March 26, 2017

Mitigating the Increasing Risks of an Insecure Internet of Things

The emergence and proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices on industrial, enterprise, and home networks brings with it unprecedented risk. The potential magnitude of this risk was made concrete in October 2016, when insecure Internet-connected cameras launched a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Dyn, a provider of DNS service for many large online service providers (e.g., Twitter, Reddit). Although this incident caused large-scale disruption, it is noteworthy that the attack involved only a few hundred thousand endpoints and a traffic rate of about 1.2 terabits per second. With predictions of upwards of a billion IoT devices within the next five to ten years, the risk of similar, yet much larger attacks, is imminent.

The Growing Risks of Insecure IoT Devices

One of the biggest contributors to the risk of future attack is the fact that many IoT devices have long-standing, widely known software vulnerabilities that make them vulnerable to exploit and control by remote attackers. Worse yet, the vendors of these IoT devices often have provenance in the hardware industry, but they may lack expertise or resources in software development and systems security. As a result, IoT device manufacturers may ship devices that are extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to secure. The large number of insecure IoT devices connected to the Internet poses unprecedented risks to consumer privacy, as well as threats to the underlying physical infrastructure and the global Internet at large:

  • Data privacy risks. Internet-connected devices increasingly collect data about the physical world, including information about the functioning of infrastructure such as the power grid and transportation systems, as well as personal or private data on individual consumers. At present, many IoT devices either do not encrypt their communications or use a form of encrypted transport that is vulnerable to attack. Many of these devices also store the data they collect in cloud-hosted services, which may be the target of data breaches or other attack.
  • Risks to availability of critical infrastructure and the Internet at large. As the Mirai botnet attack of October 2016 demonstrated, Internet services often share underlying dependencies on the underlying infrastructure: crippling many websites offline did not require direct attacks on these services, but rather a targeted attack on the underlying infrastructure on which many of these services depend (i.e., the Domain Name System). More broadly, one might expect future attacks that target not just the Internet infrastructure but also physical infrastructure that is increasingly Internet- connected (e.g., power and water systems). The dependencies that are inherent in the current Internet architecture create immediate threats to resilience.

    The large magnitude and broad scope of these risks implore us to seek solutions that will improve infrastructure resilience in the face of Internet-connected devices that are extremely difficult to secure. A central question in this problem area concerns the responsibility that each stakeholder in this ecosystem should bear, and the respective roles of technology and regulation (whether via industry self-regulation or otherwise) in securing both the Internet and associated physical infrastructure against these increased risks.

Risk Mitigation and Management

One possible lever for either government or self-regulation is the IoT device manufacturers. One possibility, for example, might be a device certification program for manufacturers that could attest to adherence to best common practice for device and software security. A well-known (and oft-used) analogy is the UL certification process for electrical devices and appliances.

Despite its conceptual appeal, however, a certification approach poses several practical challenges. One challenge is outlining and prescribing best common practices in the first place, particularly due to the rate at which technology (and attacks) progress. Any specific set of prescriptions runs the risk of falling out of date as technology advances; similarly, certification can readily devolve into a checklist of attributes that vendors satisfy, without necessarily adhering to the process by which these devices are secured over time. As daunting as challenges of specifying a certification program may seem, enforcing adherence to a certification program may prove even more challenging. Specifically, consumers may not appreciate the value of certification, particularly if meeting the requirements of certification increases the cost of a device. This concern may be particularly acute for consumer IoT, where consumers may not bear the direct costs of connecting insecure devices to their home networks.

The consumer is another stakeholder who could be incentivized to improve the security of the devices that they connect to their networks (in addition to more effectively securing the networks to which they connect these devices). As the entity who purchases and ultimately connects IoT devices to the network, the consumer appears well-situated to ensure the security of the IoT devices on their respective networks. Unfortunately, the picture is a bit more nuanced. First, consumers typically lack either the aptitude or interest (or both!) to secure either their own networks or the devices that they connect to them. Home broadband Internet access users have generally proved to be poor at applying software updates in a timely fashion, for example, and have been equally delinquent in securing their home networks. Even skilled network administrators regularly face network misconfigurations, attacks, and data breaches. Second, in many cases, users may lack the incentives to ensure that their devices are secure. In the case of the Mirai botnet, for example, consumers did not directly face the brunt of the attack; rather, the ultimate victims of the attack were DNS service providers and, indirectly, online service providers such as Twitter. To the first order, consumers suffered little direct consequence as a result of insecure devices on their networks.

