mobile platforms for pitching products such as travel protection and seat upgrades, through inaccurately representing how many other consumers that had purchased the product in question. 

In addition, the NYAG charged Fareportal with using a pressure tactic of making consumers accept or decline purchase a travel protection policy to “protect the cost of [their] trip” before completing a purchase. This practice is described in the academic literature as a covert pattern that uses “confirmshaming” and “forced action” to influence choices. 

Finally, the NYAG took issue with how Fareportal manipulated price comparisons to suggest it was offering tickets at a discounted price, when in fact, most of the advertised tickets were never offered for sale at the higher comparison price. The NYAG rejected Fareportal’s attempt to use a small pop-up to cure the false impression conveyed by the visual slash-through image that conveyed the discount. Similarly, the NYAG called out how Fareportal hid its service fees by disguising them as being part of the “Base Price” of the ticket rather than the separate line item for “Taxes and Fees.” These tactics are described in the academic literature as using “misdirection” and “information hiding” to influence consumers. 

The findings from this investigation illustrate why dark patterns are not simply aggressive marketing practices, as some commentators contend, but require regulatory intervention. Specifically, such shady practices are difficult for consumers to spot and to avoid, and, as we argued, risk becoming entrenched across different travel sites who have the incentive to adopt similar practices. As a result, Fareportal, unfortunately, will not be the first or the last online service to deploy such tactics. But this creates an opportunity for researchers, consumer advocates, and design whistleblowers to step forward and spotlight such practices to protect consumers and help create a more trustworthy internet.    

Can Facebook really make ads unblockable?

[This is a joint post with Grant Storey, a Princeton undergraduate who is working with me on a tool to help users understand Facebook’s targeted advertising.]

Facebook announced two days ago that it would make its ads indistinguishable from regular posts, and hence impossible to block. But within hours, the developers of Adblock Plus released an update which enabled the tool to continue blocking Facebook ads. The ball is now back in Facebook’s court. So far, all it’s done is issue a rather petulant statement. The burning question is this: can Facebook really make ads indistinguishable from content? Who ultimately has the upper hand in the ad blocking wars?

There are two reasons — one technical, one legal — why we don’t think Facebook will succeed in making its ads unblockable, if a user really wants to block them.

The technical reason is that the web is an open platform. When you visit facebook.com, Facebook’s server sends your browser the page content along with instructions on how to render them on the screen, but it is entirely up to your browser to follow those instructions. The browser ultimately acts on behalf of the user, and gives you — through extensions — an extraordinary degree of control over its behavior, and in particular, over what gets displayed on the screen. This is what enables the ecosystem of ad-blocking and tracker-blocking extensions to exist, along with extensions for customizing web pages in various other interesting ways.

Indeed, the change that Adblock Plus made in order to block the new, supposedly unblockable ads is just a single line in the tool’s default blocklist:

facebook.com##div[id^="substream_"] div[id^="hyperfeed_story_id_"][data-xt]

What’s happening here is that Facebook’s HTML code for ads has slight differences from the code for regular posts, so that Facebook can keep things straight for its own internal purposes. But because of the open nature of the web, Facebook is forced to expose these differences to the browser and to extensions such as Adblock Plus. The line of code above allows Adblock Plus to distinguish the two categories by exploiting those differences.

Facebook engineers could try harder to obfuscate the differences. For example, they could use non-human-readable element IDs to make it harder to figure out what’s going on, or even randomize the IDs on every page load. We’re surprised they’re not already doing this, given the grandiose announcement of the company’s intent to bypass ad blockers. But there’s a limit to what Facebook can do. Ultimately, Facebook’s human users have to be able to tell ads apart, because failure to clearly distinguish ads from regular posts would run headlong into the Federal Trade Commission’s rules against misleading advertising — rules that the commission enforces vigorously. [1, 2] And that’s the second reason why we think Facebook is barking up the wrong tree.

Facebook does allow human users to easily recognize ads: currently, ads say “Sponsored” and have a drop-down with various ad-related functions, including a link to the Ad Preferences page. And that means someone could create an ad-blocking tool that looks at exactly the information that a human user would look at. Such a tool would be mostly immune to Facebook’s attempts to make the HTML code of ads and non-ads indistinguishable. Again, the open nature of the web means that blocking tools will always have the ability to scan posts for text suggestive of ads, links to Ad Preferences pages, and other markers.

But don’t take our word for it: take our code for it instead. We’ve created a prototype tool that detects Facebook ads without relying on hidden HTML code to distinguish them. [Update: the source code is here.] The extension examines each post in the user’s news feed and marks those with the “Sponsored” link as ads. This is a simple proof of concept, but the detection method could easily be made much more robust without incurring a performance penalty. Since our tool is for demonstration purposes, it doesn’t block ads but instead marks them as shown in the image below.  

All of this must be utterly obvious to the smart engineers at Facebook, so the whole “unblockable ads” PR push seems likely to be a big bluff. But why? One possibility is that it’s part of a plan to make ad blockers look like the bad guys. Hand in hand, the company seems to be making a good-faith effort to make ads more relevant and give users more control over them. Facebook also points out, correctly, that its ads don’t contain active code and aren’t delivered from third-party servers, and therefore aren’t as susceptible to malware.

Facebook does deserve kudos for trying to clean up and improve the ad experience. If there is any hope for a peaceful resolution to the ad blocking wars, it is that ads won’t be so annoying as to push people to install ad blockers, and will be actually useful at least some of the time. If anyone can pull this off, it is Facebook, with the depth of data it has about its users. But is Facebook’s move too little, too late? On most of the rest of the web, ads continue to be creepy malware-ridden performance hogs, which means people will continue to install ad blockers, and as long as it is technically feasible for ad blockers to block Facebook ads, they’re going to continue to do so. Let’s hope there’s a way out of this spiral.

[1] Obligatory disclaimer: we’re not lawyers.

[2] Facebook claims that Adblock Plus’s updates “don’t just block ads but also posts from friends and Pages”. What they’re most likely referring to that Adblock Plus blocks ads that are triggered by one of your friends Liking the advertiser’s page. But these are still ads: somebody paid for them to appear in your feed. Facebook is trying to blur the distinction in its press statement, but it can’t do that in its user interface, because that is exactly what the FTC prohibits.

Is Tesla Motors a Hidden Warrior for Consumer Digital Privacy?

Amid the privacy intrusions of modern digital life, few are as ubiquitous and alarming as those perpetrated by marketers. The economics of the entire industry are built on tools that exist in shadowy corners of the Internet and lurk about while we engage with information, products and even friends online, harvesting our data everywhere our mobile phones and browsers dare to go.

This digital marketing model, developed three decades ago and premised on the idea that it’s OK for third parties to gather our private data and use it in whatever way suits them, will grow into a $77 billion industry in the U.S. this year, up from $57 billion in 2014, according to Forrester Research.

Storm clouds are developing around the industry, however, and there are new questions being raised about the long-term viability of surreptitious data-gathering as a sustainable business model. Two factors are typically cited: Regulators in Europe have begun, and those in the U.S. are poised to begin, reining in the most intrusive of these marketing practices; and the growth of the mobile Internet, and the related reliance on apps rather than browsers for 85% of our mobile online activity, have made it more difficult to gather user data.

Then there is Tesla Motors and its advertising-averse marketing model, which does not use third-party data to raise awareness and interest in its brand, drive desire for its products or spur action by its customers. Instead, the electric carmaker relies on cultural branding, a concept popularized recently by Douglas Holt, formerly of the Harvard Business School, to do much of the marketing heavy lift that brought it to the top of the electric vehicle market. And while Tesla is not the only brand engaging digital crowd culture and shunning third-party data-gathering, its success is causing the most consternation within the ranks of intrusion marketers.

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Android WebView security and the mobile advertising marketplace

Freedom to Tinker readers are probably aware of the current controversy over Google’s handling of ongoing security vulnerabilities in its Android WebView component. What sounds at first like a routine security problem turns out to have some deep challenges.  Let’s start by filling in some background and build up to the big problem they’re not talking about: Android advertising.
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