Consumers’ misaligned incentives suggest several possible courses of action. One approach might involve placing some responsibility or liability on consumers for the devices that they connect to the network, in the same way that a citizen might be fined for other transgressions that have externalities (e.g., fines for noise or environmental pollution). Alternatively, Internet service providers (or another entity) might offer users a credit for purchasing and connecting only devices that it pass certification; another variation of this approach might require users to purchase ”Internet insurance” from their Internet service providers that could help offset the cost of future attacks. Consumers might receive credits or lower premiums based on the risk associated with their behavior (i.e., their software update practices, results from security audits of devices that they connect to the network).

A third stakeholder to consider is the Internet service provider (ISP), who provides Internet connectivity to the consumer. The ISP has considerable incentives to ensure that the devices that its customer connects to the network are secure: insecure devices increase the presence of attack traffic and may ultimately degrade Internet service or performance for the rest of the ISPs’ customers. From a technical perspective, the ISP is also in a uniquely effective position to detect and squelch attack traffic coming from IoT devices. Yet, relying on the ISP alone to protect the network against insecure IoT devices is fraught with non-technical complications. Specifically, while the ISP could technically defend against an attack by disconnecting or firewalling consumer devices that are launching attacks, such an approach will certainly result in increased complaints and technical support calls from customers, who connect devices to the network and simply expect them to work. Second, many of the technical capabilities that an ISP might have at its disposal (e.g., the ability to identify attack traffic coming from a specific device) introduce serious privacy concerns. For example, being able to alert a customer to (say) a compromised baby monitor requires the ISP to know (and document) that a consumer has such a device in the first place.

Ultimately, managing the increased risks associated with insecure IoT devices may require action from all three stakeholders. Some of the salient questions will concern how the risks can be best balanced against the higher operational costs that will be associated with improving security, as well as who will ultimately bear these responsibilities and costs.

Improving Infrastructure Resilience

In addition to improving defenses against the insecure devices themselves, it is also critical to determine how to better build resilience into the underlying Internet infrastructure to cope with these attacks. If one views the occasional IoT-based attack inevitable to some degree, one major concern is ensuring that the Internet Infrastructure (and the associated cyberphysical infrastructure) remains both secure and available in the face of attack. In the case of the Mirai attack on Dyn, for example, the severity of the attack was exacerbated by the fact that many online services depended on the infrastructure that was attacked. Computer scientists and Internet engineers should be thinking about technologies that can both potentially decouple these underlying dependencies and ensure that the infrastructure itself remains secure even in the event that regulatory or legal levers fail to prevent every attack. One possibility that we are exploring, for example, is the role that an automated home network firewall could play in (1) help- ing users keep better inventory of connected IoT devices; (2) providing users both visibility into and control over the traffic flows that these devices send.

Summary

Improving the resilience of the Internet and cyberphysical infrastructure in the face of insecure IoT devices will require a combination of technical and regulatory mechanisms. Engineers and regulators will need to work together to improve security and privacy of the Internet of Things. Engineers must continue to advance the state of the art in technologies ranging from lightweight encryption to statistical network anomaly detection to help reduce risk; similarly, engineers must design the network to improve resilience in the face of the increased risk of attack. On the other hand, realizing these advances in deployment will require the appropriate alignment of incentives, so that the parties that introduce risks are more aligned with those who bear the costs of the resulting attacks.

Regulation and Anti-Regulation

[Hi, Freedom to Tinker readers. I’m back at Princeton, having completed my tour of duty as Deputy U.S. CTO, so I can resume writing here. I’ll start with some posts on specific topics, like the one below. As time goes on, I’ll have a lot more to say about what I learned.  –Ed Felten]

Politicians often talk about regulation as hindering business and economic development. Witness President Trump’s executive order  that tries to reduce the number of Federal regulations. Sometimes regulation inhibits innovation and limits freedom of action. But often regulation acts to open up new opportunities.

A good example is the FAA’s “Part 107” rule that was announced last summer. This rule established requirements for commercial flights of drones up to 55 pounds. For the first time, commercial flights became possible without requiring special permission from the FAA, as long as certain restrictions were followed: fly below 400 feet; avoid airports and other special facilities; don’t fly at night; don’t fly over people; and maintain visual line of sight to the drone.

Because flying aircraft in the national airspace is forbidden by default, for obvious safety reasons, regulation that permits flight, within limits, has the effect of expanding rather than reducing what companies and individuals can do. Part 107 made more types of drone flights legal.  This has already been an important enabler of beneficial innovation and use of drones.

But the FAA’s work is not done. The agency had been planning a series of follow-on rules designed to relax the boundaries of Part 107, to allow flight over people, beyond visual line of sight, and so on, as it became clear how to do so safely.  

Will the new executive order make this more difficult?  It’s hard to tell, because many aspects of the order are unclear or await further clarification from the Office of Management and Budget.  But a policy that creates new barriers to the FAA responsibly loosening the restrictions on drone flights will not increase freedom and will not benefit the American people.

I hope the interpretation and implementation of the new executive order accounts for the full range of regulatory actions.  A policy that starts out assuming that regulation limits action too much, and thereby inhibits innovation and economic growth, may or may not be correct. But a policy that tries to prevent all action by regulatory agencies cannot be the right approach for the American people, especially if the goal is to reduce the burden imposed by regulation.

 

Engineering around social media border searches

The latest news is that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is considering a requirement, while passing through a border checkpoint, to inspect a prospective visitor’s “online presence”. That means immigration officials would require users to divulge their passwords to Facebook and other such services, which the agent might then inspect, right there, at the border crossing. This raises a variety of concerns, from its chilling impact on freedom of speech to its being an unreasonable search or seizure, nevermind whether an airport border agent has the necessary training to make such judgments, much less the time to do it while hundreds of people are waiting in line to get through.

Rather than conduct a serious legal analysis, however, I want to talk about technical countermeasures. What might Facebook or other such services do to help defend their users as they pass a border crossing?

Fake accounts. It’s certainly feasible today to create multiple accounts for yourself, giving up the password to a fake account rather than your real account. Most users would find this unnecessarily cumbersome, and the last thing Facebook or anybody else wants is to have a bunch of fake accounts running around. It’s already a concern when somebody tries to borrow a real person’s identity to create a fake account and “friend” their actual friends.

Duress passwords. Years ago, my home alarm system had the option to have two separate PINs. One of them would disable the alarm as normal. The other would sound a silent alarm, summoning the police immediately while making it seem like I disabled the alarm. Let’s say Facebook supported something similar. You enter the duress password, then Facebook locks out your account or switches to your fake account, as above.

Temporary lockouts. If you know you’re about to go through a border crossing, you could give a duress password, as above, or you could arrange an account lockout in advance. You might, for example, designate ten trusted friends, where any five must declare that the lockout is over. Absent those declarations, your account would remain locked, and there would be no means for you to be coerced into giving access to your own account.

Temporary sanitization. Absent any action from Facebook, the best advice today for somebody about to go through a border crossing is to sanitize their account before going through. That means attempting to second-guess what border agents are looking for and delete it in advance. Facebook might assist this by providing search features to allow users to temporarily drop friends, temporarily delete comments or posts with keywords in them, etc. As with the temporary lockouts, temporary sanitization would need to have a restoration process that could be delegated to trusted friends. Once you give the all-clear, everything comes back again.

User defense in bulk. Every time a user, going through a border crossing, exercises a duress password, that’s an unambiguous signal to Facebook. Even absent such signals, Facebook would observe highly unusual login behavior coming from those specific browsers and IP addresses. Facebook could simply deny access to its services from government IP address blocks. While it’s entirely possible for the government to circumvent this, whether using Tor or whatever else, there’s no reason that Facebook needs to be complicit in the process.

So is there a reasonable alternative?

While it’s technically feasible for the government to require that Facebook give it full “backdoor” access to each and every account so it can render threat judgments in advance, this would constitute the most unreasonable search and seizure in the history of that phrase. Furthermore, if and when it became common knowledge that such unreasonable seizures were commonplace, that would be the end of the company. Facebook users have an expectation of privacy and will switch to other services if Facebook cannot protect them.

Wouldn’t it be nice if there was some less invasive way to support the government’s desire for “extreme vetting”? Can we protect ordinary users’ privacy while still enabling the government to intercept people who intend harm to our country? We certainly must assume that an actual bona fide terrorist is going to have no trouble creating a completely clean online persona to use while crossing a border. They can invent wholesome friends with healthy children sharing silly videos of cute kittens. While we don’t know too much about our existing vetting strategies to distinguish tourists from terrorists, we have to assume that the process involves the accumulation of signals and human intelligence, and other painstaking efforts by professional investigators to protect our country from harm. It’s entirely possible that they’re already doing a good job.